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PART VII.

## FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

## AFFAIRS OF ARABIA.

28

April to June 1906.



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## ERRATUM.

Page 1, No. 2, line 2. For "24th instant" read "24th ultimo."

## CONFIDENTIAL.

## Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Arabia.

## PART VII.

[11238] No. 1.

Sir N. O'Connor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 201.)

Sir,

Constantinople, March 27, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 100 of the 12th instant, transmitting, for my observations, copies of correspondence from the India Office and the Admiralty in regard to the advisability of establishing tide-gauges at Koweit and Bahrein.

In my opinion, there would not appear to be any reason why, with the consent of Sheikh Mubarak, a gauge should not be erected at Koweit. Even if the facts are misrepresented to Constantinople, as is almost certain to be the case, I do not think that any official representation would be made to His Majesty's Embassy on the subject.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

[10543] No. 2.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 2, 1906.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 24th instant, regarding the proposed visit of the Wahabi Amir to the Pirate Coast.

I am to inform you that Sir E. Grey concurs in the terms of the warning which the Government of India propose to instruct Major Cox to address to the Trucial Chiefs on this subject.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) E. GORST.

[11423] No. 3.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 3.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 23rd March, relative to affairs in the Aden hinterland.

India Office, April 2, 1906.

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Inclosure in No. 3.

*Mr. Morley to Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

AFFAIRS in the Aden hinterland.

Your telegram of the 17th ultimo.

Jacob's action as regards Rubeaten is approved by His Majesty's Government.

*India Office, March 23, 1906.*

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No. 4.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 4.)*

Sir,

*India Office, April 3, 1906.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 15th February, inclosing a copy of Sir N. O'Connor's despatch No. 57 of the 6th February on the subject of the proposed provision of a steam launch for the use of the Political Agent at Koweit, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to inclose a copy of telegrams which have passed between this Office and the Government of India on the subject.

Should the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs concur in the proposal, I am to suggest that the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury should be moved to sanction the necessary disbursement from Imperial revenues of a moiety of the cost (which is estimated at 50,000 rupees), viz., 1,666l. 13s. 4d.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 4.

*Mr. Morley to Government of India, February 20, 1906.*

[See Section I of February 23.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 4.

*Government of India to Mr. Morley.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*March 14, 1906.*

YOUR telegram dated the 20th February regarding Koweit. We propose that launch, to be built at Government Dockyard, Bombay, cost about 50,000 rupees, to be shared equally by Indian and Imperial Exchequers, should be provided for Political Agent at Koweit.

[12151]

No. 5.

*Sir N. O'Connor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 9.)*

(No. 221.)

Sir,

*Constantinople, April 3, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the Military Attaché to this Embassy, reporting on the troops serving in the military operations in the Yemen prior to July 1905, estimating the numbers of the Turkish troops at some 80,500 men.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure 1 in No. 5.

*Colonel Surtees to Sir N. O'Connor.*

(No. 24.)

Sir,

*Constantinople, March 28, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that I have received supplementary trustworthy information respecting the "detail" of Ottoman troops serving

permanently in the Yemen, and those sent thither in the course of 1905, up to the month of July.

This information I have the honour to inclose herewith in Schedule form (Inclosure 2).

It is, perhaps, of interest to note that, possibly, with reference to the present Turco-Persian frontier difficulties, orders issued to considerable numbers of troops located in Eastern Asia Minor to proceed to the Yemen were cancelled so far back as May-July 1905.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) H. CONYERS SURTEES, Colonel,  
Military Attaché.

Inclosure 2 in No. 5.

DETAIL of Ottoman Troops serving permanently in the Yemen, and those sent thither in the course of 1905, up to the month of July.

Date ordered for the Movement.	Description of Units ordered to the Yemen.	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Batteries.	
				Field.	Mountain.
	Troops belonging to the VIIth Army Corps, Sana'a ..	34	2	3	4
	Permanently detached from the XVth or autonomous division of the Hedjaz ..	4	..	..	..
Middle of December 1904	Further detachments from the XVth Division ..	6	..	..	1
Middle of January 1905	8 battalions of Xth Nizam Division (Aleppo) ..	8	..	..	..
	34th Redif Brigade (Tripoli in Syria) ..	8	..	..	..
	36th " " (Jerusalem) ..	8	..	..	..
March 5	From the Arsenal at Constantinople ..	..	..	..	2
	79th Regiment, Redif (Marash), and 4 battalions of the 35th Redif Brigade (Acre) ..	8	..	..	..
" 11	20,000 Mauser rifles, 1 field battery, and 2 mountain batteries ..	..	..	1	2
" 18	11th Nizam Brigade from Janina ..	8	..	..	..
" 30	4,000 recruits leave Alexandretta ..	..	..	..	..
May 2	3rd Redif Division (Angora)* ..	..	..	..	..
	14th Redif Brigade (Isparta) ..	8	..	..	..
	1st and 3rd Battalions of 35th Redif Regiment (Berat), and 3rd and 4th Battalions of 36th Redif Regiment (Durazzo) ..	4	..	..	..
" 12	27th Redif Brigade (Rize) ..	8	..	..	..
	25th " " (Erzinghian)† ..	..	..	..	..
	29th " " (Diarbekir)‡ ..	..	..	..	..
June 13	19th Division, Nizam (Kharput)§ ..	..	..	..	..
	7 battalions of the 7th Nizam Division (Erzeroum)¶ ..	..	..	..	..
" 15	2 " " (Mush)¶ ..	..	..	..	..
" 21	40th Hamidieh Regiment ..	..	5	..	..
" 24	10,000 Mauser rifles and 12—7.5 centim. guns from Constantinople ..	..	..	..	2
" 27	4 battalions of the 7th and 8th Divisions‡ (Erzeroum and Van), in addition to those previously referred to ..	..	..	..	..
" 27	23rd Hamidieh Regiment§ ..	..	..	..	..
	24th " " § ..	..	..	..	..
	25th " " § ..	..	..	..	..
July 2	25th Redif Brigade (Erzinghian) ..	8	..	..	..
	29th " " (Diarbekir) ..	6	..	..	..
	32nd " " (Tokat) ..	8	..	..	..
	Totals ..	126	7	4	11

Or, in other words, some 80,000 rifles, 500 sabres, and 90 guns.

(Signed) H. CONYERS SURTEES, Colonel.

\* Order cancelled May 15.

† Orders cancelled June 13.

‡ Orders cancelled July 2.

§ These regiments could not be mobilized.

¶ When on the point of embarkation this regiment received orders to return.



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No. 6.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 11.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 9th instant, relative to the proposed loan to the Sultan of Muscat.

*India Office, April 10, 1906.*

Inclosure in No. 6.

*Mr. Morley to Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.) P.  
MUSCAT.

*India Office, April 9, 1906.*

Your telegram of the 12th instant.  
Unconditional loan of 20,000 rupees is sanctioned in the circumstances.

[12780]

No. 7.

*The Earl of Cromer to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 17.)*

(No. 50. Secret.)

Sir,

*Cairo, April 7, 1906.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 20 of the 20th February last, on the subject of the extension of the Hedjaz Railway, I have the honour to report that, according to confidential information which has been received by the Intelligence Department of the Egyptian War Office, work is now being actively pushed on between Medawara and Thabouk, a distance of about 120 kilom., and that the rails are expected to be laid, and this section of the line to be in working order, in the course of this year.

It is also stated that embankment works will very shortly be undertaken between Thabouk and El Akhdar, a distance of about 80 kilom.

Work on the branch line from Medawara to Akaba is said to be temporarily suspended.

If this information is accurate it would appear that the Sultan has realized that, without the command of the sea, the Akaba route to Southern Arabia may be closed to Turkish troops at any moment.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) CROMER.

[13240]

No. 8.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 226.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, April 17, 1906.*

THE French Minister made to-day a communication to the following effect regarding the Muscat Arbitration Award:—

The negotiations between M. Laronce, French Consul at Muscat, and Major Grey, His Majesty's Consul, relative to the application and interpretation of the Award of the 8th August, 1905, appeared to have settled the difficulties which had originally arisen. The French Government were therefore very anxious that His Majesty's Government should accept the list of French dhow-owners drawn up by their Consul, and delivered to the British Consul on the 4th ultimo.

M. Geoffray added that M. Laronce had inserted in this document the names of

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No. 6 A.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 11.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 9th instant, relative to the proposed visit of Ibn Saood to the Pirate Coast.

*India Office, April 10, 1906.*

Inclosure in No. 6 A.

*Mr. Morley to Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*India Office, April 9, 1906.*

IBN SAOOD. Your telegram of 15th ultimo. His Majesty's Government approve your proposal as to warning Trucial Chiefs.

[12490]

No. 6 B.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 11.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of Memorandum of external affairs relating to Arabia for the month of February 1906.

Copies have been sent to the Director of Military Operations.

*India Office, April 11, 1906.*

Inclosure in No. 6 B.

*Memorandum of Information received during the Month of February 1906 regarding External Affairs relating to Arabia.*

[NOTE.—This Memorandum is based upon reports the accuracy of which it is not always possible to guarantee.]

ADEN.

ON the 6th November, 1905, the Bombay Government submitted proposals for the development of a pearl fishery industry within the territorial waters of the Island of Perim. Captain Hancock, who was till lately Assistant Resident at Aden, has reported that pearl shell exists in sufficient quantity and quality around the shores of the island to render the fishery, if properly managed, a very fairly remunerative undertaking. The Naval Commander-in-chief, East Indies Station, has been asked whether he sees any objection to the proposal.

2. On the 28th November, 1905, the Bombay Government recommended that the Political Officer at Dthala should be allowed to fly a Union Jack in the Aden hinterland, where he is the representative of Government. The Government of India, on the 8th February, 1906, concurred in the recommendation, but they were of opinion that instead of issuing a special authorization enabling the Political Officer to fly a flag, it would be sufficient to grant him the local rank of Political Agent by notification in the "Bombay Gazette," when he would, *ipso facto*, become entitled to the privilege in question.

3. On the 13th December, 1905, the Government of Bombay reported that Sultan Sir Ahmed Fadhl, K.C.S.I., the Abdali, had applied for the payment to him of his monthly stipend of 1,641 dollars for one year in advance to meet the heavy

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marriage expenses of his second son and two nephews. The Resident at Aden observed that it was highly important at the present time to gain the Sultan's co-operation in the matter of the proposed railway through his territory, and in this the Government of Bombay concurred, and recommended the payment of the stipend in advance as a special case. The Government of India, however, did not consider that the grounds upon which the Sultan asked for financial assistance justified an advance of a whole year's subsidy of 39,384 rupees, but agreed to an advance of 20,000 rupees being made subject to the condition that the Sultan would undertake not to contract any other loans pending the adjustment of the present advance, without the sanction of the Government of India. The advance thus made is to be recouped by deducting one-half of the monthly stipend of 3,282 rupees until the whole amount is paid off.

4. On the 22nd December, 1905, the Government of Bombay represented that Sultan Kahtan-bin-Omar of the Upper Yaffai did not occupy the position with his tribesmen which he was said to possess when the Treaty of October 1903 was concluded with him. They stated that he was evidently unable to fulfil his covenants with us, and had lost any nominal position he might have held amongst the Yaffai. They recommended, therefore, that the Treaty entered into with Sultan Kahtan in October 1903 should be denounced, and that an interval should be allowed to elapse before the conclusion of a new Treaty with whatever individual or individuals might eventually be considered to possess most influence over the tribe. The Government of India, however, were of opinion that the course proposed was not free from objection as long as the boundary question with the Turkish Government remained unsettled. Attention was drawn to the necessity of proceeding with caution in the north-east districts of the Aden hinterland, which have not yet been recognized by the Ottoman Government as being within the British sphere (see paragraph 5 of the Memorandum for December 1905), and it was pointed out that, although the Yaffai are within the British Protectorate, the limits of their territory are somewhat undefined, and an international dispute might easily arise with reference to some portion of the area occupied by the tribe. Indeed, the fact recently reported that the Sheikhs of Rubeaten, which has been recognized as belonging to Yaffa, had received intriguing communications from the Mudir of Rada on behalf of the Turks (see paragraph 2 of the Memorandum for January 1906), was an indication of the danger that might attend withdrawal of the direct Treaty which we now have with Sultan Kahtan, whose appanage Rubeaten is said to be. The Government of India agreed that if serious or repeated breaches of tribal engagements were shown to have taken place, and if Sultan Kahtan, by reason of his deposition, were unable to afford proper satisfaction in respect of such breaches, it might become necessary to recognize some other tribal leader, but it appeared that neither Kahtan nor his fellow-tribesmen were chargeable with any specific violation of the Treaty or with any positively improper conduct, and, if this were so, it might be regarded as an additional reason in favour of allowing things to remain unaltered. The Government of Bombay were therefore asked to consider the matter further, and if they still adhered to their opinion, to explain more fully the precise nature of the ill effects which might result from a continued recognition of Kahtan.

5. On the 28th January, 1906, the Resident at Aden reported that a Turkish Revenue officer had arrived at Mufalis, with some troops, with the intention of collecting revenue from certain of the Shujaifa tribesmen. He stated that some of the Shujaifa resided within Mansuri limits in the British sphere, and that the Mansuri Sheikh had removed a force up to the frontier to prevent the collection of revenue from his subjects. The Subaihi in the vicinity were generally restless, and the Resident was writing to the Mansuri Sheikh to forbid any form of hostility. On the 3rd February, the Resident further reported that the Turkish Revenue officer and the Subaihi Sheikh had consented to refrain from trespassing, and to refer their disputes to their respective Governments. Consequently the Mansuri and other Subaihis had withdrawn from the frontier, and it was reported from the Turkish officials had also withdrawn; but it was anticipated that trouble might again arise after the Mahommedan festival known as the Id.

(See paragraph 2 of Memorandum for March 1904.) On the 1st December, 1905, the Government of Bombay, with the approval of the Government of India, authorized the Resident at Aden to withhold the monthly stipends of the Rijai, Mansuri, and the Makhdumi Chiefs until such time as Saleh-ba-Haidara, the murderer of the late Captain Warneford, was surrendered. He was also to inform the Chiefs concerned that the arrears of stipend which would thus accumulate would be paid when the murderer

was surrendered. The Resident pointed out, however, that, if the stipends were withheld, under Article IV of the Agreement concluded in 1871 with these tribes, they would have a right to revert to the old practice of levying fees on merchandize on two of the important trade routes tapping the Taiz districts, namely, the Mufalis and Madraja routes. He stated that any reimposition of dues and taxes upon these routes was most undesirable, and might involve us in some form of hostilities. He suggested, therefore, that, to commence with, action should be directed against the Rijai only, and that the first step should not be the stoppage of stipends. He also mentioned that the Abdali Sultan had offered his assistance in case it were decided to undertake punitive measures against the Rijai. To this the Government of Bombay replied on the 6th January that the authority given to the Resident did not preclude him from taking milder measures if he considered they would suffice, nor did it compel him to use the full authority intrusted to him at once without discretion. In their opinion the temporary withholding of the stipends would hardly amount to stoppage of payment within the meaning of Article IV of the Treaty. The Government of Bombay further stated that it was quite open to the Resident to proceed by way of the stoppage of presents and correspondence, and that they were not prepared to contemplate anything in the shape of a military expedition against the Rijai tribe at present. The Government of India approved these instructions.

6. (See paragraph 3 of Memorandum for January 1906.) On the 21st January, 1906, the Resident at Aden submitted a report concerning the murder of the postal-runner near Sheikh Othman and the robbery of the mail bags. The postal-runner was at the time conveying the mails from Dthala to Aden, and the attack was delivered about half a-mile to the north-east of Sheikh Othman, within British limits. The man was shot in three places, and also stabbed in the side with a native dagger, and, before he died, he deposed before a Magistrate that his assailants were five in number belonging to the Attifi section of the Subaihis. The Resident also informed the Bombay Government that the stipend of the Attifi and Yusufi Sheikhs would be withheld, and again suggested that the present would be a favourable opportunity to make a display of force at Am Riga and thence to proceed via Al Kadaimi into the country of the Attifi and Yusufi tribes. On the 3rd February, 1906, the Government of Bombay approved the Resident's action, but stated that before they could recommend to the Government of India the Resident's proposal for the dispatch of a punitive force into the Subaihi country, they would need an assurance that a sufficient force was available to compel success in case of a combination in active hostility against the British Government of the several sub-tribes of the Subaihi, and possibly of others. They also stated that it was necessary to know, in case the offenders and property were not surrendered, what was to be the locality, nature, and extent of the punishment it was proposed to inflict, and also the period of the year when, having regard to climate, health, and supplies, an expedition could most successfully be carried out.

7. (See sub-paragraph 2 of paragraph 4 of the Memorandum for June 1905.) On the 12th February, 1906, the Bombay Government stated that the Resident at Aden hoped to visit Shugra and there arrange a Treaty with Beda. The matter would be personally discussed in Bombay, but before the Resident left it was necessary for him to have instructions as to the amount of stipend to be granted to the Chiefs and also as regards an increase to the stipend of the Fadthli Sultan, if it was found that the latter had been instrumental in bringing about the Treaty. They proposed to use their own discretion in determining both amounts after discussion with the Resident. The Government of India, on the 20th February, concurred that it was most desirable to secure a Treaty with Beda, and stated that they were willing to sanction an allowance of 150 dollars a-month. They also intimated that the Treaty should, as in the case of that with Dthala, contain, if possible, a condition requiring the Chief to be responsible for any boundary pillars erected, and for the safety of any British parties which might have occasion to visit the territories of the Chiefs. With regard to the increase to the stipend of the Fadthli Sultan, they thought it might be determined later on, when the terms of the Treaty with him could be fully discussed.

8. (See paragraph 3 of the Memorandum for January 1906.) On the 21st January, 1906, the Resident at Aden reported that the casualties at the post at Nobat Dakim were slight, and that immediately on receipt of the report, the Abdali was addressed with a view to ascertaining who the assailants were. He replied that the attacking force were probably the Juberi, a sub-tribe of the Subaihis. The object of the attacks was mainly to give expression to their general dissatisfaction with the treatment accorded to them by the Abdali Sultan and with his recent acquisition



of the post at Nobat Dakim (see paragraph 6 of Memorandum for December 1905). The Resident considered the incident in its present stage to be merely inter-tribal.

9. (See paragraph 6 of the Memorandum for November 1905.) Major-General H. M. Mason, Political Resident and General Officer Commanding at Aden, has been granted leave from the 14th March, 1906.

10. (See sub-paragraph of paragraph 2 of the Memorandum for June 1905.) The Government of Bombay, when reporting the detention and search of the pearl-fishing dhow at Imran Bay raised the following two points:—

(a.) Whether there was any special Agreement with the Porte, under Article XXII of the Brussels Convention, for stopping and searching a dhow flying Turkish colour;

(b.) Whether there was any other authority for such action.

With regard to (a) the Government of India replied on the 27th February, 1906, in the negative, but with regard to (b) they communicated the following observations:—

It seemed indisputable that, from the standpoint of international law, the rights of Great Britain as the Protecting Power in the Imran Bay territorial waters fully justified the action taken by His Majesty's ship "Perseus"; and this undoubtedly would be the attitude of Government in the event of representations being made by the Turkish Government. It was true that Imran Bay, where the stopping and searching of the dhow took place, though within British protected waters, lay outside British India, and that the provisions of "The Indian Arms Act, 1878," did not, therefore, apply in the present case; but, even in the absence of any special legal enactment providing for the exercise of such powers, there seemed no doubt that the detention and search were sustainable on the ground that the action by the "Perseus" was covered by the inalienable rights attached under the usages of international law to the status of a protecting Power. It appeared, however, to the Government of India that there might be advantages in giving definite legal authority to the local officers with a view to regularizing and defining the action that should be taken in dealing with such cases, and they considered that it was desirable to add the Indian Arms Act of 1878 to the list of enactments which it had been proposed should be applied to the Protectorate under the Foreign Jurisdiction Order in Council of 1902, subject to the introduction of suitable modifications in order to adapt the Act to local conditions. In applying the Act to the Protectorate waters, it would be necessary to direct particular consideration towards the question of legalizing the custody of vessels seized in the waters of Aden proper, and to the question of the place of trial for offences committed in the Protectorate waters. The Government of India saw no reason to anticipate any objection from the Aden Chiefs to our assuming the position hereinabove indicated, since our claim to control the arms trade in the neighbourhood of the Aden Protectorate was well understood locally, being, indeed, expressly confirmed by the Treaty with Lahej of 1881, which had never been cancelled, and which included the various Subaihi sub-tribes. Our claim was also covered by the Treaty of 1857 with the Akrabi, the tribe in whose territorial waters the present incident took place.

#### TURKISH ARABIA.

11. (See paragraph 7 of Memorandum for January 1906.) Sir N. O'Connor reported on the 4th January, 1906, that he had learnt from a secret source that instructions had recently been given to the Minister of War to dispatch 8,000 fresh troops to the Yemen. Sir N. O'Connor also reported on the 9th January that Feiza Pasha had almost certainly suffered a more or less serious reverse at the hands of the Yemen insurgents at a place called Shehara, and that he had been compelled to fall back to Omran, which is some hours' distant to the north from Sanaa. The Marshal telegraphed to the Minister of War from that place on the 4th January to the effect that, in the course of his retreat, he had been attacked by the rebels at Jebel Yezid and Hashid, but had succeeded after ten hours' fighting in beating them off with heavy loss. He intended to await the arrival of the 8,000 fresh troops referred to above, and proposed on their arrival to make a fresh advance on Shehara, where the main forces of Mahmoud Yahya were concentrated.

12. (See paragraph 9 of the Memorandum for January 1906.) It is estimated, in connection with the recently reported mobilization of Ottoman troops on the Persian frontier, that the strength of the 4th and 6th Army Corps consists of about 245,000

rifles and sabres, fifty-six batteries, and the fortress artillery. The Ottoman authorities should not, therefore, have the least difficulty in assembling a force amply sufficient to cope with any the Persians may be able to take the field with. The problematical attitude of some 40,000 hillmen situated on either side of the frontier between Bayazid and Bagdad is, however, a serious factor in the situation. Telegrams have been dispatched to the Walis of Erzeroum, Diabekr, and Mossuf, ordering them to use every means in their power to accelerate the movement to the district of Wazna of certain troops of the 4th and 6th Corps. The announced object of the movement is to insure the safety of the detachments under the command of Liwa Izzet Pasha, which are watching the frontier. The Persian Ambassador visited Sir N. O'Connor on the 17th December, 1905, with the object of communicating to him a note which he had received from the Porte to the following effect. It was urged in the first place that Wazna (Vazneh), Labidjan, and Pessweh were the summer pasturages of Ottoman nomad tribes inhabiting the Kazas of Suleimanie, Rania, Shehr Bazar, and Mamoureti Hamid, and together with Mirghian and Kelu Sheikh indubitably formed part of the Ottoman dominions. In proof of this claim attention was drawn to the fact that a Turkish Mudir formerly resided at Wazna and levied State taxes there; next it was stated that the Persians had continually encroached on these districts, and had recently collected 5,000 or 6,000 troops in the neighbourhood of Pessweh, thereby compelling the Ottoman Government to resort to similar measures; finally, it was pointed out that, in order to give proofs of its conciliatory disposition, the Porte had consented to the nomination of a Joint Commission of Inquiry, had already designated its Delegates, and would undertake to withdraw its troops from any point which the investigations of this Commission might show to be on Persian territory. The Porte could not, however, possibly consent to order the withdrawal of such troops as a measure preliminary to the inquiry. Prince Mirza Riza Khan then went on to narrate the various phases of his negotiations with the Porte. His Government had at first declined to assent to the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry unless the Ottoman Government first consented to withdraw its troops from the disputed points, which it had hastened to occupy. The matter had been the subject of discussion before the Sultan's Council of Ministers, which had twice come to an unfavourable decision, but on the third occasion had reported in favour of appointing a Commission. The Sultan had accordingly agreed to the appointment of a Commission, but had categorically refused to order the withdrawal of his troops before the decision of the Commission was made known, and had, on the contrary, directed that a Turkish force, equal in numbers to that which the Persians had assembled, should be hurried forward and should be maintained on the frontier until the opposing force was itself withdrawn. His Highness added that he had been confidentially informed that the Sultan based his refusal on the ground that he had yielded to the request of the English Ambassador under similar circumstances in connection with the Aden delimitation, and had, in consequence, lost a considerable strip of territory. The Prince considered that he had already gained a good deal in securing the Sultan's consent to the nomination of a Commission, and asked Sir N. O'Connor, if he shared this opinion, to inform His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran to this effect, as such a communication would have considerable influence upon the Persian Government. He added that the Russian Ambassador had already addressed a similar communication to the Russian Minister at Tehran. The Prince said that his own object was to arrive at an amicable settlement, since he was well aware that his Government had neither the military nor the pecuniary resources to enable it to offer a successful resistance to Turkey in the event of hostilities. Sir N. O'Connor told the Persian Ambassador that he knew that about nine battalions, with a considerable force of cavalry and artillery, had been ordered to the frontier. He recommended the Ambassador to do everything in his power to prevent an armed conflict, which might very easily assume dangerous proportions with so many unruly tribes on the Turkish side anxious to be allowed to raid the province of Azerbaijan. He also said that he would communicate with the Russian Ambassador, and that he saw no objection to telegraphing to His Majesty's Legation at Tehran in the sense requested. Mirza Riza Khan replied that this would greatly strengthen his hands, since his Government appeared to think that he ought to have been able to induce the Turks to withdraw their troops from the disputed territory.

Sir N. O'Connor is of opinion that there is ample material in this dispute to lead to serious events, but states that if, as seems probable, the Persian Government decides without delay to accept the Porte's present proposal, it may be hoped that



complications will be avoided. He does not anticipate that the Turks will assume an aggressive attitude without direct provocation, however much the neighbouring tribes, conscious of their power, may be anxious to do so.

13. On the 30th December, 1905, the Persian Minister communicated to Sir E. Grey a telegram which he had received to the effect that the Persian Government were not prepared to consent to the formation of a Mixed Commission to inquire into the Turko-Persian frontier dispute until the districts of Lahidjan and Vazneh had been evacuated by the Ottoman troops. His Highness had accordingly been instructed to request that telegraphic instructions might be sent to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople to support the representations which the Persian Ambassador had made to the Sublime Porte on the subject. Sir E. Grey informed the Persian Minister, in reply, on the 3rd January, 1906, that both the British and Russian Ambassadors at Constantinople had strongly advised the Persian Ambassador to urge upon his Government the acceptance of the proposed arrangement, under which the Ottoman Government were to appoint a Representative on the Mixed Commission, while retaining their troops at Lahidjan and Vazneh. It was added that Mr. Grant Duff had been instructed to use similar language to the Mushir-ed-Dowleh, and that His Majesty's Government were unable to alter the views which they had already expressed on the question. Sir N. O'Connor reported on the 2nd January that, in conversation with the Persian Ambassador, he had shown him the "identical map" agreed upon between the British and Russian Commissioners, which was communicated to the Turkish and Persian Governments in 1869 or 1870, with a copy of which his Highness seemed to be unprovided, and had pointed out to him that Kala Passova, which had been occupied by the Persian troops, was outside the zone of 20 to 40 miles reserved for delimitation by the Commissioners. His Highness seemed highly pleased at receiving this piece of information, and said that he would go at once to the Porte and ask for the production of the map. He hoped that this substantial evidence of the validity of the Persian claim to Passova would induce the Ottoman Government to withdraw their troops from that place, and thus enable his Government to participate in the appointment of a Mixed Commission.

14. Sir N. O'Connor stated on the 17th January that a Report had been received of an encounter on the frontier near Kazli-Gol between Ottoman troops and Kurds. The disturbance appears to have been due to the fact that a Kurdish tribe dwelling on the Persian side of the frontier had made encroachments on the pasturage claimed by another part of the same tribe in Turkish territory.

15. (See paragraph 10 of the Memorandum for December 1905.) An oval tablet, said to be of great beauty, has been presented to His Majesty the Sultan by Indian subscribers to the Hedjaz Railway.

16. Sir N. O'Connor reported on the 2nd January that he had heard confidentially that formal proposals had been made to the Porte by the Honorary Turkish Consul in Paris, M. Elie Leon, for the construction of a railway in the Yemen, from Hodiedah, through Jemile to Sanaa, and thence to Taiz Assir, and elsewhere. M. Leon's letter drew a glowing picture of the commercial, financial, strategic, and political advantages of such a line, and contained an application for permission to form an Ottoman Company to carry out the project under a Concession for ninety-nine years, and with a kilometric guarantee of £ T. 850. The scheme appeared to have attracted the Sultan's attention, for Sir N. O'Connor subsequently learnt that an *Irade* had been issued authorizing an engineer named Zabarowski, representing a French group of capitalists, to undertake preliminary surveys for the line. Sir N. O'Connor thinks that it would be useful to have information as to whether the scheme would be likely to receive serious financial support in Paris, and suggests that some British firm of standing connected with such enterprises should be placed in possession of the facts.

*General.*—(See paragraph 13 of the Memorandum for January 1906.) The allowance received from the Oudh Bequest by Mirza Fazlullah Mazindarani, Mujtahid of Karbala, has been discontinued from the month of November 1905.

At the request of the Italian Consul-General at Calcutta, Baron Airolidig de Robbiate, an Italian cavalry officer, who is going to Mesopotamia to obtain horses for the Italian Government, has been granted letters of introduction from the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department to His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad, and to His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah.

Vice-Consul S. M. Hussain is reported to have started on his yearly visit to Mecca.

# PERSIAN GULF.

17. *Muscat.*—(Vide paragraph 20 of Memorandum for January 1906.) The Political Agent at Muscat wrote on the 24th January, 1906, and explained that the ill-health of the prisoners was not in any way caused by severe treatment, but was due simply to the fact that confinement for any length of time is of itself sufficient to break the spirit of the desert Arab and destroy his health.

18. (Vide paragraph 15 of the Memorandum for January 1906.) The Political Agent at Muscat wrote on the 12th February stating that a change had taken place recently in the attitude of M. Laronce. He had hitherto been very friendly to the British Government, but he now seemed desirous of favouring the extension of foreign commerce to the detriment of British. The change might be ascribed to an intention on the part of the French Government to strengthen their position in Oman so as to be able to keep us as strictly as possible to the mutual declaration of 1862 in connection with the Sultan's independence.

On the 22nd February, the Secretary of State replied to the telegram from the Government of India dated 2nd January regarding the interpretation of the Award.

As regards points 1 and 2, His Majesty's Government agreed with the views of the Government of India. As regards point 3, they agreed that any subject of the Sultan should be regarded as coming under Muscat jurisdiction as soon as he landed in Oman, but stated that if the Omani belonging to a French protected dhow were accused of crime on the high seas, no objection could be taken to his transshipment, without being landed, to some French port for trial, and that it would not be reasonable to object if the accused were landed temporarily merely in order to enable the French Consul to make arrangements for effecting this. Objection would, however, be taken to such an Omani being tried at Muscat by the French Consul. The Secretary of State requested that Major Grey might be instructed to inform the French Consul of the conclusions arrived at by His Majesty's Government on the above points, and to endeavour to effect a settlement on the lines laid down.

As regards Major Grey's proposal that the question of a British protectorate over Muscat should be raised in connection with the negotiations, His Majesty's Government considered that it would be useless to approach the French Government in the matter, and directed that instructions against raising the question should be conveyed to Major Grey.

19. (Vide paragraph 19 of the Memorandum for January, 1906.) A large consignment of over 3,000 rifles and a considerable amount of ammunition was landed at Koweit from two native craft during the month of January. Major Grey telegraphed on the 10th February, 1906, that he had been informed by the French Consul that the greater portion of the arms shipped at Muscat for Mekran during the cold season had been sent to the Caucasus for the Mahomedan insurgents. A report as to the route by which these arms were supposed to have reached the Caucasus has been called for from the Political Agent in the Persian Gulf. Major Grey also wrote on the 5th February, 1906, that the presence of His Majesty's ship "Redbreast" off the Mekran coast had checked the export of arms from Muscat during the past month to Mekran ports. MM. Kevorkoff et Cie. had also complained to the Agency dragoman that their trade in arms had been hindered by the position taken up by the "Redbreast," and Afghan depositors were claiming a return of the money deposited by them for the supply of arms with Ali Musa Khan and M. Goguyer.

20. (Vide paragraph 13 of Memorandum for December 1905.) Major Grey wrote on the 6th February stating that the Sultan of Muscat had of late been raising numerous small loans against future payments of customs duty. In two cases his creditors were M. Goguyer and MM. Kevorkoff et Cie. M. Goguyer had offered to lend the Sultan a substantial sum at a moderate rate of interest. Major Cox telegraphed on the 9th February that, since His Majesty's Government saw objections to raising the question of the reorganization of the Muscat Customs on the basis of a substantial loan, in his opinion, it would be advisable to make a loan of 20,000 rupees unconditionally in order to avoid a financial crisis, rather than that the Award negotiations should be concluded hastily at the cost of a sacrifice.

21. The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf telegraphed on the 19th January that eleven Gwadar subjects of the Sultan of Muscat, forming the crew of a registered British Indian dhow, were suspected of having sold *en route* part of the cargo of the dhow consigned to a subject of the Sheikh of Bahrein, and that the latter had asked the Political Agent to deal with the case. Captain Prideaux considered the men



guilty on the strength of the evidence produced and on their own confession, and recommended that he might be allowed to give them six months' imprisonment, to be carried out under his supervision at Bahrein. The question is now under the consideration of the Government of India.

22. *Koweit and Nejd*.—(Vide paragraph 20 of Memorandum for November 1905.) Captain Knox gave Sheikh Mubarak to understand that it was not likely that Government would approve any interference by Ibn Saood in the affairs of Chiefs in Treaty relation with the British Government, and he further suggested that the Sheikh would do well to discourage Ibn Saood from the project of visiting the Arab coast and Oman, should he consult him in the matter.

Sheikh Mubarak informed Captain Knox that he had heard of Ibn Saood's plans, and regarded them as a mere attempt to extort money from the various coastal Chiefs; he had written already to Ibn Saood, pointing out to him that it was impolitic for a Ruler to confess to lack of funds, and further reminding him that Ibn Rashid was only scotched, not killed, that Ibn Saood's power in Nejd was by no means well established, and that the first fruits of any attempt at aggression would be that Sheikh Mubarak would break off relations with him. Sheikh Mubarak did not suppose that, after receipt of this letter, Ibn Saood would persist in his design.

Major Cox believes that the above views of Sheikh Mubarak are primarily well founded, but he considers that the question of the spread of Wahabi influence is one with regard to which we need to maintain a very vigilant attitude. Sheikh Zaeed, Chief of Abu Thabi, at a confidential interview with Major Cox, expressed himself very strongly on this question. He is the leader of the Hinawi element in Northern Oman, and was himself instrumental in the final extinction of Wahabi influence from Beraimi and the Pirate coast in 1870. It is natural therefore that he and his kinsman, the Sheikh of Debai, should regard the contingency of the appearance of Ibn Saood on the scene with much anxiety. On the other hand, the Ghafiri section of the trucial Chiefs, including all the Chiefs except those of Abu Thabi and Debai, regard Ibn Saood's overtures with favour, if not with pleasurable excitement. Some of them, who have for a long time been on strained terms, have recently effected a reconciliation among themselves for united resistance to Sheikh Zaeed, whom they regard with jealousy and distrust. Major Cox has, however, impressed upon Sheikh Zaeed the folly of driving the other Chiefs into a combination against himself by proceeding to extremities with the Beni Katab, and it is now reported that Sheikh Zaeed has found a pacific solution of his quarrel with them. It is hoped therefore that any cause for actual unrest is for the present removed.

Sheikh Zaeed suggested to Major Cox that imperative orders should be issued to the Ghafiri Sheikhs not to intrigue with Ibn Saood, and the latter has recommended accordingly that he may be authorized to warn the trucial Sheikhs, both Ghafiri and Hinawi, that the Government of India would not view with complacency the intrigues of any of them with Ibn Saood. He considered that general unrest prejudicial to our commercial interests on the coast would inevitably result from such intrigues. Before dealing with Major Cox's suggestion, the Government of India are awaiting His Majesty's Government's reply to their Secret despatch, dated the 11th January last, in which they have (1) explained the situation created by the recent reassertion by the Wahabi dynasty of its former position in Nejd; (2) urged the desirability of ascertaining whether Ibn Saood is prepared to stand by the engagement of his predecessors not to oppose or injure British subjects residing in his territories, and not to interfere with the Arab tribes in alliance with the British Government; and (3) suggested that, in the event of his unwillingness to give the necessary assurances or to declare his intentions, he should be warned that any attempt on his part to interfere in that locality, or with the Chiefs and their subjects, would be regarded as an unfriendly act, and that suitable measures would be taken to frustrate it.

23. (Vide paragraph 22 of Memorandum for January 1906.) In December last there was a report in Bussorah that four Turkish battalions would proceed from Medina to Kassim; that the vilayets of Bagdad and Bussorah had been requested to provide the sum of 9,000*l.* which would be required for their expenses, but that the Wali of Bussorah had replied that there was no money in the Bussorah Treasury. It was also stated that Yusuf-bin-Ibrahim was collecting horsemen and camelmen on behalf of Ibn Rashid, and that Ibn Saood was preparing to fight.

A later report from Koweit stated that Ibn Saood had killed a large number of Ibn Rashid's soldiers, and had looted a number of camels and other property. Ibn Rashid is said to have fled towards Mecca.

24. (Vide at close of paragraph 22 of Memorandum for January last.) On the 4th January His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Bussorah reported to His Britannic Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople on the friendly relations subsisting between Sheikh Mubarak and the Wali of Bussorah. The following matters are brought to notice in the report:—

(1.) That the Sheikh seems to do all he can to meet Muklis Pasha's wishes, both by subscribing liberally to the military barracks, which have recently been erected at Bussorah, and to which Mubarak contributed £T. 625; by regularly forwarding deserters from the Turkish troops in Kassim, who make their way to Koweit, and by safeguarding the postal communication between Bussorah and Hassa.

(2.) That the Sheikh's imprisoned Agent, Abdul Aziz, who was released and sent to Koweit with letters on the 29th November last, has not returned.

(3.) That there has been frequent interchange of letters between the Wali and the Sheikh, the correspondence being couched in very friendly terms, the Sheikh styling himself "Kaïmakam of Koweit." The bearer of one of these letters was the Sheikh's overseer at Fao, who got into difficulty in October 1904 and applied for protection and asylum on board one of His Majesty's ships.

(4.) That instructions have lately been given by the Wali to the Kolagassi in charge of the fort at Fao not to prevent the construction of embankments on the Sheikh's property at Fao, provided that the work does not interfere with the fort; and that orders have also been given to the officer in charge of the fort at Um Kasr to show all deference to Mubarak on his way from Koweit to Sefwan.

On the 1st January last Captain Knox visited Sheikh Mubarak, who, in the course of conversation, mentioned that the Turkish soldiers at Sefwan had been showing some signs of activity, and that they had troubled his messengers when passing through the village. He also mentioned that twenty Turkish soldiers, among whom were officers of rank, were guests in his house, that he expected about 200 more in the course of a few days, and that he would have to feed them while in Koweit and on their way to Bussorah.

About twenty Turkish soldiers had arrived at Koweit on the 31st December, and others followed them on the 5th January. They were reported to be in a wretched condition and clad in rags.

25. *Bahrein*.—(Vide paragraph 20 of Memorandum for December 1905.) Major Cox has submitted his report on the memorial of Sheikh Esa, Chief of Bahrein, regarding British interference in Bahrein affairs, and the report is now under consideration.

26. (Vide paragraph 10 of Memorandum for December 1905.) A detailed report of Captain Prideaux' visit to Katr has been received from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf. Captain Prideaux, before visiting Katr, wrote to the Sheikhs Jasim and Ahmed and said that he was anxious to purchase a horse for Government service. He also mentioned that there were various commercial cases between British subjects and residents or refugees in Bidaa which he wished to discuss.

Captain Prideaux, on reaching Lusail, where Sheikh Jasim usually resides in retirement, found that the Sheikh was at Bu Hasa, 12 miles in the interior in camp. He proceeded thither and stayed at Bu Hasa three days, during which he had several interviews with the Sheikh. He recorded the evidence required by the High Court of Bombay, and also collected useful information from various persons for the "Gazetteer" of the Persian Gulf. The Sheikh showed himself much interested in politics, but told Captain Prideaux that he had retired from all administrative work, and was therefore unable to help him in the other matters in connection with which he had come to Katr. The Political Agent then went back to Lusail and sailed round to Bidaa to visit Sheikh Ahmed, the brother of Sheikh Jasim and the *de facto* Chief of Bidaa. He was received in most friendly style by Sheikh Ahmed, but the Turkish officials at Bidaa protested against his landing, and especially objected to the presence of the escort of six sepoys whom Captain Prideaux had taken with him. Sheikh Ahmed told Captain Prideaux that he was only one of a Mejlis that rules his town. Captain Prideaux heard, however, that the Sheikh possesses much popularity and influence over his subjects. He showed rather a partisan spirit in talking over the cases brought to his notice, and Captain Prideaux was not able definitely to settle any one of them. The Sheikh promised, however, in most of the cases, either to make the defendants settle with their creditors in the course of one or two months or else to send them over to Bahrein or to drive them out elsewhere. In the course of conversation, Sheikh Ahmed expressed his willingness to enter into a Treaty similar to those



between the Trucial Chiefs and the British Government, but said that with the Turks in their present position it would be impossible for him to do so. Captain Prideaux thinks that the strongest ambition of the Thani family, next to the establishment of their independence from both the Turks and the British, is to wrest the possession of Odeid once more from the hands of the Chief of Abu Dhabbi. Sheikh Jasim remarked to Captain Prideaux that he believed that the Turks were shortly going to establish a Mudir again at Odeid. Captain Prideaux thinks that if the Thani family are ever allowed to settle themselves at Zubeira or any other point in the northern half of the peninsula, the Turks will follow them there, and their grasp on the Katr Peninsula will be tightened.

27. (*Vide* paragraph 27 of Memorandum for January 1906.) The report of the murder of Sheikh Ahmed by a Beni Hajir Bedouin in his service has been confirmed. On hearing the news of the murder, the elders of the Beni Hajir tribe are said to have repaired to Sheikh Jasim's camp to express their regret, and to have offered to submit to any suitable punishment. The Chief is said to have replied that a son and nephew of his had started with 100 men in pursuit of the murderer, and that if they succeeded in killing him and the whole of his family, the feud would be ended. In no other event would he forgive the tribe. There is a fresh report, however, to the effect that in revenge for the murder, another servant of Sheikh Ahmed has murdered Sheikh Salim-bin-Shafi, the Chief of Makhadhdhaba in Sheikh Jasim's camp. If this proves to be true, it is anticipated that there will be considerable unrest in Katr.

Major Cox has instructed Captain Prideaux to keep himself closely informed with regard to any change in the position which may result from the death of Sheikh Ahmed and to maintain vigilance in regard to Odeid.

The Government of India have approved of these instructions.

28. On the occasion of Captain Prideaux' visit to Sheikh Jasim's camp at Bu Hasa, he unexpectedly met there the latter's son-in-law Nasir-bin-Mubarak, who is an outlawed cousin of Sheikh Esa, Chief of Bahrein. As a result of the interview, Nasir-bin-Mubarak made a representation to the Government of India expressing his willingness to submit to the existing régime in Bahrein, and begging that the Government would mediate to effect a reconciliation between himself and Sheikh Esa. He asked that the latter might be persuaded to bestow suitable allowances upon him and the members of his section. As the reconciliation would probably introduce an element of unrest into the politics of Bahrein, which does not now exist, and having regard to the uncompromising hatred which Sheikh Esa bears towards his cousin, the Government of India have approved of an answer being sent to Nasir-bin-Mubarak to the effect that, in view of the past, the Government of India do not consider that they have sufficient grounds for intervening in order to press a reconciliation upon Sheikh Esa, but that in saying this they wish in no way to discourage Nasir-bin-Mubarak from making such friendly efforts on his own behalf to arrive at a reconciliation with his cousin as may seem good to him.

29. A Persian subject residing in Bahrein having committed an offence on board a British ship in Bahrein Harbour, the Secretary of State has called for the views of the Government of India as to how the case should be dealt with. It is reported that the Political Agent, who has only power to try British subjects, considers that the offender deserves two years' imprisonment. The Secretary of State has drawn attention to the difficulty which may be raised by the question of jurisdiction with the Persian Government. The matter is now under consideration.

30. *Miscellaneous.*—(*Vide* paragraph 29 of Memorandum for January last.) The full text of the Concession granted by His Majesty the Shah of Persia to the "Sponge Exploration Syndicate" has been received.

The chief conditions of the grant are the following:—

- (1.) The Syndicate are to have the exclusive right of exploiting the sponge fisheries for a period of fifty years.
- (2.) The Concession extends from Fao to Gwettar, including all the islands belonging to Persia, on the clear understanding that the limits of the Concession apply only to Persian waters.
- (3.) The Syndicate are to pay to the Persian Government 1,500*l.* on the grant of the Concession, and a royalty of 50 fr. on every 200 pounds of sponges exported abroad or imported for sale into Persia; after expiry of thirty years from the date of the grant the Syndicate are to pay an additional fixed annual rent of 300*l.*
- (4.) Machinery, &c., required for the fishery operations is to be passed free of customs duty.

(5.) No export duty is to be charged on sponges, but customs duty according to the Tariff of the day is to be paid on imports for sale in Persia.

(6.) Persian workmen are to be employed as far as possible. Foreign employés must be Greeks, and the number must be limited to the minimum necessary for the industry.

31. (*Vide* paragraph 32 of Memorandum for January 1906.) Dr. Theodore Thomson visited Calcutta on the 6th February and interviewed Sir Louis Dane, Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department. The views of the Government of India on the question of quarantine arrangements and on the political situation on the shores and islands of the Persian Gulf were explained to him.

Dr. Thomson explained that he proposed to learn all he could during his tour in the Gulf, in order that he might be in a position to meet the arguments of delegates of other Powers, and especially of Dr. Faivre, at future conferences. On his present information he was disposed to think that a quarantine station at the mouth of the Gulf was unnecessary, and that proper arrangements at Bussorah and Mohammerah would be preferable to a station on Henjam or Hormuz. Should he find reason for any material alteration of his views, he promised to communicate personally with the Government of India again before returning to Europe.

32. Dr. Thomson left Bombay on the 15th February for the Persian Gulf. The Royal Indian Mail steamer "Lawrence," with Captain Condon, the Bushire Residency Surgeon on board, was to await him at Muscat. In the course of his tour he will probably visit Gwadar, which has been suggested as a possible site for a quarantine station. His Majesty's Secretary of State telegraphed on the 7th February that the Foreign Office preferred not to inform the Porte about the Mission, or to depute Dr. Clemow along with Dr. Thomson. On the 23rd February the Secretary of State telegraphed that Dr. Thomson should not visit Katif or Ojeir unless the visit were essential to the completeness of the Mission; and that, in the latter event, he might land with the Commander of the despatch boat on the pretext of paying the local authorities a complimentary visit. These instructions have been communicated to Dr. Thomson.

(Signed) R. E. HOLLAND.

Calcutta, March 1, 1906.



certain Arabs who were included in the Agreement signed at London on the 13th May, 1904, regarding the Zanzibari dhow-owners. These natives were, indeed, wrongfully claimed by the Sultan of Muscat as his subjects, and it was advisable to guard against any incident arising in the future with regard to them.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) EDWARD GREY.

[13397]

No. 9.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 20.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 15th March, relative to the Muscat Arbitration Award.

*India Office, April 19, 1906.*

Inclosure 1 in No. 9.

*Major Grey to Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Muscat, March 5, 1906.*

FOLLOWING sent to Major Cox to-day :—

"Please refer to my letter dated the 22nd January regarding the Muscat Award. The French Consul has given me a list of flag-holders, and I am engaged in its examination."

Inclosure 2 in No. 9.

*Major Grey to Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Muscat, March 8, 1906.*

FOLLOWING sent to Major Cox to-day :—

"Please see my telegram of the 5th March regarding Muscat Arbitration. There seems to be no doubt that certain owners are shown in the list as possessing more dhows than they actually do possess. French Consul denied this, but he may have been imposed upon. Should the Sultan of Muscat send a special Envoy to inquire from the owners, they will probably decline to give details, as they did before. In my opinion the Sultan should go himself, and inquire personally, pressing the owners for a reply if necessary, but he will not do this without the promise of our support. If you have no objection it would be a good thing for me to accompany him. Please send me instructions as soon as possible."

[13404]

No. 10.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 20.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 15th March, relative to Ibn Saood's alleged intention to visit Northern Oman.

*India Office, April 19, 1906.*

[1639]

C



## Inclosure 1 in No. 10.

*Major Cox to Government of India.*

(Confidential.)

*Bushire, February 23, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to submit a further report from Captain S. G. Knox, Political Agent, Koweit, on the subject of Ibn Saood's alleged intention to visit Northern Oman, in continuation of my letter of the 4th instant.

2. Sheikh Mubarak's suggestion that Ibn Saood's overtures to the Sheikhs of the Trucial Coast are merely a plan for obtaining financial support (or blackmail) from them, is probably well founded, as from another communication in connection with Nejd affairs, which I am addressing by this mail to Government, it will be apparent that his position in Nejd is so unsettled at present as to make it improbable that Ibn Saood would be in a position to turn his serious attention to the Trucial Coast. At the same time I see no objection to the issue of the admonition recommended in paragraph 5 of my last communication above quoted.

3. In regard to Sheikh Mubarak's attitude, it seems possible that his temporary disapproval of Ibn Saood is due to the fact that while his own relations with the Turks are getting more friendly, Ibn Saood's are becoming decidedly strained, and this means, no doubt, that the latter is less inclined than before to be guided by the Sheikh of Koweit's advice in his relations with the Porte.

## Inclosure 2 in No. 10.

*Captain Knox to Major Cox.**Koweit, February 3, 1906.*

IN continuation of correspondence ending with my Camp No. 1, dated the 19th January, 1906, on the subject of Ibn Saood's projected visit to the Pirate Coast and Oman, I have the honour to inform you that Sheikh Mubarak visited me yesterday morning, and, of his own accord, introduced this topic of conversation, and informed me that he had written to Ibn Saood on the subject. He again assured me that he had every hope that the visit would not come off, and that Ibn Saood's only object was money.

2. This uncalled for return to the subject suggests to me that Sheikh Mubarak has strong objections to Ibn Saood being served by any port but Koweit, and that we may reckon on Sheikh Mubarak's support in this matter.

## Inclosure 3 in No. 10.

*Major Cox to Government of India.*

(Confidential.)

*Bushire, February 23, 1906.*

WITH reference to the correspondence ending with Foreign Department endorsement, dated the 30th January, 1906, I have the honour to furnish the following information bearing on the situation in Nejd.

2. On the 12th instant, I received a communication from the Political Agent, Bahrein, to the effect that an emissary of Ibn Saood, named Musaad-bin-Suweilim, had arrived at Bahrein via El Bida, and had called at the Agency. He informed Captain Prideaux that Ibn Saood felt himself strong enough to turn the Turks out of Hassa and Katif, and then wished to enter into Treaty relations with us, allowing us, if we desired, to keep a Political Officer in Hassa or Katif in return for our protecting him from a sea attack from the Turks.

Captain Prideaux expressed his personal doubts as to whether Ibn Saood was strong enough to free himself from the Turks, and otherwise refrained from giving any encouragement to Musaad's suggestions, and the old gentleman left the Agency in a somewhat disappointed mood, saying that he intended to proceed to Bushire by the next mail for medical treatment.

3. On the same date three Nejd Arabes arrived in Bushire, and I had their move-

ments watched, as reported in Political Diary for the week ending the 18th February, 1906. They proved to be Musaad-bin-Suweilim and two companions. They stayed with Najaf-bin-Ghalib, the Koweiti merchant living in Bushire, and on the 18th instant they sent a long and expensive telegram to His Majesty the Sultan in Romanized Arabic, of which I attach a translation. It will be seen that it actually purports to come from Sheikh Jasim-bin-Thani, but was evidently sent on behalf of, and in communication with, Ibn Saood.

With reference to the first-named veteran, it is interesting to note that at the end of the telegram, as transliterated for delivery to the telegraph office, he describes himself:

"Kayem Mekam Kaze Katr ve reiese ashayeraha ve kebayelleha al abduadek Jassim-al-Sani."

I am doubtful whether this is intended to mean:

"Kaim Mukam of the Kaza of Katr and Chief of its clans and tribes, the faithful slave Jassim-al-Thani"; or

"Kaim Mukam and Kazi of Katr and Chief of its clans and tribes, the faithful slave Jassim-al-Thani."

Whichever it be, Sheikh Jasim poses as the humble slave of His Majesty the Sultan, whereas, in a letter to the Political Agent, Bahrein, which must have been written about the same time as the above telegram, he rather went out of his way to mention the fact that he considered himself subject to Sheikh Esa of Bahrein.

4. The position seems to be that Ibn Saood is exasperated by the neglect of the Turks to suppress Ibn Rashid, and that he (Ibn Saood) and Sheikh Jasim, whose sympathies are with him, are sitting on the hedge at present, and apparently sent this representative, Musaad-bin-Suweilim, with instructions to sound the British Representative in the first place, and, if he received no encouragement from the latter, to proceed to Bushire and send the above telegram to the Sultan.

My informant tells me that the Arabs expected to receive their reply via Bussorah, and it was therefore no use their remaining here longer. They left again for Bahrein on the 21st instant, and I may mention that they did not visit the Residency during their stay in Bushire.

5. I am forwarding a copy of this communication to His Majesty's Consul, Bussorah, for information.

## Inclosure 4 in No. 10.

*Translation of a telegram dispatched in Romanized Arabic to His Majesty the Sultan, Constantinople, from Bushire, by a Representative of Ibn Saood and Sheikh Jasim-bin-Thani, on the 18th February, 1906.*

To His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, Commander of the Faithful, May God uphold his Imperial Throne with glory and victory.

WHEREAS my devotion, honesty, sincerity, friendliness, zeal, and sense of honour do not allow me to discontinue tendering advice to my religion, my Government, and my Sultan, whether they are accepted or not, a petition was previously made by this loyal slave, suggesting the undesirability of employing a body of Imperial troops against Ibn Saood—a course for which there was no necessity.

The effect of my advices is now apparent, as also are the disturbances caused by interested persons who are unable to derive profit in cash, money, or opportunity, except by creating difficulties and troubles like these under reference.

Indeed, I stated my opinion on the occurrence of each incident which I considered harmful to the Turkish Empire and to its faith and its subjects, and which emanated from Amir Abdul Aziz-bin-Rashid from the time when Amir Mohamed died, and the affairs of the State passed into the hands of the said Abdul Aziz-bin-Rashid.

He massacred the Faithful and plundered their property; he put men to death and killed children; and disturbance became general in the country, and the lawless Arabs were encouraged to infest the roads and highways along which the dependents of the Government dwelt.

When things came to this pass, pious men, seeing the harm suffered by Mussulmans, came forward and solicited Ibn Saood to ward off difficulties which befell them in their sorry plight. Accordingly, Ibn Saood arose and joined them. He expelled the evil-doers and wicked persons, and secured tranquillity to the country and people by his excellent behaviour and high character, and by his righteous services to the Great



Lord, the Commander of the Faithful, and the successor of the Prophet of God of the two worlds. He still remains ready to render service, and submissive to Government, and protects all the roads, and all the people testify to this. His is beloved by everybody in general. Ibn Saood has indeed repeatedly invoked favour, saying that he is an obedient servant of the Commander of the Faithful, and that he is neither schismatic nor a rebel. On the other hand, according to what I hear, Ibn Rashid ceases not to supply material for suspicion to interested persons, and to give them bribes with a view to their making misrepresentations and accusations; and therefore all the Mussulmans beseech the Great Lord and Commander of the Faithful not to listen to the statements of such interested persons who are the enemies of the State and of the Faith, and who are liars and false accusers. Similarly, I pray that this, my counsel, may not be treated with indifference; and the order and command rest with His Majesty; and may peace rest upon Mahomed and his family.

From Kaim Mukam 1, 2, Kazi of the Kaza, of Katr and Chief of its clans and tribes,

JASIM-AL-THANI.

[13409]

No. 11.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 20.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 8th March, relative to the arrival at Mufalis of a Turkish Revenue official and the consequent unrest among the tribesmen on the British side of the border within Mansuri limits.

*India Office, April 19, 1906.*

Inclosure 1 in No. 11.

*Government of Bombay to Government of India.*

(Confidential.)

*Bombay Castle, February 15, 1906.*

IN continuation of my letter dated the 9th February last, I am directed to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a letter from the Political Resident, Aden, dated the 4th February last and of its inclosures, regarding the arrival at Mufalis of a Turkish Revenue official, and the consequent unrest caused amongst the members of the Shujaifi tribe who reside on the British side of the border and within Mansuri limits.

2. I am at the same time to state that any remarks which the Bombay Government may desire to make on these papers will be communicated to the Government of India hereafter.

Inclosure 2 in No. 11.

*Major-General Mason to Government of Bombay.*

(Confidential.)

*Aden Residency, February 4, 1906.*

WITH reference to my letter dated the 28th ultimo, I have the honour to forward, for the further information of Government, copies of letters received, in the course of the week, from the Abdali Sultan, the Mansuri Sheikh, the Sha'bi Sheikh, Sheikh Darwish Battash, the Dubeni and Sheikh Sa'id-al-Jorabi.

2. From these it will appear that local excitement in the vicinity of Mufalis has, for the time being, subsided, and that there has been a mutual withdrawal of both parties from the border. It would at the same time appear that there is a possibility of trouble again arising after the forthcoming *Id*. And it seems that dues are actually still collected at the post of Al Doka by certain Arabs nominally, if not actually, on behalf of the Turks.

3. Under these circumstances it may be held desirable to address the Turkish authorities with a view to the withdrawal of their subjects from the post of Al Doka, and the careful avoidance of any form of encroachment on Shujafa and Shaabi lands, situated on the British side of the border. If desired, I can, of course, myself make the necessary communication to the Mutessarif of Taiz, through the Vice-Consul of Hodeida, and this would, in such cases, seem a convenient course to follow.

4. In regard to the small border disputes which occasionally arise on the Amiri border, it has hitherto been the practice for the Political Officer at Dthala to occasionally correspond direct with the Kaimakam of Kataba, and direct correspondence between local officials may frequently prove the most expeditious and the most convenient way of settling disputes of this nature.

5. If desired, intimation can, of course, be conveyed to the Shaabi Sheikh that he should himself take steps to effectively occupy the post of Al Doka, and to prevent the collection of dues there, but the peaceable withdrawal of Turkish subjects from that post would seem a desirable preliminary.

6. Of course, should Government decide that the Subehi country should be toured in by a Political Officer, as has been previously suggested, the settlement of the affairs of Shaab could be made one of his first objectives.

Inclosure 3 in No. 11.

*Sheikh Abdulkawi-bin-Mohamed to Major-General Mason.*

(After compliments.)

[Undated.]

I BEG to represent to Your Majesty's exalted Government that, after the intimidation and alarm to which the people of Shaab were subjected by the Kobati and Absi, a letter was received from Ahmed Fadhl informing them (people of Shaab) to remain in their houses, not to interfere with the Turkish soldiers or their subjects, that they are admitted under the protection of the British Government, and that, if any one should interfere with them, they might let him know, and he would represent the case to the Resident of Aden. They consequently were pacified, and enthusiastically prayed for your Government; they praised God and thanked Him for the same.

As to myself, personally, by the Grace of God, all the people from Taiz to the gate of Aden, including the Kaimakam of the Hojaria, and all the Sayads and Sheikhs, are my friends. I have been speaking unfavourably of the Turks and eulogizing the British Government. I have no enemy except three men; two are Kobati and an Absi, who is the Akil of the Ta'arita. He and the Arari were the cause of the Dareja incident. He wrote to them (Dareja people) to proclaim religious war, which they did. I went to the Kaimakam in connection with this matter; therefore I incurred the displeasure of Mohamed Nasir, and Fari 'Ayedth, who conspired against the Sha'bis, and caused the seizure of forty loads of bees belonging to them, for the redemption of which we had to pay 1,000 dollars. Eventually Mohamed Nasir was taken to Sana'a.

This was the cause of the enmity between the Absi, Kobati, and myself; the rest of the people, however, always come to me for advice, and are anxious to find out if there is any way of getting them admitted to the protection of the British Government. I am telling them to be patient.

When the survey party arrived at Wadi Ma'adin I informed Mr. FitzMaurice and his friends that Wadi Shaab was within the Subehi country. Mustafa Renzi and the military Lieutenant-Colonel then asked me to show proofs to that effect, and I had produced documentary proofs. These incidents had intensified the hostility of the Kobati against me. He went to the Modir of the district and complained against me, so I was locked up for three months and 115 dollars were recovered from Shaab. While I was in prison the Kobatis and Absis were informed that Shaab was within the British limit; nevertheless they ironically sent word to me to say "Bring the Rohillas" (meaning Aden troop sowars) "to remove us from Shaab."

The Kobati has been illegally using my lands, which he still retained, in spite of the order issued from Taiz forbidding him from encroaching on my lands.

I now beseech the illustrious British Government to adopt some measures regarding the Kobati, or that I might be allowed to fight for my right.

The custom-post question may not be forgotten, as it is the cause of trouble to the people of Shaab daily.

[1639]

D



We request, from the generosity and boundless liberality of Government, to assist me with what you can conveniently spare, even if it was on credit, as I have to celebrate a marriage during the *Id*. I was in the habit of getting presents from Saleh Jaffer and (Colonel) Hunter without any request.

Inclosure 4 in No. 11.

*Sultan Sir Ahmed Fadhl to Major-General Mason.*

(After compliments.)

4 *Al Hijja*, 1323 (January 31, 1906).

WE inform your Honour that we have received your letter dated the 26th January last, and in reply we inform you, O friend, firstly, that we shall write to the Akils of Shaab, as you have proposed, and shall advise Kayed No'man as hinted in your letter above referred to.

As regards Doka, the Turkish officials are still stationed there, and they have a little custom post. The people are much aggrieved for the same.

If you, O friend, can possibly address the Mutessarif of Taiz to order the removal of the custom post from Doka, please do so, and send it to us for transmission.

As for the soldiers who were at the Doka custom post, they are Abdulla Alwan-al-Attawari, Saeed Mohammed Ali Attawari, and Salim-al-Masri, the Zaidi. The last mentioned is a Subehi, and is not a Turkish subject.

We herewith send you the inclosed letter from all the people of Shaab, stating their grievances. Please return us the same, as well as the letter of Kayed No'man.

May you be preserved.

Inclosure 5 in No. 11.

*Sheikh Abd Ahmed and others to Sultan Sir Ahmed Fadhl.*

(After compliments.)

[Undated.]

WE have received your letter, in which you instructed us to remain in our houses. We hear, obey, and follow the order of a slave of the family of Sultan Fadhl Mohsin Fadhl, leave alone the order of the good master. By God and by God, since the withdrawal of the survey party, and Sheikh Abdul Kawi was imprisoned, we and the Shaabis have expended nearly 2,000 dollars up to date, and paid it to the Absi, Kobati, and others. The ornaments of our wives and our arms are mortgaged with the Absi up to the present day.

You have intimated to us that you will represent to the Resident what is happening to us. We ask you by the one who caused you to be a ruler to communicate our thousand of thousand salaams to him (the Resident), and tell him that as long as the custom post is established at Doka and the bad character and mysterious people and thieves of the Turkish subjects and Subehis congregate there, and as long as the Kobati is occupying lands at the Shaab and recover revenues from the Shaabi limit without right, we have no peace.

Sheikh Abdul Kawi had proceeded to Taiz to refer his complaint, and the Mutessarif had already decided that the Kobati should not encroach upon his neighbours, the subjects of Shaab, and that he should give over the lands which he had misappropriated from them. The Kobati consented and agreed to abide by the decision, but when he arrived in his country, he repudiated the order, and said, "Tell Abdul Kawi to bring the Rohillas (Aden troop) from Khor Maksar and the slave of his father Ahmed (Abdali) to raise my hand from Shaab."

O, our lord and master, please inform the Resident that as long as the Kobati and custom post are still existing, Shaab does not belong to its people, nor is it under British protection. The people at the custom post have consumed privately and openly all our animals. Daily there is a row between them and our young men.

The Kobati, on the 28th Sha'aban of the current year, raided Shaab, and a fight took place between them and us. The whole time there was firing from both sides, and the party in the custom post has supported them. The other tribes had also assisted in stopping us from going into their markets and interrupted us on the road. O, Master Sultan Ahmed, we feel sure that all the tribesmen from Taiz to Aden do not fear either

of the two Governments as they fear you. If you will look severely on the Kobati, &c., as your predecessor, the late Sultan Fadhl-bin-Ali, used to do, by writing them, they would not have ventured to trespass on Shaab. We pray to God to prolong your life and give you victory against your enemies. We cannot reward you except to say prayers for you.

The Zaidi is assisting the Kobati, either by day or night; they at times raid on us, and at other times rob from the Shaab. We shall now remain in our houses, and the condition of the country is as you see and hear.

Inclosure 6 in No. 11.

*Sheikh Shahir-bin-Sef to Major-General Mason.*

(After compliments.)

22 *Al K'ida*, 1323 (January 17, 1906)

WE had addressed you in the month of Ramadhan regarding our children (subjects) who are under the British Government, and who had been wrongly encroached upon by the Sublime Government. They were treated in a harsh manner that makes the body shudder, so they came crying to us. We had referred the matter to you and received a special intimation from you that Shaab was under the protection of the great Government.

Verily, O master, these are conspicuous places of which 'Uzlat (country) of Mufalis and its dependencies and Sahar are under one Akil, who is of our children (subjects). These people came crying on the advent of Government, knowing that these places had been decided by the Boundary Commission of the Powers as a British limit, which fact you are well aware of. We have summoned the Akils of the Subehis on the arrival of the Sublime Porte on the border, with a view of recovering dues from the people above referred to. We have encamped on the border of the frontier. Bin Khodam and the sons of Kasim Mokbil the Dubeni, as well as all the Jorabis, have joined us; everyone had garrisoned his own border. Nasir Imad and Shouter did not fail to render assistance and service. About 300 men of our people were with us, and we have sustained considerable expenses for the sake of the great Government. We have met Ahmed No'man, the official of the Sublime Porte, and discussed the matter with him. We have finally arrived at an understanding that each party should abstain from trespassing, and that we should refer the matter to the British Government, while he would represent the same to the Turkish Government. This is what had happened. Your wisdom is sufficient. Please expedite your reply, with particulars.

May you be preserved.

Inclosure 7 in No. 11.

*Sultan Sir Ahmed Fadhl to Major-General Mason.*

(After compliments.)

29 *Al K'ida*, 1323 (January 25, 1906).

WE inform your Honour that we have heard that Saleh-bin-Ahmed, the Mansuri, had collected fifty men of the Mansuri tribesmen and took them to the Shujaifi country, in direction of Shaab, with the intention of fighting the Turkish soldiers. On hearing this report, we did not approve of it, as we are perfectly sure that if all the Subehis will assemble they cannot resist the Turks. It is better that, if any encroachment is made by the Turkish soldiers, the matter of checking them should be conducted through you, either by amicable understanding or by force, and not through the Mansuri, unless you approve of the same.

May you be preserved.

Inclosure 8 in No. 11.

*Sheikh Darwish Battash to Major-General Mason.*

(After compliments.)

4 *Al Hijja*, 1323 (January 1906).

WE wish to inform your Honour that Sheikh Saleh-bin-Ahmed-al-Mansuri and his tribesmen came to Shaab and summoned the Sheikhs of the Subehis, of whom I was one.



We proceeded thence and inquired about the cause of the invitation. He replied that whoever was a friend and helper to the British Government, he must garrison and defend the frontier of the said Government. We said we cannot do so without order from Government. He therefore showed us a letter from you, addressed to Sheikh Shahir in the month of Ramadthan, purporting that Shaab was under the protection of the great Government. We thereupon acquiesced and garrisoned the borders of the frontier. Sheikh Ahmed No'man arrived on the 28th Al Ki'da, on behalf of the Sublime Porte, and we have mutually come to an understanding that each of us should represent the matter to his own Government. In conclusion, we do not know the limit of the Government. We know only the extent of our own territory, so we were afraid to venture at a thing which might not be satisfactory to Government. Hence we represent the matter to you, lest we should get into trouble. We request your answer, on which we may rely.

Salutation.

Inclosure 9 in No. 11.

*Sheikh Saeed Al Jorabi to Major-General Mason.*

(After compliments.)

[Undated.]

WE inform your Honour, in connection with the previous news regarding the Turkish Government on the border, that their [F] has on Sunday last been withdrawn to the Upper Mufalis, after the interview which was held.

All the tribes, who were encamped on the edge of the border, have also returned to their respective homes, and we likewise returned to our homes on Tuesday, the 5th Al Hijja (30th January, 1906). Sheikh Saleh-bin-Ahmed, the Mansuri, has also gone back to his house.

It is alleged by the people that the Turks will come again after the *Id*.

[13410]

No. 12.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 20.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 8th March, relative to Katr affairs.

*India Office, April 19, 1906.*

Inclosure 1 in No. 12.

*Government of India to Major Cox.*

(Confidential.)

Sir,

*Fort William, March 2, 1906.*

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 21st January, 1906, forwarding reports from Captain Prideaux regarding Katr affairs, and announcing the death of Sheikh Ahmed-bin-Thani.

2. In reply, I am to say that the Government of India approve of the instructions mentioned in paragraph 2 of your letter which you have communicated to Captain Prideaux for his guidance.

3. I am further to say that Captain Prideaux' reports have been read with interest, but that the Government of India consider that he would have been more prudent if he had refrained from referring to the question of a Treaty in the terms reported in the opening sentence of paragraph 5 of his letter dated the 23rd December, 1905. I am to request that, should you see no objection, Captain Prideaux may be informed accordingly.

I have, &c.

(Signed) R. E. HOLLAND,  
Assistant Secretary to the Government of India.

Inclosure 2 in No. 12.

*Major Cox to Government of India.*

*Bushire, January 21, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, copies of the communications which I have received from the Political Agent, Bahrein, regarding Katr affairs.

The first contains an account of a visit paid by Captain Prideaux to the tents of Sheikh Jasim-bin-Thani in connection with a Judicial Commission which had to be executed, as well as with a view to collecting information for the "Gazetteer" now under preparation. It will, I think, be interesting to Government on general grounds.

The second treats of a separate interview which the Political Agent had during the same excursion with the other brother, Sheikh Ahmed-bin-Thani.

This report throws a good deal of useful light on the position in Al Katr, and on that of the Thani family in relation to Turkey, and it is a matter for regret that since it was penned a rumour has been received, and is now corroborated, of the murder of Sheikh Ahmed by one of his own Arab retainers.

2. I am instructing Captain Prideaux to keep himself and me closely informed with regard to any change in the position which may result from the death of Sheikh Ahmed, and to maintain vigilance in regard to Odeid, the suggested inclination of the Turks to again attempt to place a Mudir there, and the apparent ambition of the Bin Thani family to occupy it.

Beyond this the report seems to call for no special comment from me at the present juncture.

3. The case of Nasir-bin-Mubarak is being dealt with separately in another communication of to-day's date.

Inclosure 3 in No. 12.

*Captain Prideaux to Major Cox.*

*Bahrein, December 23, 1905.*

I HAVE the honour to submit the following report, giving an account of my visit last month to Sheikhs Jasim- and Ahmed-bin-Thani of Katr.

2. My ostensible object was to record the evidence of Sheikh Jasim under a Commission received from the High Court of Bombay in connection with a civil suit between Sheikh Esa-bin-Khalifa and Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdul Latif Mooshari. Both the litigants are well-known pearl merchants, and their families originally came from Bahrein. I had also previously written to the Sheikhs that I was anxious to purchase a horse for Government service, and that there were various commercial cases between British subjects and residents of, or refugees to, Bid'a which I wished to discuss.

3. I started from Manama in a native sailing-boat ("mashuwa") at 2 A.M. on the 8th November, taking with me the Agency Interpreter, Mr. Inam-ul-Hak, the Probationer Munshi Mirza Abdul Rasul, a non-commissioned officer, and five riflemen of my guard and the agents of the two parties to the civil suit.

4. We reached Lusail at 11 A.M. on the 9th November, but found Sheikh Jasim's *soi-disant* fort locked up and quite deserted except for a negro slave and his family, who acted as caretakers of the place. The Sheikh was reported to be in camp 12 miles away in the interior, and I therefore was compelled to write and ask him to send me some transport to enable me to reach his tents. The Sheikh's camels and donkeys appeared on the following morning, and we reached Bu Hasa, our destination, at 2 P.M.

4. At Lusail, with the exception of two or three mud huts at the back of the fort, which are doubtless the abodes of some of the Sheikh's servants, there is nothing in the nature of a settled village. At about half-a-mile distant, however, along the coast there was a large cluster of black Bedouin tents, whose occupants appeared to be more maritime than nomad in their pursuits, judging from the number of pearling-boats drawn up on the beach in front of them. I imagine that the families of these people remain here generally throughout the year.

[1639]

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5. The only wells belonging to Lusail are a couple that have been dug at the foot of a rocky hillock about 1,000 yards inland. The water is extremely brackish. On the top of the hillock is a two-storeyed watch-tower, which can be seen from several miles inland.

6. The first 2 miles of our road were through heavy sand. After that the country changed to hard, strong, undulating ground, with rocky mounds and numerous hollows, which evidently produced good crops of grass, and looked as if they should be culturable. Not a tree, however, did we see until at about 5 miles from the coast we surmounted a low ridge and came upon a most refreshing and unexpected sight—a garden inclosed by a neat and low mud wall, 100 by 200 yards in area, and bordered by a line of tamarisk trees on all sides. Within were three masonry Persian wells of the largest size, worked by donkeys, and irrigating large plots of lucerne grass, as well as a number of pomegranate trees and some 300 date-palms. The garden was only started, I am told, a very few years ago by Sheikh Jasim, but its waters were said by my followers to be better than any they had tested in Bahrein. The gardeners were all negroes. In addition to their quarters, the garden contained a small double-storeyed rest-house and a narrow verandah-like mosque. The name of this oasis is Sakhamma.

7. Bu Hasa was some 6½ or 7 miles further on. On our way we saw to the southward, some 3 or 4 miles distant, the trees of another fertile oasis, Mazruwa, but that all the lowlands were not equally fortunate in their possession of water was proved by a forsaken well which had been dug in a grassy hollow between Lusail and Sakhamma, the water of which had been found to be quite useless for purposes of irrigation. The Bu Hasa oasis consists of some 300 acres of low land, all green, with a coarse grass that grows in raised clumps. It contains only one well, 30 fathoms deep, but the water is good, and sufficient for the needs of the Sheikh's entourage and the half-dozen other tents of Bedouin whom we found encamped there. The place must apparently be almost a lake after heavy rain, and one fall had already occurred before our visit, at a much earlier date than rain is ever expected in Bahrein. The tents were pitched at considerable distances from each other, on the spurs of the surrounding more elevated ground, while Sheikh Jasim's five or six mares and a small flock of fine sheep and goats grazed in the centre. The Sheikh's camels appeared to be very numerous, and it was difficult to understand how they obtained sufficient food in so treeless a country.

8. At Bu Hasa I stayed three nights, having several interviews with the Sheikh, besides recording his evidence for the High Court of Bombay, and collecting useful information from other persons for the "Persian Gulf Gazetteer." Sheikh Jasim had furnished one of his best goat-hair black tents with carpets and camel saddles for myself and my following, and treated us most hospitably in other respects as well.

9. I was much taken aback when at our first meeting, which took place in my tent, the Sheikh introduced me to his son-in-law, Nasir-bin-Mubarak, of the Bahrein family, and told me that he had specially ridden over from his camp the previous day to meet me. In the circumstances, I considered it would be impolitic not to hear what Sheikh Nasir had to say. I accordingly gave him a private interview subsequently, and am addressing you a separate letter on the subject.

10. Sheikh Jasim-bin-Thani is a typical patriarch of the ancient type, about 80 years of age, with long white beard, and nearly blind from ophthalmia, but still vigorous in mind and healthy in body. He is said to have had nearly a hundred wives, and he is evidently very proud of his youngest son—a boy of about 6 years—whom I saw. The Sheikh is still much interested in politics, but he told me that he had retired from all administrative work, and that he could not help me in the other matters in connection with which I had come to Katr. His brother Ahmed afterwards aptly described Sheikh Jasim's character in saying that he was a plotter of new projects every day of his life, so that I do not think that anything was said in the course of our conversations of sufficient importance to call for repetition here.

11. I was disappointed at not seeing Sheikh Ahmed in Sheikh Jasim's camp, as he was aware that I had expressed a wish to meet him there. It seems, however, that a certain amount of latent jealousy exists between the two brothers, and the presence of Nasir-bin-Mubarak, whom he does not like, also probably contributed to keep the younger brother away. In the circumstances I found it necessary to return to my boat at Lusail and to sail round to Doha (*cum*-Bid'a) if I wished to get any satisfaction for the numerous claims that had been accumulating against people of that place.

12. We took twenty-two hours to accomplish this short journey of 15 miles. Sheikh Ahmed received me in most friendly style, and put me up in his guest-room,

making my clerical staff and sepoys most comfortable elsewhere. Scarcely had we settled down when two subordinate Turkish officials came over from the fort to protest against our landing, and especially against that of the sepoys. I told them that I had come to Doha to discuss certain commercial claims of British subjects (the total sum involved was about 45,000 rupees) with the Ruler of the place, that I had previously been twice on a similar errand to Katif, that I had my guard with me as those waters were notoriously unsafe, and that I had brought the men ashore as their religious scruples prevented them from cooking any food upon the boat. Sheikh Ahmed told the two Turks that he would go round and see their Bimbashi, which after a short delay he did, and at the interview between them he seems to have promised that he would get rid of us in an hour, for after he had returned to us and conversed for that length of time the two Turks again came in and announced that the time was up! By this time a strong wind had sprung up, accompanied by rain. It was quite impossible for us to leave, and Sheikh Ahmed told us not to trouble ourselves. The Turks after a few threatening words to the Sheikh departed, and we did not see them again, although in the evening we walked over most of the town.

13. Sheikh Ahmed-bin-Thani struck me as being a somewhat extraordinary character and at the same time an extremely astute man. He appears to be about 45 years of age, and though he once professed in conversation to be only one of a Mejlis that rules his town, he evidently enjoys much popularity and influence over his subjects. He showed rather a partizan spirit in talking over the cases I brought to his notice, and I was not able definitely to settle any one of them. The Sheikh promised, however, in most of the cases to make the defendants settle with their creditors in the course of one or two months or else to either send them over to Bahrein or to drive them out elsewhere. I hope, therefore, that some beneficial results will be attained soon. Whenever a point was hard pressed against him he would break into most infectious roars of laughter, though the causes were hard to find, and to such an extent as almost to make one question his sanity. There is no doubt, however, that the people of Bahrein and Katr regard him as being a strong and clever man, and that none of the younger members of the family stand out with any prominence over each other.

14. I sailed from Doha at 10 A.M. on the 16th November, and reached Bahrein at 11 P.M. on the 19th after a most tedious voyage, well pleased at its satisfactory termination.

#### Inclosure 4 in No. 12.

*Captain Prideaux to Major Cox.*

(Confidential.)

*Bahrein, December 23, 1905.*

WITH reference to correspondence ending with my letter dated the 28th June, 1905, on the subject of the political position in the Katr Peninsula, I have the honour to submit the following description of a conversation I had with Sheikh Ahmed-bin-Thani on the 15th November, 1905, at his residence in (Doha) Bid'a.

2. After talking of various minor matters, I asked the Sheikh whether he in reality was now the Kaïmakam of Bid'a or whether his brother still was, and whether he had ever received a formal warrant of any description conferring on him the post and title.

3. Sheikh Ahmed replied in the negative, saying, "What do I want with a warrant or title from the Sultan? Am I not in possession of my father's house and Ruler of this place?" I answered that the Turks seemed to have a good deal of power over him, and he replied, "Yes, God's curses upon them! But what can I do?" I waited for some time to see if the Sheikh would not make some reference to the possibility of his coming under British protection, and as he did not, I referred to the recent visit that Sheikh Hamad-bin-Esa of Bahrein had paid him, and asked if the subject of Zubara had been mooted between them. Sheikh Ahmed replied in the affirmative, and asked me with a considerable display of interest whether the Government of India would now allow the place to be again colonized.

4. I understood, knowing Sheikh Hamad's wishes on the subject, that he had been sounding Sheikh Ahmed as to whether he would oppose a Colony being established at Zubara from Bahrein, and I accordingly replied that Government would never allow the settlement of a party hostile to Bahrein at Zubara, but that I did not quite know



whether they would consent to a friendly Colony from Bahrein living there. For the immediate future I doubted very much whether such a permission would be given.

5. After some further talk on various subjects, and in particular on recent events in Bahrein in connection with the deportation of Sheikh Ali-bin-Ahmed, I at last remarked that I supposed that our recent acts had caused my host to change his views about the desirability of a Treaty with the Government of India similar to those of the Trucial Chiefs. Sheikh Ahmed replied that he would be glad to have such a Treaty, but with the Turks in their present position how could he make one? Would we drive them out of Bid'a for him? To this I answered that the British and Turkish Governments were on friendly terms, and that nothing of the sort could be effected except by diplomacy.

6. I felt considerable surprise and at the same time some relief that Sheikh Ahmed should be found in this frame of mind, believing as I do that it is an extremely difficult matter for us to evict the Turks from Bid'a. I had been under the impression that Sheikh Ahmed knew my predecessor Mr. Gaskin well, but I learnt that he had only once met him in Colonel Meade's time on board the Royal Indian mail steamer "Lawrence" off Wakra.

7. After my return to Bahrein I sent for Abdul Rahman Wazzan, Sheikh Ahmed-bin-Thani's Agent here, and asked him to tell me how Sheikh Ahmed had come to ask for British protection of Mr. Gaskin. The Agent informed me that Sheikh Ahmed's request had been for permission to form a Settlement at Odeid. Mr. Gaskin had told the Agent that this would never be permitted, and inquired whether Zubara would not be considered an equally acceptable place, to which the Agent had replied in the affirmative.

8. In Mr. Gaskin's letter dated the 22nd March, 1902, to your address, it will be observed that nothing is stated to show that Sheikh Ahmed was aware that the offer of residence at Zubara was being contemplated for him, and I feel very doubtful whether his Agent Abdul Rahman Wazzan ever did more than to tell him that he would not be allowed to establish a Settlement at Odeid. A remark which Sheikh Jasim-bin-Thani made to me the other day, that he believed the Turks were shortly going to appoint a Mudir again at Odeid, acquires a greater significance from this discovery, and it seems to me that the strongest ambition of the Thani family, next to the establishment of their independence from both Turks and British in Bid'a, is to wrest the possession of Odeid once more from the hands of the Chief of Abu Dhabbi.

9. In my humble opinion, if the Thani family are ever allowed to settle themselves at Zubara or any other point in the northern half of the peninsula, the Turks will only the more insistently follow them there, and their grasp on the Katr Peninsula will be proportionately tightened.

Inclosure 5 in No. 12.

Captain Prideaux to Major Cox.

Bahrein, December 30, 1905.

WITH reference to this Office diary entry dated the 22nd December, 1905, I have the honour to report that the rumour of the death of Sheikh Ahmed-bin-Thani of Bid'a is now universally believed in Bahrein to be correct.

2. Owing to the stormy weather which has prevailed during the last three weeks, communication between Katr and Bahrein has been almost entirely suspended; two or three boats have, however, arrived here, and there can no longer be much doubt that the Chief was shot dead by one of his own servants, who belonged to the Makhadhdhaba section of the Beni Hajir. It is reported that, on hearing of the news, the Elders of the Beni Hajir all repaired to Sheikh Jasim-bin-Thani's camp to express their regret, and that they threw down their arms before him, offering to submit to any suitable punishment. The Chief replied that a son and nephew of his had started with 100 men in pursuit of the murderer, and that if they succeeded in killing him and the whole of his family the feud would be ended. In no other event would he forgive the tribe.

3. A Beni Hajir tribesman who has recently arrived in this island from Dthaharan has stated that the murderer and his relatives are seeking refuge in that district.

It seems probable that the culprit will in due time meet with punishment unless the Ajman tribe give him shelter.

4. A fresh report, which requires confirmation, is to the effect that in revenge

for the murder another servant of Sheikh Ahmed-bin-Thani has murdered Sheikh Salim-bin-Shafi, the Chief of the Makhadhdhaba in Sheikh Jasim-bin-Thani's camp. If this is actually the case there would seem to be a probability of considerable unrest in the Katr Peninsula.

[13412]

No. 13.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 20.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 8th March, relative to Bahrein affairs.

India Office, April 19, 1906.

Inclosure 1 in No. 13.

Government of India to Major Cox.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Fort William, March 2, 1906.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 21st January, 1906, on the subject of a representation made by Sheikh Esa's outlawed cousin Nasir-bin-Mubarak, begging that the Government of India may intervene in order to effect a reconciliation between himself and the Sheikh.

2. In reply, I am to say that the Government of India approve your proposal that an answer should be sent to Nasir-bin-Mubarak on the lines indicated in paragraph 3 of your letter.

I have, &c.

(Signed) R. E. HOLLAND,  
Assistant Secretary to the Government of India.

Inclosure 2 in No. 13.

Major Cox to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Bushire, January 21, 1906.

WITH reference to Foreign Department letter dated the 7th May, 1903, I have the honour to forward, for the consideration of the Government of India, copy of a communication received from the Political Agent at Bahrein, which gives cover to a representation from Sheikh Esa's outlawed cousin, Nasir-bin-Mubarak, begging that the British Government will intervene in order to effect a reconciliation between himself and the Ruler of Bahrein.

For convenience of perusal, I have interpolated among the inclosures of Captain Prideaux's Report copies of Nasir-bin-Mubarak's letter to me of the 8th May last and of my letter dated the 13th June communicating my instructions to the Political Agent in regard thereto.

2. With such an ensanguined basis as it has, I am inclined to think that the hatred which Sheikh Esa bears towards his cousin is too natural and bitter to admit of reasonable hope that any *bond fide* reconciliation is possible between the families during the lifetime of the present Ruler; and that it would save us trouble rather to let matters remain as they are than to take action, which if it had the effect of making way for Nasir's return to Bahrein, would introduce into the Principality a probable element of unrest or difficulty which does not now exist.

I have little doubt that any overtures from us in this direction would be unpalatable to Sheikh Esa; still more so would be the necessity for suitable pecuniary allowances which would be an inevitable corollary of such intervention.

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3. Primarily, therefore, I would be inclined to suggest that we continue to stand aloof, and inform Nasir-bin-Mubarak that, in view of the past, the Government of India do not consider they have sufficient grounds for intervening in order to press a reconciliation upon Sheikh Esa, but that in saying this they wish in no way to discourage him from making such friendly efforts on his own behalf to arrive at a reconciliation with his cousin as may seem good to him.

4. If, however, in view of Nasir's friendly meeting and peaceable overtures to Captain Prideaux, the Government of India would prefer to adopt a somewhat more benevolent attitude towards him, I see no great objection to our asking Sheikh Esa if he would be prepared to entertain proposals for reconciliation if made through us. On the whole, however, I am inclined to doubt the practical wisdom of such a course.

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Inclosure 3 in No. 13.

*Nasir-bin-Mubarak to Colonel Kemball.*

(Translation.)

3 Rabi-al-Awal, 1323 Hijri (May 8, 1905).

I BEG to state the following for favour of your kind consideration and reply :—

You are aware that I am of the Al Abdallah, and it is a matter of common knowledge that I have landed interests in Bahrein. The Turkish Government approached me, years ago, with the request that I should sell to them my rights in Bahrein, but that could not be arranged. Afterwards I thought that I should assail Bahrein, and decide by force of arms as to whose is the right of sovereignty in Bahrein.

But now, since I am assured that Bahrein has come under British protection, and I respect British authority, I have said truce to all thoughts of assailing Bahrein. Sheikh Esa has all this time been appropriating to himself the revenues of the island. I submit that he has no right, and especially to usurp my rights over half of Bahrein.

I now beg to say that since your Government is a Government of justice, and since I am an injured person, you should do me justice and have me restored to my rights and privileges. Failing to achieve my object, I shall sell all my rights to the Turkish Government.

I hope you will kindly favour me with an early reply.

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Inclosure 4 in No. 13.

*Major Cox to Captain Prideaux.*

*Bushire, June 13, 1905.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 1st June, inclosing translation of a letter from Nasir-bin-Mubarak to my address.

2. We can only regard Nasir-bin-Mubarak as a subject of Sheikh Esa in rebellion, and I think the proper course is to ignore the letter and refuse to hold any communication with the writer except through Sheikh Esa.

In fact, I think it would be worth while your telling Sheikh Esa now that you have had a letter from Nasir expressing a desire to communicate with you, and are ignoring it, and adding that you mention the fact to him is case he can suggest any reason for the rebel writing to you now.

Presumably Sheikh Esa knows his movements.

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Inclosure 5 in No. 13.

*Captain Prideaux to Major Cox.*

*Bahrein, December 23, 1905.*

WITH reference to correspondence ending with your letter dated the 13th June, 1905, on the subject of Nasir-bin-Mubarak, I have the honour to inclose a copy of the letter which I at once addressed to Sheikh Esa in accordance with your instructions, and a translation of the Chief's reply thereto.

2. In the circumstances, I was much embarrassed last month at unexpectedly meeting Sheikh Nasir in his father-in-law, Sheikh Jasim-bin-Thani's camp at Bu Hasa, as my refusal to listen to him would have certainly annoyed my host. I decided, therefore, to give Sheikh Nasir some good advice, and I am glad to be able now to forward a translation of a letter, dated the 6th Shawwal, 1323 (the 3rd December, 1905), which the refugee has sent to me on the lines I suggested to him. I told Nasir distinctly that there was little chance of Government's pressing Sheikh Esa to allow him to return to Bahrein, but that they would undoubtedly be glad to hear of the reconciliation, if it could be effected, and that submission on his part would, at any rate, perhaps benefit his descendants after Sheikh Esa's decease. Sheikh Nasir met Sheikh Hamad in Doha a few weeks previous to this conversation, though I am not certain whether the interview was prearranged.

3. Sheikh Nasir is exactly the same age as Sheikh Esa, but looks much stronger and younger. It has been our policy always to support Sheikh Esa against Sheikh Nasir after the people had chosen the former for their Chief—Sheikh Esa himself, as well as others, has related to me the story that the Government actually offered Nasir to the people of Bahrein as an alternative Ruler—but, according to his lights, Sheikh Nasir seems to have lived an honourable life, and I do not think that he is altogether undeserving of sympathy.

4. At the commencement of our interview the Sheikh told me that he only asked the British Government to stand neutral, and he would soon capture the islands; he would guarantee at the same time that no pillaging of private property would occur. I told him that the Government had guaranteed the Ruler of Bahrein against all external enemies, and that they would not consent ever again to see the Government of the islands divided into two. I then asked him why he had never taken to pearl-dealing after the example of his father-in-law. On this Sheikh Jasim interposed with the remark that it would not be fitting for a Prince to engage in commerce. I have heard the same remark from lesser lights of the family in Bahrein.

5. On my return to Bahrein I explained to Sheikh Esa the awkward circumstances in which I had been placed, and told him that I had not in any way sought the interview. I have said nothing about the receipt of the letter since from Sheikh Nasir as there are so many other more pressing matters under discussion with the Chief.

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Inclosure 6 in No. 13.

*Captain Prideaux to Sheikh Esa-bin-Ali.*

*Bahrein, June 22, 1905.*

(After compliments.)

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I have recently received a letter from Nasir-bin-Mubarak, stating that he has something to communicate to me, and expressing a wish that I may meet him either in Katar or in Katif.

As Nasir-bin-Mubarak is your subject, and is in rebellion against you, I do not intend to hold any communication with him unless he makes his submission to you. Can you suggest any reason for his writing to me now?

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Inclosure 7 in No. 13.

*Sheikh Esa-bin-Ali to Captain Prideaux.*

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

19 Rabi-al-Thani, 1323 H. (June 23, 1905).

I AM in receipt of your letter of yesterday's date, and I feel extremely obliged to you for the regard you have shown to me in the case of the rebel Nasir-bin-Mubarak. It is quite the right thing that you propose to do, namely, to hold no correspondence with the said person, who is a notorious rebel, and who was the cause of the murder of my father, Shiekh Ali-bin-Khalifa, in 1286 H. Since that time he has declared himself in open rebellion against us, and has been an outlaw from Bahrein; I have never had any good feeling for him.



Inclosure 8 in No. 13.

*Sheikh Nasir-bin-Mubarak to Captain Prideaux.*

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

6 Shawwal, 1323 H. (December 3, 1905).

I BEG to say that I am anxious to be reconciled to the Chief of Bahrein, and to be allowed to live in the country of my ancestors. I have abandoned all hopes of recovering the heritage of my grandfather, and I submit to the decision of the British Government and of the people of Bahrein that there should be only one of the Al Khalifa as Ruler of Bahrein.

I wish only to reside in Bahrein as a subject of the Chief like the other members of the Al Khalifa. If the British Government will mediate and effect a reconciliation between me and my cousin Sheikh Esa-bin-Ali and will persuade the latter to bestow suitable allowances upon me and my brethren of the Al Abdallah section, I strictly bind myself to abandon all such ways as may result in mischief. I am not responsible for the events which under God's will occurred in the past, as I was young and ignorant, and a follower of Sheikh Muhammad-bin-Abdallah. I hope to God that a reconciliation will be effected between the Al Abdallah and the Al Selman, and that this may be achieved through the efforts of the British Government.

The order is yours, &c.

[13434]

No. 14.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 20.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 8th February, relative to the flying of the Union Jack in the Aden Hinterland.

*India Office, April 19, 1906.*

Inclosure 1 in No. 14.

*Government of Bombay to Government of India.*

Sir,

*Bombay Castle, November 28, 1905.*

I AM directed to submit, for the favourable consideration of the Government of India, a recommendation that the Political Officer at Dthala should be allowed to fly the Union Jack in the Aden Hinterland, where he is the Representative of Government.

2. The British flag carries influence and is known in the Aden Protectorate, and flags are given to some of the Chiefs to fly. I am therefore to request that the Government of India may be moved to accord sanction to the recommendation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) S. W. EDGERLEY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 14.

*Government of India to Government of Bombay.*

Sir,

*Fort William, February 8, 1906.*

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of the Hon. Sir S. W. Edgerley's letter dated the 28th November, 1905, recommending that the Political Officer at Dthala should be allowed to fly the Union Jack in the Aden Hinterland, where he is the Representative of Government.

2. The Government of India concur in the recommendation of the Bombay Government, but they are of opinion that, instead of issuing a special authorization enabling the Political Officer to fly a flag, it would be simpler to grant him the local rank of Political Agent, by notification in the "Bombay Gazette," when he will, *ipso facto*, become entitled to the privilege in question. I am to inquire whether His Excellency the Governor in Council sees any objection to the adoption of this course.

3. I am also to draw attention to the fact that sanction has recently been accorded by the Government of India for the display of a flag over the fort at Dthala.

I have, &c.

(Signed) R. E. HOLLAND,

*Assistant Secretary to the Government of India.*

Inclosure 3 in No. 14.

*Government of India to Lieutenant-General Commanding, Western Command.*

Sir,

*Fort William, December 15, 1905.*

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your Memorandum dated the 1st November, 1905, recommending the issue of a Union Jack and flagstaff to each of the posts at Dthala, Suleik, and Nobat Dakim, in the Aden Hinterland.

2. It appears that Suleik and Nobat Dakim are forts, while Dthala is a camp dominated by a fort. It is represented that it is desirable that the tribes in the hinterland should see and learn to respect the British flag.

3. In reply I am to say that the Government of India sanction the supply and replacement when worn out, of a flag, union, 6 feet by 3 feet, and a camp flagstaff, 46 feet, for each of the posts in question.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. T. KENNY,

*Deputy Secretary to Government of India.*

[13590]

No. 15.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 21.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a despatch to the Government of India, No. 15, Secret, dated 13th April, 1906, with inclosures, relative to the reported intention of Abdul Aziz-bin-Saood to visit the Pirate Coast and Oman.

*India Office, April 20, 1906.*

Inclosure in No. 15.

*Mr. Morley to Governor-General the Earl of Minto.*

(Secret.)

My Lord,

*India Office, April 13, 1906.*

I HAVE received the letter of your Excellency's Government in the Foreign Department, dated the 11th January last, informing me of the reported intention of the Wahabi Ameer Abdul Aziz-bin-Saood to visit the Pirate Coast and Oman, and of his threatened interference with the affairs of those districts.

2. In view of the serious consequences which would follow such action by the Ameer, you recommend that, in the event of his not giving satisfactory assurances as to his intentions, a warning should be addressed to him that any attempt on his part to interfere in Oman or along the Arab coast, either with the Chiefs or with their

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subjects, will be regarded as an unfriendly act, and that suitable measures will be taken to frustrate it.

3. I forward herewith, for the information and guidance of your Excellency's Government, a copy of correspondence\* with the Foreign Office on the subject.

4. His Majesty's Government accept the view that a warning to the Ameer would be necessary if he were to carry out his reported intention. They consider, however, that it would be better that such warning should be conveyed to him only in the event of his appearing upon the coast, and that it should then be conveyed to him directly, as proposed by Sir N. O'Connor.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) JOHN MORLEY.

[14684]

No. 16.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 30.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, a paraphrase of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 26th April, relative to the Muscat Arbitration Award.

*India Office, April 30, 1906.*

Inclosure in No. 16.

*Mr. Morley to Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.) P.  
MUSCAT.

*April 26, 1906.*

What is present state of negotiations?

French Government are stated by French Minister to be very anxious His Majesty's Government should accept list of dhow-owners delivered to Major Grey on the 4th March, difficulties as to which are said to have been settled by negotiations between Grey and M. Laronce.

Names of certain Zanzibaris, regarding whom occurrence of incidents in future ought to be guarded against, and whom the Sultan of Muscat claimed wrongfully as his subjects, are also stated to be included.

In regard to these men, please see my telegram of 6th ultimo, and letter dated the 16th December, 1905, from Major Grey.

[14553]

No. 17.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 30.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, a paraphrase of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 29th instant, relative to Nejd affairs.

*India Office, April 30, 1906.*

\* Not printed.

Inclosure in No. 17.

*Government of India to Mr. Morley.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*April 29, 1906.*

WE have received following telegram, dated the 25th April, from Resident, Persian Gulf, regarding affairs in Nejd:—

"News of surprise and annihilation of Bin Rashid and his immediate following by Bin Saood has been received by Sheikh of Mohammerah in letter by special messenger from Sheikh of Koweit."

[15448]

No. 18.

*Sir N. O'Connor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 7.)*

(No. 292.)

*Constantinople, May 1, 1906.*

Sir,  
WITH reference to my despatch No. 189, Confidential, of the 20th March, and to previous correspondence respecting the proposed visit of the Wahabi Emir to the Pirate Coast and Oman, I have the honour to report that I have received telegrams from His Majesty's Acting Consul at Jeddah and His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah, stating that news has been received in both places of fighting between Abdul Aziz-bin-Rashid, of Nejd, and the Wahabi Emir Abdul Aziz-bin-Saood, in which the former and 250 of his followers have been killed.

In my despatch No. 373 of the 16th May, 1904, I drew attention to the serious consequences which might ensue if Ibn Saood succeeded in his object of conquering Hail, the stronghold of the Nejd Emirate, and re-establishing a Wahabi dynasty throughout the centre of Arabia; and if the present report of the defeat and death of Ibn Rashid prove true, the result can only be to enhance the importance of Ibn Saood and to oblige us to watch with greater care his relations with the Sheikh of Koweit and the Trucial Chiefs.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

[15458]

No. 19.

*Sir N. O'Connor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 7.)*

(No. 301.)

*Pera, May 1, 1906.*

Sir,  
WITH reference to the Marquess of Lansdowne's despatch No. 248 of the 1st August, 1905, inclosing copy of a letter addressed to Messrs. Ritchie, Graham, and Milne, ship-builders, of Glasgow, inviting them to prepare and submit tenders for the construction of four new steamers required by the Turkish authorities for the navigation of the Tigris, I have the honour to report that His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah has informed me that he learns from several sources that the Hamidieh Administration have purchased, or are purchasing, two new steamers from Messrs. Cockerill and Co., a Belgian firm.

If this report be true, I think that Messrs. Ritchie, Graham, and Milne's failure to obtain the order is almost wholly due to the unsatisfactory nature of the work which they executed on a former occasion for the Seniye Administration.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.



[15690]

No. 20.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 8.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 29th March, relative to affairs in the Aden hinterland.

*India Office, May 7, 1906.*

Inclosure 1 in No. 20.

*Government of Bombay to Government of India.*

Sir,

*Bombay Castle, March 8, 1906.*

I AM directed to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a Memorandum from the Political Resident, Aden, dated the 23rd February, 1906, and of its inclosure, regarding an affray between the parties belonging to the Atifi and Mansuri tribes of the Subaihi.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) S. W. EDGERLEY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 20.

*Sultan Sir Ahmed Fadhl to Political Resident, Aden.*

(After compliments.)

*18 Al Hijja, 1323 (February 12, 1906).*

WE inform your Honour that a raiding expedition of the Atifis had started either in your or our territory, but they, meanwhile, met Sheikh Thabit, the Mansuri, and his comrades on the road, and both parties fired on one another. One of the Atifis' camels was wounded, and they retreated.

You may, O friend, perceive the provocation of the Subaihis which still continues up to now.

We, moreover, inform you that the Haushabis have killed two of the Jabairis at Jol-Madram.

We report you this as we have heard it.

May you be preserved.

*Aden Residency, February 23, 1906.*

Copy forwarded, with compliments, to the Secretary to the Government in the Political Department for information.

(For Political Resident, Aden),

(Signed) J. DE B. HANCOCK, Captain.

Inclosure 3 in No. 20.

*Government of Bombay to Government of India.*

Sir,

*Bombay Castle, March 9, 1906.*

I AM directed to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a letter from the Political Resident, Aden, dated the 25th February, 1906, regarding a raiding expedition into Turkish territory by a party of the Barhemi tribe of Subaihis, and of the instructions issued by his Excellency the Governor in Council thereon, of to-day's date.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) S. W. EDGERLEY.

Inclosure 4 in No. 20.

*Political Resident, Aden, to Government of Bombay.*

(Confidential.)

Sir,

*Aden Residency, February 25, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of Government, that I have received credible information that a party of the Barhemi tribe of Subaihis has recently made a raiding expedition into Turkish territory, and looted eighty-five camels from the Hakami, Hatema, and Kawassuma tribes in the vicinity of Moza.

2. The losses are reported to have been as follows:—

	Killed.	Wounded.
Barhemi..	2	1
Hakami..	4	1
Hatema..	3	..
Kawassuma	1	..

3. The wounded member of the Hakami tribe has recently been under treatment in the Perim Coal Company's Hospital, and his statement confirms reports received from other sources.

4. Sheikh Ali-bin-Ahmed Am Tommi has been called upon for an explanation of the affairs, and his reply is awaited.

I have, &amp;c.

(For Political Resident, Aden),

(Signed) F. DE B. HANCOCK, Captain.

Inclosure 5 in No. 20.

*Government of Bombay to Political Resident, Aden.*

(Confidential.)

Sir,

*Bombay Castle, March 9, 1906.*

WITH reference to your letter dated the 25th February, 1906, reporting the result of a raiding expedition into Turkish territory by a party of the Barhemi tribe of Subaihis, I am directed to request that you will insist upon the prompt restitution of the looted camels to the Hakami, Hatema, and Kawassa tribes.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) S. W. EDGERLEY.

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No. 21.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 8.)*

WITH reference to this Office letter of the 30th ultimo, the Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a Secret despatch to the Government of India, dated the 4th instant, relative to the views of His Majesty's Government on the main questions arising in connection with the tribes of the Aden Protectorate.

*India Office, May 7, 1906.*

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Inclosure in No. 21.

*Mr. Morley to Government of India.*

(Secret.)

My Lord,

*India Office, May 4, 1906.*

THE appointment of a new Resident at Aden seems to be a proper occasion for laying before your Excellency the views of His Majesty's Government on the main questions arising in connection with the tribes of the Aden hinterland. The correspondence also addressed to the Government of India by the Governor of Bombay in Council, which, by your instructions, his Excellency has forwarded to me under date the 12th March, 1906, appears to invite an immediate consideration of the principles that it would now be most politic to follow in that region.

2. It appears to be supposed by some that the process of delimitation, satisfactorily carried out in concert with the Turkish Government in the Aden hinterland and establishing a definite frontier between the territories of the Sultan and certain of the tribes, brought with it an extension of the responsibilities and obligations of Great Britain. Lord Lansdowne, however, who was actively concerned in the transaction, explicitly rejected that construction of what had taken place. In the House of Lords on the 30th March, 1903, replying to a question whether the demarcation arranged with Turkey had enlarged the British sphere of influence, he said: "With regard to the responsibility for these territories, I do not see why what has taken place should make any difference in these responsibilities. We have never desired to interfere with the internal and domestic affairs of the tribes. On the other hand, we have throughout made it perfectly plain that we should not tolerate the interference of any other Power with them." In this interpretation His Majesty's present advisers in the fullest sense concur. The security and strength of Aden as one of the main posts and fortresses that guard the line between England and India must always be a standing object in national policy. That strength will obviously be impaired, and not augmented, by quarrels with the tribes, by intervention in their disputes, by multiplication of formal agreements with them, by locating troops at a distance from the fortifications of Aden, or by any excessive readiness to resort to expeditions out of all proportion, whether immediate or indirect, to either the occasions for them or to any clear advantage to be gained by them.

3. If, as His Majesty's Government have decided, the main purpose of the recent delimitation is achieved by the fixing of a line beyond which Turkish troops or agents cannot advance, I submit to your Excellency the following propositions as well fitted to carry out our decision. So far as the Turkish frontier is concerned, it is in the highest degree desirable that the importance of trespasses across the line, which are neither serious nor deliberate, should not be exaggerated, and, should a protest be required, it would naturally be by way of action at Constantinople. Outside the territory of British India and within a limited area of the Protectorate similar to that formerly known on the Somali Coast as the "10-mile limit," internal disturbances would call for interposition. But beyond that line our Agent should be careful to avoid every step that might lead us into military or political entanglements, without the express sanction of the Secretary of State. A railway to Dthali and a cantonment or sanatorium there should be considered as outside the contemplation of the Government. This being so, the large body of troops now stationed at Dthali should be withdrawn, leaving only a sufficient escort for the political officer so long as he may remain there.

4. The retention of a Political officer at Dthali was originally provisional. In September 1904 my predecessor assented to the proposal of the Government of India "as a temporary measure, to retain a British officer and a small body of troops at Dthali." This assent he limited to one year, requesting that, after the expiry of that time, he should be informed as to the existence of "any real necessity for maintaining the official and his escort at Dthali." In November 1905, however, he accepted the reasons of the Government of India for making it permanent. In view of the change of circumstances which will be the result of the present instructions, His Majesty's Government are satisfied that the arrangement need not be regarded as a permanent one, and that it will be sufficient if the Political Agent is permitted to visit Dthali temporarily and for special purposes, as occasion may require. For the present I leave it to your Excellency to decide when, after the retirement of the troops, the Political officer and his escort should be withdrawn.

5. The dispatch of postal runners or Agents of the British Government into the

interior is to be, as much as possible, avoided. Any project for disarming the tribes in the nine cantons should be dismissed from serious consideration. Punitive expeditions for offences committed during the demarcation, and not punished then and there, are now out of the question. No demonstration along the frontier, whether demarcated or not, seems to be needed, and, without previous reference to me, no attempts should be made to conclude fresh Treaties.

6. I trust that these propositions may commend themselves to your Excellency, as principles to be pressed upon the attention of the Government of Bombay, and as matter for instructions to the Resident whom your Excellency has appointed to Aden. Any other policy might draw us into a repetition on another scene of the recent transactions in Somaliland.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) JOHN MORLEY.

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No. 22.

*Sir N. O'Connor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 14.)*

(No. 309. Secret and Confidential.)

*Constantinople, May 8, 1906.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 292 of the 1st instant, I learn from a secret and confidential source that the Vali of Bussorah has informed the Vali of Bagdad, who has in turn reported to the Ottoman Government, that the armed conflict in Kassim between Ibn Rashid and Ibn Saood, which resulted in the death of the former and the defeat of his followers, was the result of the attempts of Sheikh Mubarek-es-Sabah, of Koweit, to bring about a reconciliation between these two Arab Chiefs. The Vali of Bussorah accused Mubarek of plotting and treachery, and asked that the necessary military steps might be taken at once to restore order and arrest Ibn Saood.

In a telegram sent by the Grand Vizier to the Vali of Bagdad in reply to this message, the opinion is expressed that the position of affairs in Kassim and the neighbouring districts, brought about by the death of Ibn Rashid, is the direct outcome of the recent encroachments of the military authorities in the province on the functions of the civil authorities. The Vali is to warn the Commander of the VIth Army Corps that all interference in civil matters must now cease, and that no time must be lost in taking steps to restore tranquillity in the disturbed districts.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

[16671]

No. 23.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 15.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of telegrams relative to affairs in the Aden hinterland.

*India Office, May 14, 1906.*

Inclosure 1 in No. 23.

*Government of India to Mr. Morley.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*April 25, 1906.*

AFFAIRS in Aden hinterland. Our Foreign Secretary's letters dated the 22nd February and the 8th March, forwarding reports from Bombay Government regarding encroachments near Mafalis by Turks. That collection of dues at Al Doka on behalf of Mudir of Mafalis is still going on there appears to be no doubt, according to Resident at Aden's latest reports. Map accompanying Colonel Wahab's Secret letter dated the 11th June, 1904, shows that Al Doka is within British side of boundary



line. Government of Bombay therefore recommend that either (1) Resident at Aden should first address Mutessarif of Taiz; or (2) a formal representation regarding violation of frontier involved in levy of these dues at Al Doka should be made to Porte. We propose to authorize former alternative subject to your approval.

Inclosure 2 in No. 23.

*Mr. Morley to Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*India Office, May 2, 1906.*

AFFAIRS in Aden hinterland. Your telegram dated the 25th April.

Before any communication is made to the Turkish authorities I should like to consider the papers and to receive your opinion on the question whether the dispute is such as to require our intervention. It is possible that matter, which seems to be one of local interest, may involve no international complications. At present I am not sufficiently informed as to the nature or mode of collection of the dues collected on behalf of the Mudir of Mafalis.

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No. 24.

*Treasury to Foreign Office.—(Received May 15.)*

Sir,

*Treasury Chambers, May 14, 1906.*

I AM directed by the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th ultimo, transmitting a copy of the India Office letter of the 3rd ultimo with reference to the provision of a steam-launch for the use of the Political Agent at Koweit.

In the absence of any recommendation from Secretary Sir Edward Grey, my Lords assume that the India Office proposal has not received his concurrence.

I am, &c.

(Signed) G. H. MURRAY.

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No. 25.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 18.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 26th April, relative to affairs at Koweit.

*India Office, May 17, 1906.*

Inclosure 1 in No. 25.

*Major Cox to Government of India.*

(Confidential.)

*Bushire, March 18, 1906.*

HAVING spent three days at Koweit during last week, I have the honour to submit, for the information of Government, a few observations regarding the present aspect of affairs there.

I met Sheikh Mubarak on three occasions, and on the 7th instant had a lengthy interview with him at the Agency, for the details of which I beg reference to the attached Memorandum drawn up for me by Captain Knox, who was likewise present.

It will be seen that during it several topics were touched upon, some of which are subjects of separate correspondence.

2. The trend of our conversation regarding the affairs of Central Arabia, which was started by Sheikh Mubarak, is of some significance. The possibility of the Ruler of Koweit smoking the calumet of peace with Bin Rashid, and Mubarak's own vision

of a three-cornered compact between himself, Bin Rashid, and Bin Saood, which would in practice probably be found to amount to a defensive alliance for resistance to Turkish expansion in Nejd and Hassa, is an interesting, if somewhat utopian, prospect to contemplate.

It is to be feared, however, that Sheikh Mubarak's own ambitions, as indicated in the second of the conditions suggested by him to Bin Rashid, are likely to form the chief obstacle to such a development.

On the other hand, there is no doubt that in the course of the strife of the last few years both Bin Saood and Bin Rashid must have been brought to realize what a strong position the Ruler of Koweit, territorially situated as he is, occupies both strategically and politically in relation to them, and they evidently see the advantage of maintaining friendly relations with him.

In connection with Bin Saood's doings I may remark it is possible that his recent telegram to the Porte was sent to disarm suspicion preparatory to some further move, as recent reports from Bahrein show that the Turks are now having trouble at Hofuf, in which it seems possible, if not probable, that Bin Saood has had an indirect hand.

3. As for Sheikh Mubarak's attitude towards ourselves, I do not consider that on the whole it gives any present cause for dissatisfaction or anxiety; rather the contrary. As long as the practical expression of his sentiments in regard to us undergoes no change, the improvement of the relations between Mubarak and the Turkish authorities at Bussorah, within reasonable limits, is rather a convenience to us than otherwise. The Sheikh's treatment of our Agent, and his invariable demeanour towards myself, could not be more satisfactory and sensible than it is. He has always treated Captain Knox exceedingly well; more so than ever lately, and it is a matter of satisfaction to me as it will, I am sure, be to Government that our Representative seems clearly to have gained Sheikh Mubarak's personal regard, and that he is visited freely in a friendly way by many of the Sheikh's subjects. He is thus making useful influence of a kind which seems to be all we require at present and which we can legitimately cultivate.

It is only in regard to the Arms question that the position at the present moment leaves much to be desired, and this is partly owing to the fact that the general question of the Gulf arms traffic is *sub judice*. I do not know quite what line to take with the Sheikh in the event of our having an exhaustive change of views in this connection, and until I am sure of our intentions it seems better for me to keep off the subject and avoid any specific discussion with him.

4. The question of the conveyance of the Turkish postal bag to Al Hassa, of which a good deal has been said, has, I think, been somewhat misunderstood, and I concur with the Political Agent in thinking that there is nothing in the existing working arrangement which need cause us to take exception to, or be exercised by, Sheikh Mubarak's connection with it.

Inclosure 2 in No. 25.

*Note of a Conversation between the Resident in the Persian Gulf and Sheikh Mubarak of Koweit, dated March 7, 1906.*

ON the 7th March, 1906, at 4 P.M., the Sheikh of Koweit returned the informal visit paid by the Resident on the previous day.

The present interview lasted about an hour and a-half, and Sheikh Mubarak was friendly and cordial as usual.

The Sheikh informed the Resident that he thought he would be interested to hear that he had lately, on the 24th February (29th Zi-ul-Hajj), received a letter from Bin Rashid couched in friendly language and proposing that Sheikh Mubarak should be on the same terms of friendship with him as the Rulers of Koweit had been with his uncle and grandfather before him. The Sheikh said that he had replied to Bin Rashid that he, Mubarak, was a man who loved peace and quietness, and would welcome friendly relations with him, provided that Bin Rashid would keep within his own boundaries and not harass his neighbours, and was really sincere in his desire for peace.

The Resident, in the way of friendly interest, asked how peace could be arranged between the two; whether a personal meeting would be necessary or whether trusted messengers would be sent.

The Sheikh replied that it would be done by correspondence, and that a meeting

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would be unnecessary. He proceeded to sketch the terms on which, in his opinion, a reconciliation between him and Bin Rashid could be considered practicable.

These were:—

1. That Bin Rashid should have Chhaffa (Kaffa) and Hail, and the Bedouins of Jebel Shammar.
2. That he, Bin Sabah, should have Koweit, Aneyza, Boreyda, Sedeyr, and Washm, and should control the tribes occupying them.
3. That Bin Saood should have Nejd and the Wadi Dowasir.

The Resident asked if Sheikh Mubarak thought that he would be able to keep the parties to their agreement with himself and with one another; and the Sheikh replied that he could.

The Resident then asked whether, under such circumstances, Bin Rashid would have sufficient income to enable him to live without harrying his neighbours, and Sheikh Mubarak replied that he would have Hail and Chhaffa, the Zakat of Shammar, and the produce of forays on the Harb and Aneyza tribes between Hail and Medina.

Asked what view the Turks would, in his opinion, take of this triple alliance, Sheikh Mubarak replied that they would undoubtedly regard it with disfavour.

The Resident then asked whether the relations between Sheikh Mubarak and Bin Saood continued the same as formerly; to which Sheikh Mubarak replied that they did, and that Bin Saood still listened to his advice. Major Cox then thanked the Sheikh for his co-operation in ascertaining the truth regarding Bin Saood's alleged intention to visit Oman.

Mubarak rejoined that Seyyid Feisal of Muscat had also written to him, and that he had told his Highness that there was no cause for apprehension, and that Bin Saood had quite enough to do where he was for some time to come.

A reference was then made to the long telegram sent from Bushire to Constantinople through Jasim-bin-Thani on behalf of Bin Saood. Sheikh Mubarak was asked what inference he drew from the fact that Bin Saood had not consulted him before, and regarding its dispatch. The Sheikh said that he had received full details from Bin Saood's messenger, Mussad-bin-Suweilim, who sent the telegram, but admitted that he had heard nothing on the subject direct from the Bin Saood family or from Abd-ur-Rahman. He thought this was because the telegram had been inspired by Sheikh Jasim-bin-Thani, of whom he spoke in no very favourable terms.

Sheikh Mubarak next mentioned that Nasir-bin-Mubarak of the El Khalifah family had just been paying him one of his periodical visits and had only left a couple of days before. He continued that Nasir had told him of his meeting with Captain Prideaux, and had gone on to ask him (Sheikh Mubarak) to put in a good word for him to the Resident, with a view to a reconciliation being effected between himself and Sheikh Esa.

Sheikh Mubarak agreed with the Resident in thinking that Sheikh Esa would resent any overtures on behalf of Nasir Mubarak, and that it would be difficult to alter the latter's circumstances during Sheikh Esa's lifetime.

The Resident then introduced the topic of the flag and ships' articles to be carried by Koweit vessels.

It may be mentioned here that the Resident had brought with him a specimen flag of the pattern previously selected by Sheikh Mubarak with the addition of the word "Koweit" in Roman letters as well as Arabic.

The "Articles" were read over to the Sheikh, and it was explained that it was proposed that the English translation should be verified by the signature of the Political Agent, and this the Sheikh considered would be an advantage. Sheikh Mubarak approved of the "Articles" with the exception of the item "Name of Nakhoda." To this he objected, as the Nakhodas were always changing.

The Sheikh then inspected the flag, and after doing so said that he would lay before the Resident what appeared to him the objections to the use of the flag as now shown him, and that then, if the Resident did not consider the objections of any weight, he would be prepared to order his subjects to adopt the new pattern.

The Sheikh then explained his objections at some length. He recited his grievances against the Turks and their oppression in the matter of his Fao date gardens and their ingratitude for all he had done in their behalf. He clearly showed that he considered that all the trouble he experienced at their hands was due to his friendly attitude towards the British Government.

He said in conclusion that he would accept the flag as it stood if we would give him

a written guarantee to protect him against any consequences that might arise to him from its use.

It proved, on further inquiry, that it was the addition of the English characters to which he objected. The reason for this addition was thoroughly explained to him, but the explanation did not remove his objections, and he was therefore told that the European lettering was only a useful addition and not an essential, and he then expressed himself as quite ready to adopt the flag, without the English letters, and combined with the "Articles," for use by his subjects.

Sheikh Mubarak next informed the Resident that Bin Rashid had sent a messenger to Meshed Ali, who had laid hands on all the money belonging to Yusuf-bin-Brahim in that place.

Sheikh Mubarak then went on to explain that he too had claims against the house of Bin Brahimi; that account books, in Arab merchants' dealings, were the only evidence, and that the deposits belonging to himself in the hands of Abdul Aziz-bin-Brahim, the present Representative, amounted to 1,30,000 rupees, and that the advances against him were 70,000 rupees, showing a balance of 60,000 rupees in his favour.

He said that Abdul Aziz at present resided at Surat, in the Bombay Presidency, and would certainly contest the claim, and that he (Sheikh Mubarak) would be glad of assistance from the Resident to enable him to obtain a settlement of the accounts and the payment of the balance due to him. He said he would be glad to appoint an Agent who would take the account book to Bombay for examination.

In this connection Sheikh Mubarak seemed to be only putting forward a feeler and did not make any definite proposals.

In conclusion, the Resident asked Sheikh Mubarak whether he could inform Government that his affairs generally were, as they seemed to be, in a satisfactory and prosperous condition. Mubarak replied that they were. Asked, "as regards the Turkish authorities?" he rejoined "yes, just at present they are satisfactory, but it costs me £ T. 1,500 a-year in douceurs to their officials to maintain that position."

The Sheikh then expressed his gratitude for the amount of British protection received; declared that the peace and rest he now enjoyed were, he knew, the result of British support; and that he desired no other or better protectors. He concluded by referring to the pleasant relations which existed between himself and the British Representative.

[17040]

No. 26.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 18.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 12th ultimo, relative to the Political Officer at Dthala.

*India Office, May 17, 1906.*

Inclosure 1 in No. 26.

*Government of Bombay to Government of India.*

Sir,

*Bombay Castle, March 19, 1906.*

WITH reference to paragraph 2 of Mr. Holland's letter dated the 8th February, 1906, I am directed to state that the Bombay Government have adopted the suggestion made in paragraph 2, and have gazetted the Political Officer at Dthala as a Political Agent.

2. I am to request that the necessary orders may issue to the Inspector-General of Ordnance, Southern Circle, to meet his indents for flags.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) E. W. EDGERLEY.



Inclosure 2 in No. 26.

*Government of India to Government of Bombay.*

Sir,

Simla, April 11, 1906.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 19th ultimo, requesting that the Inspector-General of Ordnance, Southern Circle, may be instructed to meet the indents of the Political Officer at Dthala for flags.

2. In reply, I am to say that the necessary orders have already been issued by the Director-General of Ordnance.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) R. E. HOLLAND.

[17314]

No. 27.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 21.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 18th instant, relative to the use of a distinctive flag for Koweit.

*India Office, May 19, 1906.*

Inclosure in No. 27.

*Government of India to Mr. Morley.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 18, 1906.

PLEASE refer to your telegram dated the 1st March last. In view of present relations with the Porte, is there any objection to distinctive flag for Koweit shipping being brought into use? Use of the present Turkish pattern inscribed in Arabic letters with the word "Koweit" has been settled upon with the Sheikh.

[16699]

No. 28.

*Foreign Office to Treasury.*

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 21, 1906.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th instant, respecting the provision of a steam-launch for the use of the British Political Agent at Koweit.

I am to state, in reply, that Sir E. Grey concurs in the view of the Government of India that the Agent should be provided with a launch, but that he considers that the question whether half the cost should be borne by Imperial funds will depend upon the decision at which the Lords Commissioners arrive on the question of the incidence of expenses at Koweit, which is now before their Lordships.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) E. GORST.

[17701]

No. 29.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 23.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 19th April, relative to Katr affairs.

*India Office, May 22, 1906.*

Inclosure 1 in No. 29.

*Major Cox to Government of India.**Bushire, March 17, 1906.*

IN continuation of this Office letter, dated the 21st January last, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter which I have received from Captain F. B. Prideaux, I.A., Political Agent, Bahrein, on the subject of the murder of Sheikh Ahmed-bin-Thani of Bida.

Inclosure 2 in No. 29.

*Captain Prideaux to Major Cox.**Bahrein, March 9, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to my letter, dated the 30th December, 1905, on the subject of the murder of Sheikh Ahmed-bin-Thani of Bida, and to report, in continuation, the history of subsequent events in Katr, so far as I believe them to be authenticated.

2. The murderer's name was Bin Mu'ammam. As anticipated in my last letter, he succeeded in gaining the shelter of the 'Ajman tribe, by whom he was received with much honour and with presents of a mare and a robe of honour.

3. The meeting between Sheikh Jasim and the townspeople of Doha, who were attached to Sheikh Ahmed, on the one side, and the Sheikh and elders of the Beni Hajir tribe on the other, took place at Mutaq, in the interior of Katr, west of Bida. The account previously given of this meeting, and also of the assassination of Sheikh Salim-bin-Shafi in retaliation by a slave of Sheikh Ahmed, have been correctly reported. It was generally rumoured in Bahrein that Sheikh Jasim had thereupon promptly executed the slave with his two accomplices, but this has proved to be incorrect. The Chief, however, expressed his sincere regret for the untoward event, and the three slaves were driven out of his camp, whence they seem to have reached Doha safely.

4. It would seem that the Beni Hajir readily recognize that they are the weaker side, for, in spite of the murder of their Chief, they deputed a young man of the same family, named Bashir, to hunt down Bin Mu'ammam, with the result that Bashir returned from Dthaharan about a week ago, bringing a letter from Sheikh Muhammad-bin-Nasir-bin-Mubarak, a grandson of Sheikh Jasim, testifying that he had accomplished his task and had duly taken the life of the originator of the trouble. Sheikh Jasim gave the youth a most warm and friendly reception, and expressed himself very gratified at the conclusion of the blood-feud. He also presented him with a mare and a robe of honour.

5. The question of the succession to the Government of the Principality, with its consequent obligations of residing in Doha and corresponding with the Turkish officials, is still unsettled. Sheikh Ali, the eldest son of Sheikh Ahmed, is ready to accept the appointment, but Sheikh Jasim and the people of Bida and Doha appear to consider him too young. Sheikh Khalifa, the eldest son of Sheikh Jasim, to whom the post was first offered, refused it, as a strong minority believe that he was an abettor of the murder of Sheikh Ahmed. Sheikh Abdallah-bin-Jasim declined it on the ground that he preferred to devote all his attention to pearl dealing, and Sheikh Abdul Rahman-bin-Jasim replied that he preferred to remain in Wakra.

6. For the present the late Kaïmskam's clerk, Ibrahim-bin-Saleh-bin-Bakar, has

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[1639]



been acting as Bazar-Master, while the Turkish Bimbashi seems to have arrogated more authority to himself in the town, and Sheikh Jasim has been dealing with the important disputes of the tribes and merchants himself.

7. The Turks have been urging the latter to return to Doha and resume the Kaimakamship with its attendant salary himself. This he has refused to do, but it seems probable that Sheikh Abdallah, his second son, will soon be compelled by the popular vote to take up the appointment. He is described by the Arabs as a wise and God-fearing man.

[17669]

No. 30.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 23.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosure in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 19th April, relative to affairs in the Aden hinterland.

*India Office, May 22, 1906.*

Inclosure in No. 30.

*Government of Bombay to Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Mahabaleshwar, April 11, 1906.*

RESIDENT at Aden telegraphs on the 7th instant:—

"Major Jacob reports further fighting between Abdali (tribes) and Subaihis near Al Anad, and further trouble brewing near Nobat Dakim. He reports that one Sallam, a minor Abdali chief, who has recently quarrelled (with) Sultan, is at (the) bottom (of the) trouble. I am calling upon the Abdali Sultan to restore order and to take Sallam political prisoner, if possible."

(Addressed to Foreign, Simla; repeated, Foreign with Viceroy.)

[17809]

No. 31.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 24.)*

Sir,

*India Office, May 23, 1906.*

WITH reference to Sir Thomas (now Lord) Sanderson's letter of the 18th February, 1905, with regard to the use of a separate flag by the Sheikh of Koweit, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Morley to inclose, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of a telegram from the Viceroy on the subject.

It will be seen that Sheikh Mubarak has agreed to use a flag of the existing Turkish pattern, but with a distinctive mark, viz., the word "Koweit," in Arabic letters written across it.

Should there be no objection, on account of existing relations between His Majesty's Government and the Sublime Porte, Mr. Morley would suggest that the Political Agent at Koweit might be instructed to advise the Sheikh to bring the new flag in use.

I am, &c.

(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure in No. 31.

*Government of India to Mr. Morley.*

*May 18, 1906.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

PLEASE refer to your telegram dated the 1st March last. In view of present relations with the Porte, is there any objection to distinctive flag for Koweit shipping being brought into use? Use of the present Turkish pattern inscribed in Arabic letters with the word "Koweit" has been settled upon with the Sheikh.

[17934]

No. 32.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 25.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of correspondence received from the Government of India regarding arrangements for the conclusion of a Treaty with the Chief of Beda.

*India Office, May 24, 1906.*

Inclosure 1 in No. 32.

*Government of Bombay to Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.)

*February 12, 1906.*

PLEASE see Foreign Department telegram of the 1st July last. Resident hopes to visit Shugra on his return journey to Aden from Bombay and there arrange Treaty with Beda. The matter will be personally discussed in Bombay, but, before Resident leaves, he must have instructions as to amount of stipend for Beda, and as to increase in Fadthli stipend, if it be found that latter has been 59 (*sic*) really instrumental in bringing about Treaty with Beda. Government propose to use their own discretion in determining both amounts after discussion with Resident. There will not be time between discussion and Resident's departure to await instructions from the Government of India, and he must be informed of the limit of his discretion before he leaves, as after that he will not be able to communicate until after visit to Beda.

Inclosure 2 in No. 32.

*Government of Bombay to Government of India.*

*Bombay Castle, February 13, 1906.*

IN continuation of my telegram, dated the 12th instant, I am directed to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a letter from the Political Resident, Aden, dated the 3rd February, 1906, and of its inclosures, together with copies of the correspondence regarding the proposed conclusion of a Protectorate Treaty with the Chief of Beda.

2. In forwarding these papers, I am to explain that General Mason's plans have been changed since he wrote his letter of the 3rd instant, and as explained in my telegram of the 6th idem, he may visit Shugra on his return from Bombay.

3. The telegram which, under instructions from his Excellency the Governor-in-Council, I have dispatched to you yesterday will have explained the position to the Government of India, and all that seems necessary to add now is that, unless they hear from the Government of India to the contrary, this Government will use their discretion in fixing the stipend to be given to the Chief of Beda under the proposed Treaty and in determining the "special favour" which General Mason, in his letter of the 30th January last to the Fadthli Sultan, shows he has promised to recommend.



## Inclosure 3 in No. 32.

Major-General Mason to Government of Bombay.

Aden Residency, October 28, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Shereef of Behan, Shereef Ahmed-am-Mohsin, who is now on a visit to Aden, has informed me that certain of the Turkish forces which are still operating against the rebel Imam of Yemen, are now in the vicinity of the marginally-noted places\* and are within two or three days' march of his territories and those of Sultan Ali-bin-Ahmed, the Rasosi (Beda).

2. The Shereef suggests that the proximity of these forces threatens to have an undesirable effect upon Beda politics, and that it would be well if the conclusion of the proposed Treaty with Sultan Ali-bin-Ahmed were no longer delayed. I have some reason to hope that Sultan Ali-bin-Ahmed may send a deputation to Aden shortly after the end of Ramazan to conclude the Treaty, but I would suggest, for the consideration of Government, that if these expectations are not fulfilled, and if the Beda Treaty is not concluded before the end of the calendar year, it would be advisable to dispatch a Political Officer to the Baniardth with a view to as far as possible expediting the conclusion of the Treaty and more fully ascertaining the true position of affairs in that vicinity.

3. I would propose that this officer should be accompanied by sufficiently strong escort to hold his own against any opposition which might be shown to him on the road, and that the party should either, when returning from or proceeding to Beda, traverse the Dathina district in which Mr. Bury's party met with opposition in 1904 and bring about the submission or the subjection of the Hasani and Saeedee tribes which then offended, and are still punished by exclusion from Aden.

4. I would at the same time recommend, for the consideration of Government, that the Political Officer deputed should be instructed to negotiate for a Treaty with the Audali Sultan, and to report upon the true status and condition of the Chiefs of the Hasani and Saeedee, which are the other important tribes of the Dathina district. Should time and opportunity allow of it, the party might also visit the important town of Habban in the Wahidi country.

5. According to my information the Audali Sultan is a Ruler of considerable importance, and occupies a central and a commanding position on the trade routes passing through the Dathina country on which he levies transit dues. He has a considerable following, and situated as he is between States such as Behan, Aulaki, and Fadthli, with which we already have Treaty relations, and to none of which he really owes dependence, I think it desirable that he, as well as the Rasasi Chief of the Baniardth, should now be formally included within the number of our protected stipendiaries.

6. I have reason to believe that this Sultan would probably accept an invitation to Aden without his country being visited, but I consider it preferable that his territory should first be visited, and, if Government are prepared to undergo the attendant expense, I would recommend that the little-known districts under reference should now be formally visited by a properly-equipped expedition.

7. Presuming that it is not immediately desired or desirable to demarcate the north-east boundary lines running from Lakmat Ash Shub to the desert, it would at least seem as well to be to some extent prepared for contingencies which the final Turkish reconquest of Yemen may be not unreasonably expected to possibly give rise to.

8. If Government propose that the expedition should be on a small scale, and for the present to forego the opportunity of effecting the subjection of the Dathina tribes, then I consider that such an expedition is also feasible, though it doubtless would be accompanied with some risk to the officer deputed.

9. It is, of course, to be considered that a small expedition of this nature would be less liable to arouse Turkish suspicions and possible protests from Constantinople, and, according to my present information, there is fair reason to hope that a small party would not meet with serious opposition.

10. I do not think that I should find any difficulty in finding an officer in Aden willing to proceed on that expedition, and to take the risk of proceeding with a comparatively small escort of the Aden troop, or of a few specially enrolled native followers.

\* Al Jounf, Al Jouba, and Al Malajim.

## Inclosure 4 in No. 32.

Government of Bombay to Major-General Mason.

January 30, 1906.

(Telegraphic.)

HOME authorities against political expedition to Beda without their sanction. Letter follows.

Meantime prepare strongest case you can for visiting Beda in preference to waiting for Beda to visit Aden.

## Inclosure 5 in No. 32.

Major-General Mason to Government of Bombay.

Aden, January 30, 1906.

(Telegraphic.) P.

WITH reference to your telegram of to-day, I will prepare the case as desired. I am meanwhile requesting the Chief of Beda to come and meet me at Shugra on the 15th February next to sign the Treaty, and I am promising the Fadthli Sultan that if this is arranged with his assistance he will be eligible for a reward. If this Treaty with the Beda Chief is satisfactorily arranged I strongly recommend that I may be authorized to promise the Fadthli Sultan an increase of stipend from 180 dollars (the amount he at present receives) to 300 dollars per mensem. Even apart from the Beda question, I am of opinion that the Fadthli is entitled to some increase in his stipend. The Sultan has much influence north-east of Aden, and a considerable volume of trade passes through his territory.

## Inclosure 6 in No. 32.

Government of Bombay to Major-General Mason.

Bombay Castle, January 31, 1906.

WITH reference to this Department Memorandum dated the 26th January, 1906, and in continuation of my telegram dated the 30th idem, I am directed to state that, in the opinion of Government, the time has arrived for a review of the situation as regards Beda. It will be convenient if you will state, in view of the existing condition of things, the advantages to be expected from an Agreement with Beda, the extent to which any objections likely to be made by the Turkish authorities are invalid, and the particular reasons for preferring a political Mission to Beda to awaiting overtures and a visit to Aden from that Chief, if any such are likely to be made.

## Inclosure 7 in No. 32.

Government of Bombay to Major-General Mason.

Bombay, February 3, 1906.

(Telegraphic.)

YOUR telegram dated the 30th January.

You cannot be authorized at present to increase Fadthli's stipend, nor can Government address India on the subject pending receipt of full Report asked for in my telegram of the 30th January and letter dated the 31st January.

## Inclosure 8 in No. 32.

Major-General Mason to Government of Bombay.

Aden Residency, February 3, 1906.

(Confidential.)

WITH reference to recent correspondence, ending with your telegram of this date, concerning the proposal that a meeting should now, if possible, be arranged with the



Rasasi Chiefs of Beda at Shugra, with the assistance of the Fadthli Sultan, I have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of Government, copies of letters which I have dispatched to the address of Sultan Ali-bin-Ahmed, the Rasasi, and to Sultan Ahmed-bin-Husen, the Fadthli Sultan, and of a reply which I have this morning received from the latter.

2. I at the same time forward, for the information of Government, copy of a letter, dated the 29th ultimo, which I have received from the Abdali Sultan.

3. I am of opinion that it is possible that, if the Fadthli Sultan really brings the full force of his influence to bear upon the matter, the suggested meeting may actually take place at Shugra and the desired Treaty be at length concluded.

4. In anticipation of the possibility I have the honour to request that some discretion may be allowed to me in regard to both the amount of the stipend which shall be allotted in the 5th clause of the usual Protectorate Treaty to the Beda Sultans, and to the nature of the reward which shall be accorded to the Fadthli Sultan in the event of his proving himself capable of rendering the desired assistance.

5. The stipend hitherto suggested for the Beda Sultans is 100 dollars per month, which is the amount of that paid to the Aulaki Sultan under the Treaty concluded with him in the year 1904.\* This, with the dollar taken at the rate of 2 rupees per dollar, would allow of a grant to each of the two Sultans, Ali-bin-Ahmed and Alawi-bin-Husen, of 100 rupees per mensem. But as it is clear from past correspondence that one of the main causes of delay has been the desire of the subordinate Chiefs of Beda to share in the profit accruing from the Treaty, and to derive as much personal gain as possible from the transaction, it may prove desirable to grant the Sultans a somewhat larger stipend than that originally proposed.

6. It will not be possible for me to obtain instructions in the matter from Shugra, and, with a view to the successful and rapid conclusion of the affair, I would request that sanction may be accorded to me to, if necessary, raise the proffered stipend to one of 150 dollars, or, if necessary, even 200 dollars per mensem.

7. The political advantages to be gained by the Treaty may be held to be worth the extra expense, which, however, will be, of course, if possible, avoided.

8. As to the reward to be given to the Fadthli Sultan, I understand from your telegram received to-day that this cannot take the form of an enhanced stipend—or, rather that sanction thereto cannot be solicited from the Government of India pending a full Report on your letter dated the 31st ultimo, which will not, of course, reach me till next mail.

9. I would at the same time venture to here represent that Sultan Ahmed-bin-Husen, the Fadthli, does not at present draw a stipend really proportionate to his importance in the affairs of this Protectorate. I would remind Government that he is, under Treaty, debarred from the collection of transit dues, from which his more fortunate neighbour, the Abdali Sultan, derives such substantial profit; and I would recommend that, if the Sultan now actually illustrates the extent of his influence to the north-east of the Protectorate, his importance should be recognized by the grant of enhanced stipend, which shall place him more on a level with his old rival the Abdali, and will also have the effect of substituting a feeling of really loyal friendship for one of continued discontent.

10. I would therefore recommend that his stipend should be raised to one of 300 dollars a-month, in the event of the proposed meeting taking place with the desired effect.

11. To these proposals I would solicit the favour of necessary instructions by telegram. If the Treaty is concluded, as suggested, at Shugra, all the trouble and expense of a political Mission to Beda will be avoided; and in the event of my present invitation to the Rasasi Sultan not being accepted, it will then be possible to again consider the desirability of such a Mission.

12. In the event of its proving desirable to slightly postpone the date of the proposed meeting at Shugra the necessary intimation will be conveyed by telegram.

\* Secret, E., June 1904, Nos. 201-206.

Inclosure 9 in No. 32.

*Major-General Mason to Sultan Ali-bin-Ahmed.*

*Aden Residency, January 30, 1905.*

(After compliments.)

WE write, oh, friend, to inform you that we shall arrive at Shugra on the 15th February (21st Al Hijja, 1323) next exactly. We hope that you will meet us there to sign the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of which we have written to you before. We can stay at Shugra for one day, or, possibly, two days; and then we proceed straight to India to see his Excellency the Governor. We hope that we shall be able to hand him the Treaty signed by you, and that we shall not have to tell him that you have refused this invitation to meet us.

If, which God forbid, you are sick, or for any other really urgent reason cannot come yourself, then send your son with your seal and with a letter from you authorizing him to sign the Treaty on your behalf.

Send or bring Sultan Alawi-bin-Husen to also sign the Treaty, and send Ahmed Husen, the Azzani, and Sheikh Abdurrah-bin-Ahmed-am-Musa, the Hamakani, and a few other of your friends to witness the signing of the Treaty.

Arrange for all to be ready at Shugra to meet us before the 15th February (21st Al Hijja, 1323). Fail not.

We are sending this letter through our friend Sultan Ahmed-bin-Husen, the Fadthli Sultan, and he will doubtless give you good advice to come quickly on this our invitation.

We cannot wait at Shugra longer than the time we have stated.

May you be preserved, and we look forward to the pleasure of meeting you soon.

Inclosure 10 in No. 32.

*Major-General Mason to Sultan Ahmed-bin-Husen.*

*Aden Residency, January 30, 1906.*

(After compliments.)

WE write, oh, friend, to tell you that we shall arrive at Shugra on the Government steamer on the 15th February next exactly (21st Al Hijja, 1323). We look forward to the pleasure of then meeting you again. We send you with this letter a letter to the address of Sultan Ali-bin-Ahmed, the Rasasi of the Baniardth. Please send this up to him as quickly as ever you can, and press him to take our advice and to come and meet us and sign the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with us in our town on that day.

We need not say that if this can be arranged with your assistance it will be a great pleasure to us to bring your services in the matter to the notice of the Great Government.

We can only stay at Shugra for one or, at the outside, two days, and then we have to proceed at once to India to see his Excellency the Governor, and we hope to be able to hand him the Treaty with Sultan Ali-bin-Ahmed with your signature upon the same as a witness between us. And we trust that his Excellency will then accede to our recommendations which we shall make to him in regard to the special favour which shall be shown to you for your assistance.

We are soon, after our return from India, going on leave again to England, oh, friend, and we particularly desire to have this matter settled before we go.

Tell Sultan Ali-bin-Ahmed if he cannot come himself to send his son, with his seal and a letter from him authorizing him to sign the Treaty on his behalf without fail. They should arrive at Shugra as soon as possible to be there ready to receive us. We shall not have much time to talk, and we hope to find all ready for us on arrival.

Tell Sultan Ali-bin-Ahmed to send or bring Sultan Alawi-bin-Husen without fail to also sign the Treaty. This is necessary.

He can also send or bring the Hamakani and the Azzani, or any other of his relations or friends to witness the Treaty.

Please, oh, friend, use all expedition in this matter, and if the Treaty is signed you may be sure that it will prove advantageous to you.



## Inclosure 11 in No. 32.

*Sultan Ahmed-bin-Husen to Major-General Mason.*

(After compliments.)

6 Al Hijja, 1323 (January 31, 1906).

WE have received your letter dated January 1906 and understand it. Firstly, about your visit to Shugra in the Government vessel on the 15th February, corresponding with the 21st Al Hijja, 1323, next, you are welcome. We are exceedingly glad for your calling at our country, and your visit will produce much pleasure and relief to our mind.

The inclosed letter to Sultan Ali-bin-Ahmed, the Rasasi, was also received, and we immediately dispatched it with a special messenger, together with a letter from us giving him advices in every way. We hope that they will come as you wrote us. If God pleases, we are doing our best endeavour and advised them.

We are desirous to do a favour to the Great Government. We had previously written them, but we have as yet received no reply. We directed the messenger to take the letters and deliver them personally to Sultan Ali-bin-Ahmed and to at once obtain a reply. We hope that they will comply with our advice and the request of the Government according to the mentioned time.

God willing, on their arrival, we will advise them to sign the Treaty and enter into friendship and alliance.

You state that you will remain at Shugra for two days; you are welcome for two days or more.

As to Sultan Ali-bin-Ahmed, we have written to him to come soon, and if he fails he may send his son with his seal, as well as Sultan Alawi-bin-Husen and the leading men of the Hamakani and Azzani, who may accompany him or his son.

## Inclosure 12 in No. 32.

*Sultan Sir Ahmed Fadhlī to Major-General Mason.*

(After compliments.)

4 Al Hijja, 1323 (January 29, 1906).

WE inform your honour that we have heard from a reliable source that letters have been received by Sultan Ali-bin-Ahmed, the Rasasi, and the Audali Sultan from the Turks asking them to go to Sanaa. We have dispatched a trustworthy man to go and, if possible, fetch the letter from the Audali so that we may know its contents.

Oh, friend, we do not appreciate that these two tribes should go under the Turks, because the Audali is lying between the Fadhlī and Aulaki, and the Rasasi is in the neighbourhood of Yafa. He possesses an extensive territory which would be large piece added to Yemen.

If some arrangement could be made to stop the Turks from these places in a diplomatic manner it will be much better. There is no harm if these places will then be left aside by you for a long time, but our wish is that the Turks should be restrained from taking them.

Your judgment is right.

May you be preserved.

## Inclosure 13 in No. 32.

*Government of India to Government of Bombay*

(Telegraphic.)

Calcutta, February 20, 1906.

YOUR telegram of the 12th and letter of the 13th February. Beda Treaty.

Government of India concur that it is most desirable to secure Treaty with Beda, and are willing to sanction allowance for Chiefs up to 150 dollars a-month. Treaty should, as with Dthala, contain, if possible, condition requiring Chiefs to be responsible for any boundary pillars erected, and for safety of British parties which may have occasion to visit territories of Chiefs.

Increase of Fadhlī Sultan's stipend might be determined later on, when terms of Treaty with him can be fully discussed.

## Inclosure 14 in No. 32.

*Government of Bombay to Government of India.*

Bombay Castle, February 20, 1906.

Sir,

IN continuation of my letter of the 13th February, 1906, I am directed to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a letter from the Political Resident, Aden, of the 11th idem, and of my reply thereto of to-day's date, regarding the proposed conclusion of a Protectorate Treaty with the Chief of Beda.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed)

J. J. HEATON.

Acting Chief Secretary to Government.

## Inclosure 15 in No. 32.

*Major-General Mason to Government of Bombay.*

Aden Residency, February 11, 1906.

Sir,

WITH reference to your letter of the 31st ultimo, concerning Beda affairs, I have the honour to invite reference to Boundary Commissioner's letter of the 1st October, 1903, and to Mr. FitzMaurice's letter dated the 30th April, 1905.

2. Mr. FitzMaurice's remark that Beda is the one serious gap in the north-east line constitutes the main argument in favour of the early conclusion of the Treaty.

3. A political Mission with Beda as its objective was suggested in this Office letter of the 27th August last, in connection with the proposal to exact submission from the Dathina tribes, and to generally acquire a more intimate acquaintance with the easterly portion of this Protectorate, and to establish closer relations with the more important Chiefs of that district, and it is not necessary to here repeat what was then urged in favour of that proposal.

4. I would only add that there is much to be urged in favour of acquiring some personal knowledge of the country and of individuals before Treaties with them are concluded. There is good reason to believe that some of the Treaties entered into with the Upper Yaffai and with Behan-al-Kasab were not really concluded with the most powerful and truly representative members of the communities concerned.

5. I am personally inclined to the opinion that a Treaty with the Abdali Sultan is desirable as well as a Treaty with the Rasasi Chief of Beda. This opinion is based upon information obtained from various sources, including the Abdali Sultan and other persons of importance who have been interviewed on the subject. But it would, I think, be desirable that if possible a more direct personal knowledge should be acquired of the districts before individuals are finally selected to represent the tribes concerned.

6. In regard to Beda itself there is little room for doubt that Sultan Ali-bin-Ahmed, the Rasasi, is really a man of influence, but one of the main causes of his not having at present visited Aden would at the same time appear to be connected with the relations subsisting between him and the minor Chiefs of the sub-tribes of the Baniardth.

7. At the present moment the position may be said to be that there are too many at work trying to bring in the Beda Sultan in the hope of gaining some reward. Each of these individuals is naturally anxious to secure the reward for himself, and the result is doubtless that to some extent one is undoing the work of another. It may therefore be urged that rather than depend upon the efforts of contending aspirants to the expected reward, it would be better that we should ourselves dispatch a Mission to that country.

8. It has now been decided to accept the apologies of the Hassani and Saeedee tribes, and a Mission may be held to be no longer necessary to correct them. It may at the same time be held desirable that our acquaintance with them should now be improved.

9. Our relations with the Lower Yaffai Sultan have for some time past not been satisfactory, and a political Mission to the north-east might be expected to have a beneficial effect upon them.

10. Sir N. O'Connor has recently urged that it is desirable to proceed with extreme caution north-east, and it is of course to be considered that the north-east line has not



yet been delimited, and that the Porte have expressed their willingness to at any time determine the frontier with us.

11. At the same time a magnetic north-east line has been decided upon, and there is no room for doubt that both the Dathina district and Beda lie to the south of that.

12. Upon the whole I am of opinion that if the Rasasi Sultan fails now to accept my recent invitation to meet him at the head-quarters of another Chief, it is desirable that his country should be visited by a political Mission, with a view to the conclusion of the desired Treaty, and to the additional support which will thereby be lent to our general claim that this territory lies on our side of the magnetic north-east boundary line agreed upon.

13. The Baniardth is reported to be the most fertile district, and the establishment of more intimate relations with the Rasasi Chiefs should tend to the benefit of the trade of the main Settlement. Apart from the *desideratum* of effectually debarring the Turks from access to the Hadramaut, I think it desirable that this Treaty should now be concluded with as little further delay as possible.

14. For the sake of our general prestige alone it is to be desired that the object, which we have for some years passed been known to desire, should now be achieved.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. M. MASON, Major-General,  
Political Resident, Aden.

Inclosure 16 in No. 32.

*Government of Bombay to Major-General Mason.*

Sir, *Bombay Castle, February 20, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 11th February, 1906, formulating in response to the call in my letter of the 31st January, 1906, the case in favour of pushing forward an Agreement with the Chief of Beda.

2. His Excellency the Governor, as you are aware, thought it desirable to invite you to come to Bombay to personally discuss this and other matters with himself. Major Jacob, the Political Officer at Dthala, and the Chief Secretary to Government (Sir Steyning Edgerley) were present at the discussion, and I am to reply to your letter in the following sense.

3. So far as it may be necessary to carry through to an end the arrangements already initiated to meet the Chief of Beda at Shugra and negotiate a Treaty there with him, you may continue on the lines on which you have so far moved, and if it is obtainable negotiate a Treaty on the same lines, and with a promise of a subsidy up to the same maximum as that of Behan. Should the Chief not come into Shugra, or should the negotiations not be successful, no further move should be made, and the initiative in the future be left to the Chief. I am to place on record the reasons which led to this conclusion.

4. Practically the only argument in favour of the early conclusion of a Treaty with Beda is that indicated in paragraph 2 of your letter under reply. It appeared, on discussion, that this argument has lost much of its force since the acceptance by the Turks of the principle of the continuance of the boundary line from Lakmat-as-Shub to the desert on the true north-east line. It transpired that there is no certain knowledge, apart from the most recent maps, whether Beda lies entirely on the British or Turkish side of the line. It is believed that it lies considerably to the British side, so much so, that the British would be entitled to protest if the Turks interfered seriously in Beda affairs. If that be so, there is little reason for the somewhat unusual anxiety for this Treaty which the invitations to the Chief must have disclosed to the hinterland tribes.

5. There is also no further reason connected with the Dathina country for any political Mission in the direction of the north-east. The submission of the Hassani and Saeedee tribes for their conduct in the matter of Mr. Bury's party is being accepted, and it became evident in discussion that anything in the shape of a political Mission for the purpose of securing this Treaty would have to be accompanied by a not inconsiderable force, and might lead to most undesirable difficulties. The case for any change from the traditional to a forward policy therefore seemed unconvincing.

6. So far as the wishes of the Secretary of State are known,\* the policy to be followed is not to do anything which may lead to the administration of the territory, but to recognize to the full the independence of the tribes, subject to their friendly attitude towards the British and abstinence from intrigue with other Powers, and to maintain a constant respect to the susceptibilities of our Turkish neighbours. There is thus every reason for avoiding any overt action in the hinterland which may lead to enhancing the necessity for intervention in the affairs of the tribes, and the conclusion was reached that the improvement of our relations with and knowledge of the tribes would be best served by the methods of work already laid down by this Government for Major Jacob, and recently approved by the Government of India and His Majesty's Secretary of State.† For anything in the shape of definite Treaty relations with the tribes it is at once more dignified and satisfactory that the Resident should await solicitation by the tribes for the conclusion of such engagements.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. J. HEATON,  
Acting Chief Secretary to Government

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No. 33.

*Sir N. O'Connor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 28.)*

(No. 358. Confidential.)

*Constantinople, May 23, 1906.*

Sir,

IN reply to your telegram No. 92 of yesterday, informing me that the Sheikh of Koweit has agreed to use the Turkish flag, but with the addition, in Arabic letters written across it, of the word "Koweit," I have the honour to make the following remarks:—

It is probable that the Turkish Government will object and remonstrate with the Sheikh as soon as they become aware of the innovation, and it is almost certain that the Sheikh, in pursuance of his usual policy, will endeavour to mitigate his offence in the eyes of the Sultan, whatever may be the language he holds to the British Resident, by alleging that the alteration was urged upon him by the British Government. It is improbable, however, that the Imperial Government will so far resent the Sheikh's action as to refuse Koweit dhows carrying the obnoxious flag "pratique" in Turkish ports, but if they should do so it will, I think, be incumbent on His Majesty's Government to see that the Sheikh does not suffer for following the advice given to him.

Apart from this, it seems to me to be in consonance with our general policy in regard to Koweit that the Sheikh should adopt some special and visible sign of his quasi-independence, and I do not know that any better emblem of his peculiar political position than that now proposed could easily be found.

I have, &c.

(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

[18431]

No. 34.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 29.)*

WITH reference to Sir A. Godley's letter of the 24th May, the Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 10th May, relative to the Muscat Arbitration Award.

*India Office, May 28, 1906.*

\* *Vide* Secretary of State's telegram, dated May 14, 1902; ditto despatch, dated April 1, 1904; ditto, dated December 8, 1905.

† Dated August 31 and November 10, 1905.



## Inclosure 1 in No. 31.

*French Consul, Muscat, to British Consul, Muscat.*

*Mascate, le 20 Avril, 1906.*

AFIN de terminer la question de l'application de la sentence arbitrale de La Haye dans l'affaire des boutriers Mascatais Français, et comme conclusion de nos entretiens sur ce sujet, j'ai l'honneur de vous adresser sous ce pli un projet de Règlement élaboré par moi dont je vous serai obligé de vouloir bien transmettre le texte à Londres avec les observations que vous jugerez utiles d'y ajouter. De même serai-je particulièrement heureux de communiquer à Paris tout projet de Règlement similaire que vous voudrez bien m'envoyer.

Nos deux Gouvernements, à l'aide de ces documents, seraient par suite en mesure d'établir un Règlement définitif.

Veillez, &c.  
(Signé) R. LARONCE.

## Inclosure 2 in No. 34.

*Projet de Règlement concernant l'application de la sentence prononcée par le Tribunal Arbitral de La Haye le 8 Août, 1905.*

*Remarks by His Majesty's Consul at Muscat upon the French Consul's plan for applying the sentence of the Court of Arbitration.*

ARTICLE 1. Les sujets du Sultan qui sont autorisés à l'avenir à arborer le pavillon Français sur leurs navires jouissent dans l'Oman du même traitement et des mêmes droits que tous les autres sujets de Sa Hautesse.

Art. 2. En principe les personnes autorisées à arborer le pavillon Français sur leurs navires sont celles dont la liste a été dressée par le Consulat de France à Mascate, et remise au Consulat d'Angleterre le 4 Mars, 1906, à moins de modifications pouvant résulter du décès de ces personnes ou du retrait par la France de l'autorisation.

Art. 3. Les propriétaires de boutres battant pavillon Français pourront en toute liberté vendre leurs navires, ou en acheter d'autres sans que leur droit au pavillon Français puisse être contesté.

Art. 4. Les boutriers qui ont le droit d'arborer le pavillon Français ne pourront transmettre ce droit à leurs héritiers, descendants ou collatéraux, les boutres dont ceux-ci obtiendraient ainsi la possession arboreront le pavillon du Sultan.

2. Impossible, as, supposing every owner to have received authorization for one dhow between 1863 and 1892 (for which we are obliged to take the word of the French), only those would be entitled to retain it who had actually the same boat sailing under the French flag at the time The Hague sentence was pronounced, and his number of boats could not be increased subsequently according to our reading of the terms of the Award (*vide* Mr. Graham's despatch of the 8th August, 1905, to which I was referred for guidance by the Government of India in their telegram of the 21st November last), and my list and remarks on that of the French.

3. There would be no objection to the proprietors selling their dhows, but the reply to (2) applies to the question of their replacement. If this concession is made, the purchase of a new dhow should at the most only be allowed to replace one lost or sold.

Art. 5. La juridiction du Sultan sera applicable dans l'Oman à tous les propriétaires de boutres battant pavillon Français, ainsi qu'aux capitaines et aux membres de l'équipage; toutefois pour les crimes et les délits ou contestations, ayant eu lieu à bord en haute mer ou dans les eaux territoriales de l'Oman, et en général partout où le droit d'inviolabilité est réservé, la compétence restera au Consul de France, ou à défaut à son représentant, ou aux officiers de la Marine Nationale: Si le crime ou délit est établi, le coupable sera remis au Sultan.

5. This should not be accepted; the views of His Majesty's Government, having been already communicated to the French, should be adhered to.

This clause throws much light upon the manoeuvre reported in my letter, dated the 16th November, 1905.

Art. 6. Les dispositions du présent Règlement, après approbation des Gouvernements Français et Anglais, seront communiquées, ainsi que le texte de la sentence, par voie d'affiches, aux sujets du Sultan.

6. A clause should be added to the effect that infringement of the arrangement come to by any of His Highness' subjects would be severely punished. The owners should be allowed to give up their authorization when they please.

(Signé) R. LARONCE.

*Mascate, le 20 Avril, 1906.*

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No. 35.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 29.)*

THE Secretary in the Political Department presents his compliments to the Director of Military Operations, and begs to forward herewith, for his information, copy of Memorandum of external affairs relating to Arabia, the North-East Frontier, Burmah, Siam and China, for the month of April 1906.

*India Office, May 29, 1906.*

Inclosure in No. 35.

*Memorandum of Information received during the Month of April 1906, regarding External Affairs relating to Arabia.*

[NOTE.—This Memorandum is based upon reports the accuracy of which it is not always possible to guarantee.]

ADEN.

(SEE paragraph 4 of the Memorandum for March 1906.) On the 20th April, 1906, the Secretary of State was informed that the Resident at Aden had reported that the local British officials would place no hindrance in the way of the Italian recruiting agents, but that the Sultan of Shehr and Mokalla, who derived considerable profit from the trade which passed between his port of Mokalla and the Mijjertain and the Ben Adir coasts, was, not unnaturally, averse to any action in the matter which might be construed into co-operation with the Italians in an endeavour to coerce the inhabitants of the coast district concerned.

2. (See paragraph 8 of the Memorandum for February 1906.) On the 7th April the Resident at Aden telegraphed that Major Jacob had reported further fighting between the Abdali and Subaihi tribes near Al Anad, and that further trouble was brewing near Nobat Dakim. One Sallam, a minor Abdali Chief, who had recently quarrelled with the Sultan, appeared to be at the bottom of the trouble. The Resident was calling upon the Abdali Sultan to restore order and to take Sallam prisoner, if possible.

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3. On the 25th February, 1906, the Resident at Aden reported that a party of the Barhemi tribe of the Subaihis had recently made a raiding expedition into Turkish territory, and looted eighty-five camels from the Hakami, Hatema, and Kawassama tribes in the vicinity of Moza. Orders have been given for the immediate restitution of the camels.

#### TURKISH ARABIA.

4. (See paragraph 7 of the Memorandum for March 1906.) The Resident at Aden reported, on the 25th March, 1906, that Major Jacob had heard from a Turkish deserter that Kankaban was still in possession of the Turks who were, however, besieged at Imran, Hajja, and Tawila, and were losing ground. Ahmed Feizi Pasha was still at Sanaa. The Military Attaché at the Embassy at Constantinople had an audience with the Ottoman War Minister on the 30th January, 1906, and in the course of conversation, his Excellency stated that it was true that Liwa Riza Pasha had been killed, and that there had been a slight disaster near Shehara, but that the statement that there had been a loss of one and a-half battalions was a gross exaggeration. The Vali was said to have reported to Constantinople that the rebels had begun to move their forces, together with the guns captured from the Imperial troops from Shehara, towards Firket-el-Azr. Both the Vali and the Commander-in-chief are said to have demanded the dispatch of a Nizam division with fresh drafts, and they have also asked for a battery of the new pattern of quick-firing guns with 20,000 rounds of ammunition and four howitzers. A despatch from General Feizi Pasha speaks of fifty guns having been captured by the rebels at Shehara, half of which were subsequently recaptured. The Resident at Aden, writing on the 1st April, 1906, reported that the Marshal, Feizi Pasha, was said to have applied to be relieved on the plea of old age, his real reason being the shortness of money and supplies. The Taiz authorities were said to be attempting to disarm the tribes in their vicinity. Sir N. O'Connor reported on the 28th February to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that there was reason to believe that there had lately been a considerable amount of friction between the Commander-in-chief of the forces in the Yemen and the Special Commission of Inspection under Ferik Ferid Pasha. The Commission apparently endeavoured to interfere with Feizi Pasha's conduct of the military operations, but the Commander-in-chief succeeded in compelling them to retire from Sanaa to Hodeidah, whence they had been striving to obtain permission to return to Sanaa.

5. *General.*—(Vide paragraph 15 of the Memorandum for March.) In connection with the recent attack on Messrs Lynch's depot at Marghil, the Naval Commander-in-chief telegraphed on the 4th March that His Majesty's ship "Lapwing" had been ordered to proceed to Bussorah from Bushire.

#### PERSIAN GULF.

6. *Muscat.*—(Vide paragraph 21 of the Memorandum for March 1906.) On the 9th April, a telegram was received from His Majesty's Secretary of State for India consenting to the unconditional loan of 20,000 rupees to the Sultan of Muscat. The telegram was repeated to Major Cox on the 24th April, and he was directed to advance the money, if it was still considered desirable to do so. He was requested to furnish the Government of India with his opinion as to the manner in which the repayment of the loan should be made.

7. On the 27th March a letter was received from Major Cox stating that M. Goguyer was preparing to build a house on the site of certain go-downs which had been purchased by a servant of his. The Sultan of Muscat had assured Major Grey that the sale of the property to M. Goguyer's servant had been genuine. There was little doubt, however, that M. Goguyer had advanced the money.

8. (Vide paragraph 17 of the Memorandum for March 1906.) A dispute has arisen between M. Goguyer and Ali Musa over the importation of arms. Large quantities of arms and ammunition have been landed at Muscat and Koweit.

9. *Koweit and Nejd.*—(Vide paragraph 23 of Memorandum for March 1906.) Early in March, Major Cox had a lengthy interview with Sheikh Mubarak at the Koweit Agency. The Sheikh expressed himself as grateful for British protection which had ensured peace and rest to his State, and testified to the pleasant relations which existed between himself and Captain Knox. He stated that at present his relations with the Turkish authorities were satisfactory, but confessed that it cost him £T. 1,500 a-year in

douceurs to Turkish officials to maintain that position. Major Cox considers that as long as the practical expression of the Sheikh's sentiments in regard to us undergoes no change, the improvement of the relations between Sheikh Mubarak and the Turkish authorities and Bussorah, within reasonable limits, is rather a convenience to us than otherwise. Major Cox notes Captain Knox seems to have gained the Sheikh's personal regard, and that he is visited freely in a friendly way by many of the Sheikh's subjects.

10. The Political Resident announced in a telegram, dated the 25th April, that the Sheikh of Koweit had informed the Sheikh of Mohammerah that the Ibn Rashid and his immediate following had been surprised and annihilated by Ibn Saood. The telegram has been repeated to the Secretary of State.

11. (Vide paragraph 22 of Memorandum for February 1906.) His Majesty's Secretary of State telegraphed on the 14th April, approving of the Government of India's proposal that a warning should be given to the Trucial Chiefs to the effect that the Government of India would not view with complacency the intrigues of any of them with Ibn Saood. Major Cox has accordingly been authorized to convey the warning.

His Majesty's Government have accepted the view of the Government of India that a warning to Ibn Saood would be necessary, if he were to carry out his reported intention to visit the Pirate Coast and Oman. They consider, however, that it would be better that such warning should be conveyed to him only in the event of his appearing upon the coast, and that it should then be conveyed to him direct by the British Government rather than through the Sheikh of Koweit or the Sultan of Muscat. It is proposed that, in the event of a warning being necessary, a vessel of war should meet Ibn Saood at one of the places along the coast, which he proposes to visit, and that he should be given clearly to understand that no tampering with the engagements and Conventions of the Trucial Chiefs will be allowed.

12. *Bahrein.*—(Vide paragraph 21 of Memorandum for September 1905.) With reference to Major Cox's letter of the 9th September, on the question of obtaining reparation for the murder of certain Bahreinis by the Behai tribe, the Government of India recommended to the Secretary of State, in January last, the adoption of one of two possible alternatives:—

- (1.) To press for compensation from the Porte for the outrage committed by the Behaihs in its territory; or,
- (2.) To drop the case.

His Majesty's Government have decided to accept the second alternative, and do not propose to pursue the matter any further, so far as the Turkish Government are concerned. They consider, however, that the Sheikh of Bahrein may be advised that a further remedy lies in his own hands, as he is competent to exclude from Bahrein members of any tribes which are in a position to exercise pressure upon the Behai to induce them to come to terms. Finally, they desire that the Sheikh should be informed that His Majesty's Government will not countenance any excessive action on his part in pursuance of this policy.

13. (Vide paragraph 29 of Memorandum for February.) In reply to the Secretary of State's inquiry as to how the case of the Persian subject who had committed an offence in Bahrein harbour should be dealt with, the Government of India telegraphed, on the 6th April, that the practice is for the Political Officer to dispose of such cases, the representative of the Sheikh being present. It was stated that, as the Persian Government had recently been notified formally that the Island of Bahrein was under British protection, there appeared to be no reason why the Political Officer should not follow the ordinary practice, especially as the offence in question was committed in connection with a British vessel. The Political Officer's action could be justified on the ground that he exercised jurisdiction either delegated by the Sheikh or derived from his position as Representative of the protecting Power. Major Cox reported on the 21st April that the offender, having restored the money stolen, had been released by the Political Agent on bail in anticipation of sanction.

14. In January last the crew of a Persian dhow bound for Bahrein complained to Captain Prideaux that, their boat having been driven by stress of weather into the anchorage of Abu Dhaluf, on the north-western extremity of the Katr Peninsula, they were ill-used by the Sheikh and people of the place, and the cargo of the boat was forcibly removed and appropriated by the villagers. Captain Prideaux proceeded to Abu Dhaluf on board His Majesty's ship "Sphinx," and summoned the Sheikh to reply to the accusation made against him. The Sheikh at first refused to comply, but on



being threatened with punishment he eventually appeared at Bahrein. He made a statement before Captain Prideaux to the effect that a quarter of the cargo of the boat in question had been given to some of his subjects by the boatmen in return for assistance, and that the rest of it had been purchased from the Persians by the people of Katr. As no British or Bahrein interests appeared to have been involved in the case, the Government of India intimated to the Political Resident that Captain Prideaux would have been better advised had he refrained from action until he had obtained the orders of the Government of India.

15. *Hassa*.—Events are reported from Hofuf which appear to have much excited the populace against the Turks. The disturbances originated on account of an announcement made by the Turks of their intention of taking a census of the people and cattle of the oasis of Hassa. The people regarded the proposal with suspicion, and refused to allow it to be carried out. The Turkish military outposts in Hassa are said to have been evacuated, the troops being concentrated in the fort of Hofuf.

16. *Miscellaneous*.—(Vide paragraph 31 of Memorandum for February.)—On the completion of his inquiry in the Persian Gulf, Dr. Thomson returned to India and had an interview with Sir Louis Dane, Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, at Agra on the 2nd April. He expressed himself as still of opinion that a quarantine station on any of the islands at the mouth of the Persian Gulf was quite unnecessary. Both Henjam and Ormuz would be, in his opinion, unsuitable for such a station, and he thought that if the Conference of 1903 had been aware of the sanitary arrangements introduced under the auspices of the British Government at the Persian ports from Bunder Abbas to Mohammerah, and those now existing at Muscat, Bahrein, and Koweit, they might probably have waived the question of a new quarantine station.

17.—(Vide paragraph 30 of Memorandum for February 1906.) M. Hatinoglou informed His Majesty's Vice-Consul, Bushire, that the Sponge Syndicate had, three months ago, sent out a Greek captain with instructions to visit all localities in the neighbourhood likely to yield sponges. He added that the captain had since left for Europe in order to engage Greek divers. He will return with them and with diving apparatus in about two months, and will start operations at the Islands of Ormuz, Larak, Kishm, and Lingah, and, lastly, at Kharg Island. At the latter place, according to M. Hatinoglou, some extraordinarily large petrified sponges had been found.

(Signed) R. E. HOLLAND.

Simla, May 1, 1906.

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No. 36.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 288.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, May 29, 1906.*

THE French Ambassador inquired on the 25th instant whether the Regulations to be applied to the Muscat dhows in accordance with the decision of the Court of Arbitration at The Hague had been approved, as some time had elapsed since the French Consul at Muscat had submitted them to the British Consul there.

M. Cambon was informed to-day that the negotiations in progress between Major Grey and M. Laronce do not appear to have as yet resulted in a satisfactory understanding, but that His Majesty's Government are awaiting a further report on the subject.

I am, &c.

(Signed) EDWARD GREY.

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No. 37.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 30.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 26th April, relative to the reported desire of Bin Saood to visit Oman.

*India Office, May 29, 1906.*

Inclosure 1 in No. 37.

*Major Cox to Government of India.*

(Confidential.)

Sir,

*Bushire, April 5, 1906.*

IN continuation of my letter, dated 23rd February last, I have the honour to attach copy of a note addressed by Captain Knox to me from camp on the 25th February last, in which he gives the purport of the reply said to have been addressed to Sheikh Mobarek by Bin Saood in connection with the latter's reported desire to visit Oman.

I have, &c.

(Signed) P. Z. COX.

Inclosure 2 in No. 37.

*Political Agent, Koweit, to Major Cox.*

*Camp Rasul Arz, February 25, 1906.*

I WENT to see the Sheikh this morning, and his Secretary handed me the copy of the following letter from Bin Saood to Sheikh Mobarek. I note below the translation:—

"May God prolong your life! Your Excellency knows from beforehand that the people of Oman have been our correspondents from the day that we were in Koweit, and it is true that we have sent to them letters and correspondence to them, but, by God, it was not intentional [? with any ulterior motive], and we did not mention in it any affairs in which we saw any harm, but there may have been something which we were not careful over. God forbid that there should be harm in it, and we have before written to your Excellency and Abooshahr; you know—may God preserve you!—that we are a little deficient in our knowledge of titles and how to answer them, and we fear [? to write] something that may not be suitable to their rules. We do not know them that we should write to them according to their desire, and we expect that from your kindness. We hope from God that He will prolong your existence, and salaam."

N.B.—I have not seen the original, but I have no reason to suppose that this is not genuine.

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No. 38.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 1.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 19th April, relative to affairs in the Aden Hinterland.

*India Office, May 31, 1906.*

Inclosure 1 in No. 38.

*Government of Bombay to Government of India.*

Sir,

*Bombay Castle, March 9, 1906.*

WITH reference to my letter dated the 23rd February, 1906, I am directed to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a Memorandum from the Political Resident, Aden, dated the 25th idem, and of its inclosure, being notes of an interview between Captain Hancock and Imad-bin-Ahmed, Sheikh of

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the Juledi, a sub-tribe of the Subaihi, relative to his quarrels with the Humedi, a tribe residing on the Turkish side of the border. I am also to forward copy of the instructions issued by this Government thereon of to-day's date.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) S. W. EDGERLEY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 38.

Memorandum by Captain Hancock.

1. INTERVIEWED Sheikh Imad-bin-Ahmed, the Juledi, this morning.
2. I informed him that Government had been addressed concerning his request for a rifle, and that no reply had yet been received.
3. He said that he had a dispute with Saeed-al-Jorabi, Jorabi, and Saleh-ba-Ali, the Dubaini Jerawi, concerning his share in the Mukhaddamship of the roads. I replied that it was not a matter in which we were accustomed to interfere. Caravans made their own arrangements about Mukhaddams. In reply to his query, I replied that, certainly, he must not interfere with caravans. On the other hand, he should keep the road passing his limits safe and peaceful.
4. He said that he had quarrels with the Humedi. I advised him to make peace. I said that he must not allow these quarrels to interfere with the peace of the roads. He said that the Humedi interfered with caravans in their limits. He therefore wished to interfere with their caravans passing through our limits. I replied again that this, he must not do.
5. If he had specific complaint to make of caravans having been looted in Humedi limits, I would inform the Great Government. He had none, but he said that he dared not send his camels into Humedi limits, as he wanted to. I sympathized with him, but advised him to make use of his camels in our more peaceful limits.
6. He said that the Humedi had recently raided some of his people. There was a regular feud with them. They were more powerful than he was. They had even expressed defiance of Government. The Turkish Government could not themselves control them, &c. I said that these feuds were very mischievous, and that I hoped that the country would gradually become more peaceful.
7. He asked for ammunition, clothes, and presents. Ammunition I said that I could not give him. I represented that Government had been addressed in regard to his request for a rifle. I asked him if he had ever had fair cause to complain of lack of generosity. He admitted that he had not.
8. He said that he was the friend of Government, and wished Government to assist him as much as possible. He found his tribesmen difficult to control, and needed assistance.

(Signed) F. DE B. HANCOCK, Captain,  
Acting First Assistant Resident.

February 24, 1906.

Inclosure 3 in No. 38.

Notes of an Interview between Captain Hancock and Sheikh Imad-bin-Ahmed.

BELOW, an interview took place on the morning of the 24th February, 1906, between Captain F. de B. Hancock, Acting First Assistant Resident, Aden, and the Sheikh Imad-bin-Ahmed, the Juledi.

Aden Residency, February 25, 1906.

1. Copy forwarded, with compliments, to the Secretary to Government in the Political Department, with reference to this Office letter dated the 24th December, 1905.
2. There is a long-standing feud between the Juledi and the Humedi, which appears to have recently reached a more acute stage. The Juledi Sheikh is anxious for more arms and ammunition, for the alleged purpose of defending himself more effectively against his enemy on the other side of the border.

3. Trans-border feuds are, of course, to be as far as possible discouraged, and I have pressed the Juledi Sheikh to, if possible, conclude a truce with the Humedi.

(For Political Resident, Aden)  
(Signed) F. DE B. HANCOCK, Captain.

Inclosure 4 in No. 38.

Government of Bombay to Political Resident, Aden.

Political Department, Bombay Castle, March 9, 1906.

Sir,

WITH reference to the notes of your interview with Sheikh Imad-bin-Ahmed, the Juledi, forwarded with your indorsement dated the 25th February, 1906, I am directed to state that when Chiefs on the British side of the border make allegations as to any raids by Turkish tribes within British limits, the specific facts connected with such occurrences should, if possible, be ascertained at once and reported to Government, to enable complaint to be made to the Turkish Government if the Government of India think a case a suitable one to bring to notice.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) S. W. EDGERLEY.

No. 39.

[18775]

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 1.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 10th May, relative to border affairs in Amiri territory.

India Office, May 31, 1906.

Inclosure 1 in No. 39.

Government of Bombay to Government of India.

Bombay Castle, April 5, 1906.

(Confidential.)

I AM directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a letter, dated the 18th ultimo, and of its inclosures, from the Political Resident at Aden, drawing attention to the fact that Turkish subjects have interests on our side of the boundary, and our Protectorate subjects have interests on the Turkish side of the frontier demarcated. The Resident's letter is apparently intended to favour a separation of interests which appears to his Excellency the Governor in Council to be impracticable in the circumstances of the case. But in forwarding the papers I am chiefly to draw the attention of the Government of India to the gradual establishment of direct communication in such matters between Major Jacob, the Political Officer at Dthala, and the Turkish officials on the other side of the frontier. That this would be the case is recognized in paragraph 3 (a) of the Government of India's Secret despatch, dated the 29th December, 1904, and it appears to his Excellency the Governor in Council to be inevitable, and he has, therefore, at present given no orders which shall retard the growth of the custom which is establishing itself.

2. I am to bring the matter to the notice of the Government of India, because the Secretary of State, in paragraph 2 of his despatch, dated the 10th November, 1905, did not desire to proceed with the proposal made in the Government of India's despatch of 1904, pending the exchange of notes and the signing of the maps regarding the frontier. That despatch contains the latest information which this Government have received on that particular subject, and it is presumed, therefore, that the final exchange of notes and other necessary formalities have not yet been concluded.



Inclosure 2 in No. 39.

*Political Resident, Aden, to Government of Bombay.*

(Confidential.)

*Aden Residency, March 18, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to forward copies of papers concerning border affairs in Amiri territory, and to request that I may be informed of the views of Government in the matter.

2. In regard to recent differences of a similar nature on the Subehi border, near Mafalis, the Mansuri Sheikh was informed, as mentioned in the note forwarded with this Office letter, dated the 25th February last, that such affairs depended upon purely geographical conditions. The simple view was taken that persons residing on the Turkish side of the recently demarcated border were Turkish subjects and liable to the jurisdiction and revenue demands of Turkish authority only, whereas persons residing within British-protected territory were, *ipso facto*, relieved of any further liability to Turkish authority.

3. A settlement on these broad general lines would appear the simplest solution of the difficulties which Major Jacob refers to.

Inclosure 3 in No. 39.

*Extract from Note, dated January 10, 1906, by Major Jacob, Political Officer, Dthala.*

THE Amir was then reminded of the prime duty before him, viz., the pacification and reconciliation to his house of some of the more dissatisfied tribesmen, and that this was his best opportunity while the British were in his country.

He spoke of various petty and chronic disputes with the Arabs over the border. Major Jacob explained to the Resident that there were occasional cross-disputes where each complainant was referred to the Courts at Kataba or Dthala, as the case might be, and he added that the Turkish officials were always most ready to give satisfaction. There were, it is true, a few outstanding cases, and the recent change of Kaimakam at Kataba had obviously delayed their settlement, but the Political Officer promised to insure that in a short time no ground of complaint would remain on either side; that the incidence of ownership on both sides the border naturally gave rise to these disputes, and a good deal of correspondence had taken place between himself and the Kaimakam of Kataba. If the latter officer were unable for any reason to satisfy the Amir, the Mutessarif's Court at Taiz was addressed. If this latter could not, or would not, give compliance, the Political Officer would report the circumstances to the Residency.

When asked to detail any grievance he might have, the Amir replied he would bring the same to the notice of the Resident's representative at Dthala.

Inclosure 4 in No. 39.

*Captain Hancock to Major Jacob.*

(Confidential.)

Dear Jacob,

*Aden Residency, January 24, 1906.*

WITH reference to your notes, dated the 10th instant, on the Political Resident's last tour to Dthala, I am to ask you for further notes concerning the disputes over the border, in which the Amir of Dthala is concerned, as well as the disputes on our side of the border which concern Turkish subjects or officials.

I am to ask you to attach references with your notes, so as to make the position perfectly clear for reference to Government if necessary.

Meanwhile, I am to say that General Mason does not quite understand your having engaged in direct correspondence with the Turkish authorities over the border without previous reference to him, and to request that this may be explained, and the necessity for the same remarked upon.

Turkish officials correspond fairly readily with their head-quarters at Constanti-

nople, and in view of this, General Mason, of course, desires to be kept fully cognizant of all your correspondence with them, and also that, as a general rule, they should not be addressed except upon his instructions.

(Signed)

F. DE B. HANCOCK, Captain,  
*Acting First Assistant Resident at Aden.*

Inclosure 5 in No. 39.

*Major Jacob to Captain Hancock.*

(Confidential.)

THE Amir's subjects had, and have, several claims against Turkish subjects across the border, and the Turks have in many cases proffered cross-claims. It is possible these claims in part date back to a time prior to the delimitation of the border as at present constituted, but in any case, looking to the fact, as told me by the Amir, that both he and Turkish subjects have claims of tithes from lands on the opposite side, these cross-disputes will be necessarily chronic. It would have been better had the line, as drawn, separated once and for all the interests of both parties, and it is possible this may even now be arranged, as my relations with the border officials are amicable.

2. I believe Government is considering the advisability of making the Political Officer at Dthala the referee in all such border suits, but until this point be settled it is not possible for me actively to interfere.

3. The procedure hitherto in vogue, and handed down to me by my predecessor in somewhat different cases, is as follows:—

The Amir, say, writes to me in the tenor of a complaint as per sheet (A) (attached). It is not that land alone has given rise to these claims. There has always been commerce between these people on both sides the border. In the Kataba court the defendants will probably deny the claim in whole or in part, or prefer cross-claims. I refer the same to the Kaimakam, Kataba, who may refer it to the Mutessarif at Taiz, or I may, after some interval, myself adopt this procedure. The Kaimakam of Kataba will reply that the complainant had best appear in his court. I advise the Amir accordingly. The Kaimakam, after hearing the case, reports to me the result. I communicate it to the Amir, who, if dissatisfied, again urges a reference on certain points unelucidated. Oftentimes the Kaimakam will admit the general correctness of the Amir's contention, but will modify it with a cross-complaint. He is then told to refer his subject to the Amir's Court.

In this way affairs have proceeded smoothly enough, and the late Kaimakam had given me great assistance.

The Resident asks if this inter-correspondence is necessary. Without it things would stand at a deadlock. If matters cannot be adjusted by the Turks to the Amir's satisfaction, and if, *prima facie*, the latter's case is sound, reference is made to the Resident at Aden, notably in the case of Turkish encroachment at Habil-al-Khadthar in my predecessor's time, and in the matter of the non-payment of the Amir's claim to 400L for compensation of revenues wrongly collected by the Turks prior to the recession of the line to Kataba. It is true that when the Turkish reinforcements were being hurried up through Kataba a few months ago, the number of complaints naturally increased, and settlement was further delayed by the resignation at this time of Fehmi Bey, and the interregnum of two months before the accession of 'Izzat Bey, the present Kaimakam of Kataba.

To return to the point of my intervention, by custom established, the Political Officer has, by his office, powers delegated by the Resident, whom he represents on the frontier, and it is more economical, expeditious, and befitting, in my opinion, that he should continue to act direct with the Turkish officials across the line, reference to Aden being reserved for stubborn cases.

I would suggest, for consideration of the Resident and Government, that the Residency be furnished with half-yearly returns, showing—

- The nature of the claims on either side;
- The manner of disposal;
- The number still pending for disposal; and
- Remarks by the Political Officer as to the means to be adopted.

(Signed)

H. F. JACOB, Captain,  
*Political Officer, Dthala.*

*Suleik, February 8, 1906.*



(Confidential.)

Forwarded, with compliments, to the First Assistant Resident, Aden, for the information of the Resident (*vide* Confidential demi-official letter on the subject).

(Signed)

Suleik, February 8, 1906.

H. F. JACOB, Major.

Political Officer, Dthala.

## Sheet (A).

(Confidential.)

1. There are in the hands of Bani Fadhel and Ahl-al-'Od, of the district of Kataba, some lands (arable), cash in dollars, and some grain belonging to the Busais of all Munadi (Amiri). The Amir has written to me on this subject, and I have already some eight months ago written to the Turks, but up to date received no reply. Total claim, some 6,000 dollars.

2. Yahya Bin Hasan-al-Ba'dani of Eb owes Fara' Muthanna of Dthala 25 qadahs of grain, worth 650 dollars. Also due by him, 11 dollars. I think there exists a cross-complaint.

3. 'Abdul Wahhab Attam, of al-'Athareb of Eb, owes Fara' Muthanna of Dthala 120 dollars.

4. Quadthi Yahya-al-Guma'i of Nagd-al-Guma'i owes 'Ali Abdul Rab of Dthala 140 dollars.

5. Sheikh Mus'ed Gawwas of 'Amara, of the district of Kataba, owes Ahl Ahmed, Ahl-al-Fagara and Ahl Zubaid of Dthala 441 qadahs of grain, which were kept by them for safe custody. There is also due by him 6 camels and 20 qadahs of grain, which were robbed on the trade route by him. The camels were stolen with their loads.

6. Al Qarmi of 'Amara owes Ahl Lakamat-al-Ash'ub and Ahl Sanah 20 dollars and a donkey worth 20 dollars.

7. There is with al-Khalladi of al-Haiqi, of the village of Sakah, of the district of Kataba, a she-camel belonging to Shusi of Jalila.

8. There is due by Battash of Ar Ratif of al-Haiqi, of the district of Kataba, to Ahl Shi'b al-Aswad 30 dollars, and 12 dollars to Ahl Ar Rubat.

9. There is due by Mahomed Fara' of al Naiqi, of the district of Kataba, 84 dollars to Ahmad Hubaish. I have asked the Amir to send this man to Kataba, as the case was a judicial one, but there appears to have been no action taken by him.

10. Sheikh Qaid Sa'id and Sheikh Qasim Isma'il, of Kataba, owe Haj Mohsin Sa'id 400 dollars.

11. There are still about eight camels out of a total of thirty-two with the Turks. They were impressed by them lately during the reinforcements made, and passing through Kataba. The eight camels were returned about two months after they were commandeered by the Turks. I have pressed the Ka'imakam for settlement.

F. CHURCHILL, Lieutenant-Colonel,

Acting Political Officer, Dthala.

Dthala, February 20, 1906.

## Inclosure 6 in No. 39.

Major Jacob to Captain Hancock.

(Confidential.)

Aden, February 10, 1906.

IN continuation of my Confidential letter of the 8th instant, I have the honour to state I have again this day interrogated the Amir of Dthala with reference to the disputes across the border. The exact case for possession and claims of the nature of royalties is as follows:—

2. Both parties, by the reason of the incidence of the line as demarcated by the late Commission, have lands which have fallen to the opposite side. The cultivators of these transfers owe allegiance to their respective and original over-lords, but pay tithes only to the Chief or Sheikh into whose territory their fields have by delimitation drifted. The royalty thus claimed has been on both sides by custom fixed at 1 kadah of grain in every 10. The Sheikh of Kataba, one Naji Sa'id, and Kaid Mukbil-al-Yubi, have now, says the Amir, begun to demand 9 kadahs, or in some cases even more, from the subjects of the Amir situated within their (Turkish) limits. To this Amir Shaif naturally demurs, both on the ground of championing his people's cause and, further, because his own revenues will thereby fall below the average.

3. Some rectification, not of the line, but of the rights of transfer on each side, is an imperative necessity, but the Amir believes that the Turkish subjects in possession of such land on his side the line will prefer to remain *in situ*; they know the extra taxation to which they would be subjected on their own side, and they recognize the lenient methods of collection as practised by the Amir of Dthala.

Grazing and pasturage rights on each side the border have offered no difficulties at all; things are running smoothly.

4. These are the disputes to which I especially refer in the second paragraph of my letter of the 8th instant.

5. The cases instanced in paragraph 3 and sheet (A) have their origin in commercial dealings, and in these matters, in my opinion, the plaintiff is more properly referred to the Court of the jurisdiction to which the defendant belongs.

[19105]

No. 40.

Sir N. O'Connor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 378.)

Constantinople, May 29, 1906.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 292 of the 1st instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah, reporting the death of Abdul Aziz-bin-Reshid, Amir of Shanar, and the succession of his son Metaab, to whom His Majesty the Sultan sent a message confirming him in his father's place.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

## Inclosure in No. 40.

Consul Crow to Sir N. O'Connor.

(No. 27.)

Bussorah, May 2, 1906.

Sir,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 35 of the 25th April last, reporting the death of Abdul Aziz-bin-Reshid, Amir of Shanar, I have the honour to state that, according to information received here, it appears that a severe fight occurred at Rodath-Mukenna, some seven hours from Boreyda, on the 17th Sepher, 1324 (11th April, 1906), between Ibn Saoud and Ibn Reshid, who was returning from a raid in which the Amir was killed and his followers annihilated.

It is stated that nineteen men were killed and twenty-eight wounded on the side of Saoud, and 400 killed and 200 wounded on the side of the Amir.

The news was immediately communicated by the Sheikh of Koweit to the Government of Mohammerah and the Vilayet of Bussorah. On the 29th April the Sultan's Secretary sent a telegram to Bussorah, addressed to Metaab, son of Abdul Aziz-bin-Reshid, stating that His Imperial Majesty much regretted the murder of his father, and would punish the culprits, and that he (Metaab) was appointed by the Sultan to take his father's place, and that the salary and allowances granted to his father would be continued to him.

Metaab is said to be 18 years old.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) F. E. CROW.

[18125]

No. 41.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Foreign Office, June 5, 1906.

Sir,

WITH reference to your letters of the 19th and 23rd ultimo, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to your herewith, to be laid before Mr. Secretary Morley, copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople relative to the proposed use of a distinctive flag by the Sheikh of Koweit.\*

\* No. 33.



I am to state that Sir E. Grey concurs in the suggestion contained in your letter of the 23rd instant that the Political Agent at Koweit should be instructed to advise the Sheikh to bring the new flag into use.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) E. GORST.

[19549]

No. 42.

*Memorandum communicated by the Italian Embassy, June 7, 1906.*

THE Italian Government have been for some time past rather preoccupied by the news that have reached them of disturbances in the Yemen. Apart from the possibility of such disturbances becoming so grave as to imperil the present *status quo* of the region, the chief reason of the Italian Government's uneasiness is that the present condition of affairs renders it impossible to expect any efficacious action to be taken by Turkey with a view of preserving the safety of the shipping in the Red Sea. They therefore would like to ascertain whether the British Government could concur in their opinion that it would be imperatively necessary for each Power interested in the safety of the Red Sea to be intrusted with the surveillance of the part of the Arabian coast which faces its African possessions.

If such a suggestion could be agreed to, Italy could take charge of the Islands of Hanish and Gebel Zucur by sending there a certain number of Askaris, whose presence would be sufficient to deter slave traders and pirates, without being compelled to dismiss the Turkish garrison, and so to lessen the Turkish prestige in the country.

The Italian Chargé d'Affaires, whilst expressing in a preliminary way the foregoing ideas and suggestions of his Government, would be glad to learn the opinion of the British Government on the subject, and at the same time to receive a communication of the latest news that may have reached here as to the state of affairs in the Yemen.

He is also instructed to communicate to the Foreign Office a copy of the correspondence which has lately taken place between the Italian Government and their Consul at Hodeidah respecting certain propositions that have been made by Ferid Pasha to Cavaliere Sola, and on which, too, the point of view of the British Government would be gladly learnt at Rome.

20, Grosvenor Square, W.,  
June 5, 1906.

Inclosure 1 in No. 42.

*Report of March 28, 1906, of the Italian Consul-General at Hodeidah to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.*

(Translation.)  
Your Excellency,

WITH reference to the concluding portion of my Report of the 1st February, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that, in the course of an interview which I had the day before yesterday with Ferik Ferid Pasha, he told me that the three gun-boats destined for police service in the Red Sea, which have been so long expected, have at last arrived. They are the "Adramite," "Yozgate," and "Castamimi." The latter is already anchored in this roadstead, and the other two stopped at Camaran for some necessities. A new Commodore has also arrived, who, as the above-mentioned President of the Commission of Inquiry assures me, will be able, under his (Ferid Pasha's) constant supervision, to direct this delicate service in such a way as to give full satisfaction to all the more important requirements. Ferid Pasha spoke to me for a long time in this sense with regard to the methods to be adopted in carrying out this service in the matter of the foreign sambouks sailing in the Red Sea, referring clearly to the orders given by the local authorities to the Officer Commanding the fleet in the Red Sea, on the occasion of the incident which occurred in July 1905 to the Erythrean sambouk "Asad" in the waters of Gizan—orders to the effect that the Commanders of the Ottoman gun-boats were not to approach Italian or other foreign sambouks while navigating.

Ferid Pasha, who considers with reason that the service of the gun-boats in the Red Sea, especially on the Arabian Coast, cannot possibly be efficient unless the Imperial vessels are allowed to approach with proper courtesy, and with the marks of respect laid down by international law and customs, the sambouks they may meet at sea, in order to ascertain the real nationality of the latter and whether their papers are in order, as well as the nature of the cargo, makes the following requests in this connection:—

1. That the Turkish gun-boats should have the right during their cruise to stop and visit sambouks flying a foreign flag whose appearance seems suspicious to the Commanders of the Turkish vessels. The President of the Commission of Inquiry gave me the firmest assurances that such visits to the sambouks would be made by the Turkish Commanders with all the precautions required by the case.

2. That if in the course of a visit to an Italian sambouk irregularities should be found in the ship's papers, or if for any reason of importance the appearance of the sambouk should give rise to suspicion, the Turkish gun-boat should be allowed to take the sambouk to the nearest Italian Consular offices, to which the facts would be reported at once.

3. That in the event of a sambouk being caught in the act of smuggling on the coast, confiscation of the goods smuggled should be allowed, and the sambouk taken to the nearest Italian Consulate for the ultimate development of the case before the competent Tribunal.

Without making any definite statement, I told Ferid Pasha that no one would ever have opposed the proposal that the Turkish gun-boats should stop and visit foreign sambouks in the Red Sea, since this was indispensable to the proper working of the cruiser service on the Arabian Coast, but for the reason that the complaints and the legitimate irritation caused to foreigners in the controversies which arose were always occasioned by the arbitrary and illegal methods of procedure adopted by the Commanders of the Turkish gun-boats.

I also spoke to Ferid Pasha with regard to the distribution of the cruiser service along the coast, pointing out to him which parts of the Arabian littoral required the greatest and most special supervision.

If the language which I adopted to Ferid Pasha, which was of a nature to encourage his excellent proposals, does not meet with your Excellency's approval, I request that your Excellency will give me such instructions as may be considered suitable for the purpose of effecting an ultimate agreement with the Local Government on this important matter.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) SOLA.

Inclosure 2 in No. 42.

*The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Italian Consul-General at Hodeidah.*

I HAVE to acknowledge receipt of your Report of the 28th March last, and to confirm the telegram which I addressed to you on the 3rd instant.

In your telegram of the 10th instant you informed me that the proposals of Ferid Pasha, which you specified in your Report under reference, had been disapproved by the Vali, who telegraphed to the Sublime Porte in order that the previous orders forbidding Turkish war-vessels to approach sambouks, whether in territorial waters or laden with contraband, should be upheld.

In any case I consider it desirable to amplify my telegram of the 3rd instant, and to explain to you the reasons for which the proposals of Ferid Pasha are not acceptable to us.

These proposals, in fact, barely conceal the claim already put forward by the Sublime Porte in 1890, on the occasion of the controversy with regard to papers of nationality, that the natives of Massowah should be considered as Turkish subjects, a claim which was also maintained subsequently.

Ferid Pasha cannot reasonably insist thereon, alleging in support of his views the provisions of the General Act of Brussels, which had no application to any part of Turkey, and ought not at the present time to have application in the only way useful to that country. It is known, on the one hand, throughout the coast of the

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Red Sea that sambouks flying the Italian flag are provided with all the prescribed documents, that nationality papers are only issued to those who offer the most satisfactory guarantees of honesty, and that a rigorous supervision over the sambouks is maintained by the maritime officials of Erythraea. In any case, then, when a sambouk shows the Italian flag and carries astern and on the sails the indications prescribed by the Brussels Act, it ought not to be molested in any way.

It is known, on the other hand, that all the piratical sambouks freely fly the Turkish flag, and can provide themselves when they wish with health papers from the Turkish authorities; and that the Turkish sambouks, or a great number of them, are not provided with nationality papers.

In this state of affairs the Government cannot allow the Turkish gun-boats to exercise any rights whatever over sambouks flying the Italian flag.

The Turkish gun-boats can, however, perform a really useful duty in suppressing piracy and hindering the slave trade carried on by Turkish ships or Turkish subjects.

Your attitude in the matter under discussion should conform to these precise instructions, and if other proposals on the subject are made to you, you should not fail to maintain complete reserve and report to me immediately.

I have, &c.

[19526]

No. 43.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 7.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 17th May, relative to the proposed Treaty with Beda.

*India Office, June 6, 1906.*

Inclosure 1 in No. 43.

*Government of Bombay to Government of India.*

*Bombay Castle, March 28, 1906.*

WITH reference to the correspondence ending with Foreign Department telegram dated the 20th February, 1906, relative to a Treaty with Beda, I am directed to forward herewith copy of a letter from the Political Resident, Aden, dated the 11th March, 1906, and of its inclosures.

2. In transmitting these papers, I am to state that Government approve of the suggestion contained in paragraph 3 of the Resident's letter, and to observe that an express clause guaranteeing safety of British parties which may have occasion to visit Beda territory does not find a place in the Dthala Treaty.

Inclosure 2 in No. 43.

*Major-General Mason to Government of Bombay.*

*Aden Residency, March 11, 1906.*

WITH reference to correspondence ending with copy of telegram from the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated the 20th February, 1906, forwarded to me with your letter, dated the 23rd February, 1906, concerning Beda affairs, I have the honour to forward herewith copies of letters which have this week been received from Sultan Ali-bin-Ahmed, the Rasasi, and Sheikh Abdurrah-bin-Sa'eh Am Musa, the Namaikani Sheikh. I also forward copies of a letter received from the Fadthli Sultan, and of a letter written to him by Sultan Ali-bin-Ahmed, the Rasasi.

And I also inclose copy of a letter addressed by Sultan Ali-bin-Ahmed, the Rasasi, to Haji Abdulla Am Uragee, the Aden merchant referred to in this Office Confidential

letter dated the 13th May, 1905, of which a copy was forwarded to you with this Office letter of the same date.

2. From the above it appears that Sultan Ali-bin-Ahmed, the Rasasi, desires that negotiations should now be continued through Sheikh Ahmed Husen-bin-Ahmed Am Bubakr, the Azzani Sheikh, between whom and his former rival Sheikh Abdurrah-bin-Saleh Am Musa, the Hamakani, some misunderstanding would now appear to have been arrived at.

3. To these letters suitable replies will be sent, and it may be hoped that the present negotiations may terminate in the conclusion of the Treaty in a few months' time. I am of opinion that for the present no further action need be taken beyond continuing this correspondence in the hope that it may terminate in some more tangible result than has hitherto been achieved.

4. Meanwhile I have the honour to inclose, for the approval of Government, which I have the honour to request may be communicated at the earliest possible date, the English version of a Treaty which has been drafted to meet the special requirements referred to in Government of India telegram dated the 20th February, 1906.

5. In regard to this, I would suggest, for the consideration of Government, that the last eighteen words of clause 5 may possibly lead to difficulty in negotiation, and might perhaps be omitted as unnecessary in view of the provisions already made in clause 1 of the Treaty for freedom of intercourse.

Inclosure 3 in No. 43.

*Sultan Ali-bin-Ahmed to Major-General Mason.*

[Undated.]

(After compliments.)

WE have received letters from you about making friendship with us. That is all right. The 200 rupees have duly been received. We, the Rasasi, are not like any one else, and there is no equal to us except Ahmed-bin-Husen, the owner of Shugra. If you are desirous that treaty and friendship may be concluded between you and us, we are like the Chiefs who have entered into Treaties. We have many Sheikhs in the country, but Sheikh Ahmed Husen, with whom you have had some communication, is predominant, and we are altogether under his control, so much so that we can never act contrary to his advice. Ahmed Husen is the man who arranges matters of settlement between us, our brothers, and the Sheikhs of the country. You may now settle with this Sheikh, as he and Abdurrah Saleh are in harmony, you and Ahmed-bin-Husen may deliberate about matters effecting the stipend, and such matters as may be good for us, our brothers, and the Sheikhs of the country. We have suffered some damages in the country, and expect from you an assistance which you may send us with the Habib (Sayad) Nasir-bin-Ahmed. You may treat the said Sayad with respect and kindness.

Any assistance you may grant us may be remitted through Am Uragee. May you be preserved.

Inclosure 4 in No. 43.

*Sheikh Abdurrah-bin-Saleh Am Musa to Major-General Mason.*

[Undated.]

(After compliments.)

WE have received your letter, and we had sent you a letter. If you inquire about our health, we are prosperous; we hope you are the same. As regards our affairs, there is no excuse about our coming. We have endeavoured in the matter, and ultimately we have come to an understanding and made promises. We were coming, and had only to communicate to you the time of our departure. But there happened rain and flood in their country, which had done damage. After they make things in proper order they are coming. We wanted to come in Ashoor, but Sultan Alawi-bin-Husen took away a mare from Am Rasasi, the brother of Ali-bin-Ahmed. This mare was an excellent one that it has no equal. He wanted to go with it either towards the Turks or Aden; we



overtook him, and recovered it from him. He has spoiled their arrangement. Had it not been for the mare of Am Rasasi they would have come. They are still in confusion about this loot of the mare. We shall come down after they arrive here.

O friend, we want a magazine rifle of six shots. We require it in addition to those you will give us and the Sultan; God willing, we will bring him to you.

Inclosure 5 in No. 43.

*Sultan Ahmed-bin-Husen to Captain Hancock.*

*Moharrum 1324 (March 1906).*

WE inform your Honour that we have received your esteemed letter and understood its contents. You have intimated to us that his Honour General Mason will not come to Shugra unless the reply of the Rasasi was received. O friend! we have received a letter to-day from Sultan Ali-bin-Ahmed which we herewith forward for your perusal. You may decide as to what you deem suitable (good). Your reply is requested. We have come to know that messengers have been dispatched to you with letters containing definite information from the Rasasi and Humaikani. If they have written to you about their coming please inform us when it will be and if they are not coming soon.

May you be preserved.

Inclosure 6 in No. 43.

*Sultan Ali-bin-Ahmed to Sultan Ahmed-bin-Husen.*

(After compliments.)

[Undated.]

WE have received your kind letter and understood its contents. You state that there has been correspondence between us and the Europeans. That is correct. They (Government) desire that a meeting should take place between them and us at Shugra, but we are not willing unless Ahmed-bin-Husen and Sheikh Ahmed-Husen should ascertain about our stipend, present, and ammunition, as well as the benefit of our brothers and tribesmen. Please inquire into all the affairs between the Europeans and us, and that we should meet at your place at Shugra. The negotiation may be concluded through Sheikh Ahmed-Husen as he and the Humaikani listen to each other. Please let us know what is arranged.

Inclosure 7 in No. 43.

*Sultan Ali-bin-Ahmed to Sultan Haji Abdulla Am Uragee.*

(After compliments.)

[Undated.]

WE have dispatched a letter to the British Government and a letter to Sultan Ahmed-bin-Husen, in reply to the one we have received from him (the latter). He stated that he came to know that there has been communication between the British Government and us concerning a meeting which is to be held between us, and we wrote to him that who can say to him that there are Chiefs of the Shafi' creed other than ourselves and the Fadthli. If the Fadthli would act on our behalf well and good, otherwise we ourselves will meet him face to face. We wrote to him that we are not as the other Chiefs, and requested him to ascertain the particulars about our stipend, present, arms, and ammunition. We are not on the same footing as the Chiefs, who are inferior to us. He may inquire into the matters and may treat our interest as his own.

As to the letter of the Sirkar, you may explain verbally what is insufficiently supplied therein. All the management of our affairs is now left to Sheikh Ahmed Husen-bin-Ahmed Am Bubakr, with whom you may consult, as he and the Humaikani are working in harmony. Some one will come to you on behalf of Ahmed Husen to discuss the matter of the stipend, present, arms, and ammunition, and to see to the interest of our brothers and Sheikhs. You are not unaware of all these things. We are coming to Beda. You must have heard of the damage we have sustained.

A camel of ours was killed, and we were much disappointed by committal of the act. We will incur expenses on account of this event. We request you to send us what the Government may feel inclined to bestow on us. What you will tell the Sirkar is sufficient. As to ourselves, as soon as you settle the matters, we will not delay our son for an hour. The meeting may take place at Shugra.

Please do not detain the Sayad and give him present.

Inclosure 8 in No. 43.

*Protectorate Treaty with the Rasasi Sultans of the Banyardth.*

THE British Government and Sultans Ali-bin-Ahmed, the Rasasi, and Alawi-bin-Husen, the Rasasi, being desirous of entering into relations of peace and friendship; The British Government have named and appointed \_\_\_\_\_, Political Resident at Aden, to conclude a Treaty for this purpose.

The said \_\_\_\_\_, and Sultans Ali-bin-Ahmed, the Rasasi, and Alawi-bin-Husen, the Rasasi, aforesaid, have agreed upon and concluded the following Articles:—

I.

There shall be peace and friendship between the British Government and all the tribesmen, subjects, and dependents of the Rasasi Sultans of the Banyardth. The subjects of the British and the tribesmen of the Banyardth and its dependencies shall be free to enter the territories of the other; they shall not be molested, but shall be treated with respect at all times and in all places. The said Sultans and other notable persons shall visit Aden when they please. They shall be treated with respect and be given passes to carry arms.

II.

In compliance with the wish of the aforesaid Sultans Ali-bin-Ahmed, the Rasasi, and Alawi-bin-Husen, the Rasasi, the British Government hereby undertakes to extend to the territory of the Banyardth and all its dependencies, being under the authority and jurisdiction of the said Sultans, the gracious favour and protection of His Majesty the King-Emperor.

III.

The said Sultans Ali-bin-Ahmed, the Rasasi, and Alawi-bin-Husen, the Rasasi, hereby agree and promise on behalf of themselves, their heirs and successors, and the whole of the tribesmen, subjects, and dependents under their jurisdiction, to refrain from entering into any correspondence, Agreement, or Treaty with any foreign nation or Power; and, further, promise to give immediate notice to the Resident at Aden or other British officer of any attempt by any other Power to interfere with the territory of the Banyardth or any of its dependencies.

IV.

The said Sultans Ali-bin-Ahmed, the Rasasi, and Alawi-bin-Husen, the Rasasi, hereby bind themselves, and their heirs and successors for ever, that they will not cede, sell, mortgage, lease, hire or give, or otherwise dispose of the territory of the Banyardth and its dependencies, or any part of the same, at any time to any Power other than the British Government.

V.

The said Sultans Ali-bin-Ahmed, the Rasasi, further promise, on behalf of themselves, their heirs and successors, and all their tribesmen, subjects, and dependents, that they will keep open the roads in the territory of the Banyardth and its dependencies, and that they will protect all persons who may be going in the direction of Aden for the purposes of trade, or returning therefrom, and that they will assist and protect any British party which may have occasion to visit their territory.

[1639]

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## VI.

The said Sultans Ali-bin-Ahmed, the Rasasi, and Alawi-bin-Husen, the Rasasi, also engage on behalf of themselves, their heirs and successors, and all their tribesmen, subjects, and dependents, to maintain any boundary which may hereafter be demarcated between their territory or that of any of its dependencies and Turkish territory, and to protect any boundary pillars which may be erected.

## VII.

Further, the said Sultans Ali-bin-Ahmed, the Rasasi, and Alawi-bin-Husen, the Rasasi, undertake, on behalf of themselves, their heirs and successors, to maintain order within the boundary of the territory of the Banyardth and its dependencies under their jurisdiction, and to restrain their tribesmen from creating disturbances either in their own territory or in the country beyond the boundary line, and from interfering with the tribes who are subjects of the Turkish Government.

## VIII.

In consideration of these undertakings and engagements the British Government agree to pay to the said Sultans Ali-bin-Ahmed, the Rasasi, and Alawi-bin-Husen, the Rasasi, and to their heirs and successors a monthly sum of \_\_\_\_\_ dollars, the half of which is \_\_\_\_\_ dollars.

## IX.

The above Treaty shall have effect from this date. In witness thereof the Under-  
signed have affixed their signatures or seals at \_\_\_\_\_ this the \_\_\_\_\_ day of  
March in the year 1906.

Inclosure 9 in No. 43.

*Government of India to Government of Bombay.*

*Simla, April 28, 1906.*

I AM directed to refer to your letter dated the 28th March, 1906, forwarding a Report, with inclosures, from the Political Resident, Aden, on the subject of the proposed Treaty with the Rasasi Sultans of the Banyardth.

2. In accordance with the instructions contained in Government of India telegram dated the 20th February, 1906, the Political Resident has included in the draft Treaty framed by him a provision under which the Chiefs would be held responsible for the safety of British parties which might have occasion to visit their territories. The Resident has, however, now suggested that the provision in question should be omitted from the Treaty, on the ground that its retention might lead to difficulty in negotiation, while the provisions already included in clause 1 of the draft Treaty, which provides for freedom of intercourse, might be held to secure the desired object.

The Bombay Government support this proposal, and observe at the same time that an express clause guaranteeing the safety of British parties under similar conditions does not find a place in the Dthala Treaty.

3. In reply, I am to say that the Government of India do not desire to press for the inclusion in the Treaty of the provision in question, but I am to suggest that, if the Governor in Council sees no objection, the movement of a British party within the territories subject to the Sheikhs might be specially provided for by an exchange of notes, or even verbally, at the time of negotiating the Treaty, though, of course, no such party would be sent without a special reference to Government.

No. 44.

[19072]

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir N. O'Connor.*

(No. 97.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, June 7, 1906.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 133 of the 2nd instant: Arab attack on Messrs. Lynch's steam-ship "Khalifa."

It is more advisable for His Majesty's ship "Comet" not to act as escort, and for the Turkish authorities to have the full responsibility of policing the river.

No. 45.

[19951]

*Sir N. O'Connor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 11.)*

(No. 387.)

*Constantinople, June 1, 1906.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 125 of the 27th February, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the Military Attaché at this Embassy, reporting on the discontent prevalent among the Turkish troops in the Yemen.

I have, &c.

(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 45.

*Colonel Surtees to Sir N. O'Connor.*

(No. 33.)

*Constantinople, June 1, 1906.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that information has reached me from a sure source to the effect that, owing to the scarcity of provisions, the troops in Sanaa and the neighbouring stations have refused to obey the orders of Feizi Pasha, the Commander-in-chief.

The latter has reported the matter to Constantinople, adding that he is powerless to act until the arrival of fresh and disciplined soldiers, without whom, he says, "it is impossible to settle the business."

The condition of affairs in the Yemen appears to be going from bad to worse, and that the troops have begun to question the authority of Feizi Pasha is a bad sign, as it has been generally recognized that it is almost entirely due to his personal influence that the campaign has not proved utterly disastrous to the Ottoman troops.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. CONYERS SURTEES, Colonel,  
*Military Attaché.*

No. 46.

[20052]

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 12.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 24th May, relative to the Muscat Arbitration Award.

*India Office, June 11, 1906.*



## Inclosure 1 in No. 46.

*Major Grey to Government of India.*

(Confidential.)

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your information, a copy of letter dated the 15th instant, which I have addressed to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) W. G. GREY,  
Officiating Political Agent.

Muscat, May 15, 1906.

## Inclosure 2 in No. 46.

*Major Grey to Political Resident, Bushire.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to refer to telegram dated the 14th instant from the Government of India in the Foreign Department to my address. I am directed therein to submit a brief report of the net result of my negotiations with M. Laronce, in connection with the Arbitration Award in the French flag difficulty.

2. M. Laronce and I were directed (1) to consult as to the best method of making known to the subjects of His Highness the Sultan of Oman the result of the arbitration; and (2) to make out a list of such persons who are henceforth to be entitled to fly French flags in accordance with the terms of the award.

With reference to (1), we agree that the result of the arbitration should be communicated by His Highness the Sultan to his subjects by means of a Proclamation to be issued by him.

In regard to (2), we are unable to agree as to the list of persons who are to be entitled to fly French flags according to the terms of the award. The reasons for our lack of concord in this matter are:—

(1.) M. Laronce holds that authorization to fly the French flag was given to each and every owner once for all, that is to say, for every dhow of which he might subsequently become the possessor; whereas I hold, in accordance with instructions received, that authorization was given in regard to individual dhows only. M. Laronce professes to be unable to inform me as to the date on which each individual dhow obtained her first *titre de navigation*.

(2.) M. Laronce maintains that his Government will be obliged to insist not only upon their views in regard to point (1) being accepted by us, but also that each unauthorized dhow owner should be allowed to replace any dhow at present in his possession, of which he might subsequently become dispossessed by sale or by loss.

(3.) M. Laronce wishes not only that all the owners named in the list presented by him to me on the 4th March last should preserve authorization to fly French flags, but that all the dhows named in his list should be registered as being the property of the persons against whose names they have been entered. As a result of careful inquiry I have found (1) that some of the dhow owners are not, according to our view, entitled to authorization, as they do not actually possess a dhow at the present time; and (2) that many of the dhows are not the property of the persons against whose names they have been entered.

(4.) M. Laronce has not accepted the views of His Majesty's Government in regard to the four subjects of His Highness the Sultan, for whom protection in Zanzibar has been obtained by the French according to the Anglo-French Agreement of the 13th May, 1901 (Nos. 17-20 in the French list above referred to). He has referred this point to his Government.

(5.) Owners Nos. 8 and 13 in the French list might, in my opinion, be regarded as French protégés in Oman; but M. Laronce could not agree to my proposal that their position as such should be accepted by us in exchange for the views of His Majesty's Government in regard to Nos. 17-20 being accepted by the French.

It is impossible to formulate the Proclamation to be issued by the Sultan until

the list of owners and dhows has been agreed upon, and the exact conditions in which the French flag is to be flown by them have been fixed.

3. A copy of this letter has been forwarded to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) W. G. GREY.

[20357]

No. 47.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 15.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 10th May, relative to affairs in the Aden Hinterland.

*India Office, June 14, 1906.*

## Inclosure 1 in No. 47.

*Governor of Bombay to Government of India.*

Sir,

IN continuation of my letter dated 9th March, 1906, I am directed to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a Memorandum from the Political Resident, Aden, dated 15th April, 1906, and of its inclosure, regarding a raiding expedition into Turkish territory by a party of the Barhemi tribe of Subaihis.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) S. W. EDGERLEY.

## Inclosure 2 in No. 47.

*Sheikh Ali-bin-Ahmed-am-Tomi, the Barhemi, to Political Resident, Aden.*

(After compliments.)

WE inform you that one of the Akils of Al-Hakim, named Ahmed Bolaisi, came to our country and took some of our men, about twenty-six men in number, who went with him without our knowledge. He took them in order to fight the Awashika, Kusema, and Hamiri tribes on their country, Jabal Abar, and to commit plunder. Two of our men were killed and one wounded, while three were killed and four wounded from the other side.

The Hakims espoused the cause of the above tribes, and combined together and joined hands. We are now awaiting what may come to us from them. This is what happened in our country. We therefore ask from your Honour an assistance, as we wish to build a dar to shelter our children. If you are disposed to give us, please send us a reply, and may God enhance your prosperity.

The seal was not forthcoming at the time of writing this letter.

Copy forwarded, with compliments, to the Secretary to Government in the Political Department with reference to correspondence ending with his letter dated the 9th March, 1906. The Barhemi Sheikh was written to on the 26th February and the 23rd March concerning recent hostilities with the Al-Hakims, and in the latter communication informed that full restitution should be made of all property looted in the course of the same.

[1639]



2. The Sheikh is now at Lahej, and is said to be about to visit Aden, when he will be again informed in the above sense.

(Signed)

C. T. BECHER, Colonel,  
Officiating Political Resident at Aden.

Aden Residency, April 15, 1906.

[20670]

No. 48.

Sir N. O'Connor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 18.)

(No. 400. Confidential.)

Sir,

Therapia, June 11, 1906.

WITH reference to my despatches No. 292 of the 1st May and No. 309, Secret and Confidential, of the 8th May, relative to the defeat and death of Abdul Aziz Bin Rashid of Hail, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Acting Consul at Jeddah, reporting the arrival of two messengers from Bin Saoud with letters for the Grand Shereef of Mecca and the Vali of the Hedjaz.

It would appear that after his successful encounter with the Emir of Nejd, Bin Saoud has proclaimed himself ruler of the whole "Shark" (East), and has sent letters to Constantinople and to the Valis of Bussorah and Bagdad.

As His Majesty's Acting Consul reports that the two messengers who had recently arrived at Jeddah had left for Yambo, and that the rumour is current that Bin Saoud has ordered them to proceed to Egypt with a letter addressed to the Khedive, I am forwarding a copy of the inclosure in this despatch to the Earl of Cromer.

What importance is to be attached to Bin Saoud's communication cannot be estimated at present, but, so far as his character is actually known, neither his military prowess nor his administrative capacity encourages the belief that he will be able successfully to cope with the Ottoman Government, should he decide to proclaim his independence of the Sultan. The development of the question, however, deserves to be carefully watched.

I have, &c.

(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 48.

Acting Consul Hussein to Sir N. O'Connor.

(No. 25.)

Sir,

Jeddah, May 13, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 26th ultimo a telegram was received by his Excellency Ahmed Ratib Pasha from Medina that Abdul Aziz Bin Rashid, with 250 followers, was killed in a fight with Bin Saoud. The news gradually filtered through, and on the 28th ultimo I cabled the news to your Excellency.

A few days later two messengers, bearing letters from Bin Saoud to his Highness the Grand Shereef and his Excellency the Vali arrived here. I have not been able to see them personally, but the following appears to be the contents of the letters which is also corroborated by the news given out by these messengers to some respectable people of this town and Mecca.

Towards the end of April, Abdul Aziz Bin Rashid moved from his country in a marauding mood, and went to plunder a caravan, consisting of men of Bin Saoud's tribe, which was coming to Nejd from Bagdad with quantities of merchandize and supplies for the Turkish troops. He succeeded in waylaying the caravan and plundering it in a place not far from the camp of Bin Saoud.

It appears that Bin Rashid, being in the country of Bin Saoud, was unaware of his whereabouts at the time, and did not think that Bin Saoud might be so close to the place of his depredations. Bin Rashid had a small following with him which was sufficient to plunder a caravan, but in no way capable to give battle to Bin Saoud.

The Sheikh of the plundered caravan, who knew that Bin Saoud was close by, repaired at once to give him the news, and craved his help to recover the raided property, leaving behind him orders with his men to keep Bin Saoud fully informed of the movements of Bin Rashid.

On receiving the news Bin Saoud lost no time in marching swiftly to attack Bin Rashid with a strong body of men, and overtook him next night while Bin Rashid and his men, loaded with their booty, were encamped in a small valley in a false but perfect sense of security against any attack from an enemy.

A sudden charge of Bin Saoud created unmanageable confusion and panic in the sleeping camp of Bin Rashid, and most of his followers were in flight. But Bin Rashid, with whatever men stood by him, faced the attack, and in the regular Arab style declared his presence and recited "rajaz" (verses of war).

Bin Rashid's presence having been found out, a concentrated deadly fire was poured at him, and everything was over in a few minutes.

Bin Rashid was found among the dead, and his head was cut off, and for six days paraded on a pole among the neighbouring tribes.

It is reported that Bin Rashid's own son and one cousin were also killed, but the news is not confirmed.

After this success Bin Saoud has declared himself the ruler of whole "Shark," and has sent letters to Constantinople, to the Valis of Bussorah, Bagdad, Hedjaz, and his Highness the Grand Shereef.

The messengers were well received here both by the Vali and the Grand Shereef, and were rewarded with Khilats in the usual way.

The messengers have left for Yambo, and it is rumoured that they have orders to proceed to Egypt, and have a letter addressed to the Khedive.

I have, &c.

(Signed) MOHAMMED HUSSEIN.

P.S.—It is hardly believed here that 250 men were killed with Bin Rashid, as the fighting did not last more than a few minutes.

M. H.

[20671]

No. 49.

Sir N. O'Connor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 18.)

(No. 401. Confidential.)

Sir,

Constantinople, June 12, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith two Reports on the Hedjaz Railway.

The first is a Confidential Report furnished me by Mr. Th. Loiso, British Vice-Consul at Mersina, from information supplied to him by his son, Mr. M. Loiso, who has been employed as engineer on the construction of the line.

This Report, to which a map and a list of all the stations between Damascus and Mudevere are annexed, has been carefully revised by Mr. Lloyd, Honorary Attaché to His Majesty's Embassy, and compared with the information concerning the railway already in the possession of His Majesty's Embassy.

The second Report is the work of a German engineer, Herr Otto von Kapp Kohlstein, who was deputed by the High Commissioner of the Hedjaz Railway to inspect the Haifa-Damascus branch and the complete section of the line from Damascus to Maan, as well as the extension from the latter place, now in course of construction as far as the 533rd kilom. south.

This Report was published in English in the weekly edition of the "Levant Herald."

I have, &c.

(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure 1 in No. 49.

Report by Vice-Consul Loiso.

THE accomplishment of a line of rail that should lead to Mecca has for a long time been the dream of every Moslem, and with this object steps were taken by his Excellency Izzet Pasha, Secretary and Adviser to His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, to devise and initiate a scheme which should link up by rail Damascus with the holy places.

The decision to build the line was taken in 1900, and a High Commission was formed in Constantinople, with subordinate Commissions at Damascus, for the



administration of the work, and in the same year the survey of the Damascus-Mezerib-Deraa section was begun by Turkish engineers. It was soon, however, evident that progress was being much retarded by the ignorance and lack of organization of the Turkish engineers, whereupon the Government, in spite of their original ambition that the railway should be entirely constructed by Ottoman subjects, proceeded to engage European engineers, and to appoint Herr Meissner, a German engineer of considerable repute, as Chief Engineer and Director of Construction.

On his appointment Herr Meissner took immediate steps with the High Commission to ensure the regular payment of good salaries to all the officials working under him, to be guaranteed by the Ottoman Bank; formed survey gangs composed of a mixed personnel of Turkish and European engineers, and naming the railway the "Chemin de Fer Hamidieh du Hedjaz," attempted, by actively pushing on the work and by various other methods, to arouse the interest and induce the largesse of rich Moslems in Syria and all over the Empire.

The commencement of the line from Damascus had been originally thought of and discussed; but owing to various political difficulties, as well as to the hope that the French line from Damascus to Mezereib could be bought up by the Hedjaz Railway Company, the idea was abandoned, and Herr Meissner centred his energies on the construction of the Mezereib-Deraa section, making use, for the transport of materials, rolling stock, &c., of the French Damascus-Mezerib line.

The Company were at this time in urgent need of funds, and for the sake of economy, profited by the example of the Russians in their construction of the Siberian Railway in recruiting their labour from the army; and camps of soldiers commanded by young officers were drafted in 1901 to positions between Mezereib and Deraa to undertake both the work of the "terrassement" and the laying of the line.

For the first few months the soldiers worked well, but owing to lack of pay and other grievances, the work was seriously interrupted for some time, and a mutiny or strike was only prevented by the prompt action of his Excellency Kiazim Pasha, who obtained redress for the troops.

In the beginning of 1902 Herr Meissner, who had been pointing out to the Commission the necessity of letting out to contract some portion of the work of the new sections, received instructions to call for tenders, and owing to the prospect of getting good prices, a considerable number of tenders from large railway contractors in Europe were received.

The Administration de Chemins de Fer Belges also had an idea of taking up 300 or 400 kilom. of construction, and with that object sent out their engineers to inspect in May 1902, but being unable to come to a satisfactory working arrangement with the Commission, the idea was dropped.

During the early part of 1902 the railway made rapid progress. Herr Meissner's energy and administrative capacity were felt in every direction, and the soldiers, getting practised at laying the lines, were completing daily from 2 to 3 kilom. of line. At this time, too, further skilled labour was plentiful, as the men employed on the Rayak-Hama construction had just finished that section, and were drafted down to hurry on the Hedjaz Railway construction. Unfortunately, in the late spring, soon after the return of the Haj, cholera broke out amongst the soldiers and amongst the men employed in the works at Amman, the centre of the construction, which consequently had to be closed for seven months.

During this time the Commission had come to an understanding with the French Company by the payment of an indemnity or compensation, and during 1903 the 228 kilom. of railway that separate Damascus and Amman were being put into exploitation, and though the train service was most irregular, yet it managed to be of considerable assistance in the transport of railway materials, &c., as far as Deraa. The line was now, however, getting too far south to be able to bear the heavy expense of freight for materials on the Beyrout-Damascus line, as well as that on from Damascus to Amman, and the idea of constructing a branch line from Deraa to Haiffa was being seriously considered.

The Haiffa-Damascus Railway had been already surveyed and begun by an English Company, but as such it was of no use to the Hedjaz Commission, who, being embarrassed by the excessive rates charged by the French on their line from Beyrout, were determined to obtain an independent outlet to the sea for their traffic.

The Concession bought from Mr. Arnold Hills, of the Syrian Ottoman Railway Company, for about 150,000L., by the Ottoman Government, was then handed over to the Hedjaz Commission, and the railway that is now being constructed (and is virtually completed) from Haiffa joins the main Hedjaz line at Deraa. The line from Haiffa to

Deraa gave serious difficulties in construction, passing through mountainous country and through the Valley of Yarmouk. The first half of the line from Haiffa was intrusted to Turkish engineers under Moukhtar Bey, but the latter and more difficult piece from Lake Tiberias to Deraa was split up into three sections and let out to contract. During fifteen months 1,200,000 cubic metres of earth-works and 70,000 cubic metres of masonry were satisfactorily completed on these three sections, and in October 1905 the line was ready for exploitation, awaiting only the steel bridges for the Yarmouk, over the delivery of which there had been some delay.

Meanwhile the construction of the main line was going steadily ahead, in spite of the many difficulties that were met with through lack of water, heat, and the sometimes hostile attitude of Bedawi tribes; and in 1904 the line reached Maan, which had been marked down as the point from which the branch line to the Gulf of Akaba should start. During 1905 the station buildings, &c., for the junction were built there, and a party of surveyors sent back to survey the construction of a small branch line between Es Salt and some spot on the main line between Zerka and Amman intended to facilitate the exploitation of the phosphate mines at Es Salt, but soon after the survey had begun the engineers were recalled and the construction of that branch indefinitely postponed. Pushing on southwards from Maan the line was completed as far as the Valley of Batnughoul by November of last year, and in January of this year reached Mudere making a total of 572 kilom. of line constructed from Damascus.

#### Plan.

Roughly speaking, the line of the Hedjaz Railway runs nearly parallel to the coast-line of Syria and Arabia.

From Damascus to Maan the line runs at an angle of about 20 degrees with the parallel to the Syrian coast, from Maan to Medina parallel to the coast, whilst from Medina to Mecca the "tracé" shows a considerable curve to the south-west, approaching the Red Sea between Messtura and Kachima, whence it takes a south-easterly direction to Mecca. The average distance between the stations is: between Damascus and Deraa, 14 kilom., and between Deraa and Mudere, 24 kilom. On this latter part of the line the scarcity of water has been, and still is, a serious question.

The inclosed plan, with a list of the stations, should give a clear idea of the line already in exploitation, as also of that in construction and survey and the branch lines.

#### Branch Lines.

The most important branch is the Haiffa-Deraa branch.

Starting from Haiffa, the line passes over the Jordan near Gisir-el-Medjami; from there it enters the valley of the Yarmouk, where eight tunnels have been constructed, and the rest of the route as far as the main line is marked by sharp turns and steep gradients. Other branch lines projected are the line to Es Salt and the line from Amman to Jerusalem; but there does not appear to be any probability that these will be put in construction, at any rate for the present.

The line from Maan to Akaba presents such difficulties that it is unlikely that it will ever be undertaken, and if a branch line is built to Akaba, as appears probable, it seems likely that it will be from a point further south of Maan, probably from Mudere.

The Jeddah-Mecca line has been surveyed, and presents no engineering difficulties.

#### Construction.

Gauge: 1 metre.

Rails: Vignola's system; 8 metres long, 25 kilog. weight.

Sleepers: wood and steel.

Tunnels: one only between Zerka and Kassir.

Curves: Minimum radius, 100 metres.

Gradients: Maximum, 20 in 100.

Average cost of construction per kilom., including cost of rolling stock, 50,000 fr.

Average cost of construction per kilom., including cost of rolling stock, on the

Haiffa branch, 100,000 fr.



Inclosure 2 in No. 49.

### Sketch Map and List of Stations

Inclosure 3 in No. 49.

*Report on the Hedjaz Railway, by Herr von Kapp Kohlstein.*

By request of his Excellency Kiazim Pasha, Director-General of the Railway, and Herr Meissner, Chief Engineer, and by order of the High Commission of the Hedjaz Railway, and with the permission of his Excellency the Vali of Beyrout, I have inspected the Haiffa Railway and the complete section (Damascus—Maan) of the Hedjaz Railway, as well as the extension now in course of construction to the 75th kilom. south of Maan—altogether 533 kilom. (The extension lately reached Mudvere, and 733 kilom. are now open to traffic, including the Haiffa section.)

Since 1901, when the Imperial Iradé was issued for the survey of the first part of the Hedjaz Railway, the tracing of the line, the drawing up of the estimates and the detailed reports to be presented to the High Commission, I have directed my efforts to the execution of the Imperial Order. As Director of Railway Constructions in the Ottoman Empire, I have built 1,500 kilom. of railway since 1889, and having through my former experience thoroughly grasped the situation, I have arrived at an opinion highly favourable to the enterprise. Trusting that my observations regarding so important an undertaking as the Hedjaz Railway would be found useful, I thought it well to draw up the following Report and present it to the High Commission. Before so doing, a few remarks relative to the organization may not be out of place:—

In conformity with the Imperial will, the intelligent measures taken by the High Commission at Constantinople, combining with the constant zeal of the Damascus Commission, and the extraordinary activity displayed by his Excellency Kiazim Pasha, Director-General of the Hedjaz Railway, and Herr Meissner, the work has followed a regular course. The zeal shown by the local Commission and the loyal efforts of his Excellency Nazim Pasha, the Vali, who is the President of the local Commission, deserve the highest praise. Moreover, the devoted efforts of the civil engineers and of the officers in command of the Imperial troops employed on the line afford a striking example of the administrative powers of his Excellency Kiazim Pasha.

I need not dwell upon the merits of Herr Meissner, Chief Engineer of the Hedjaz Railway. Throughout his technical career he has worked under my orders, and always gave the greatest satisfaction. His work on the Hedjaz Railway bears ample testimony to his abilities. Herr Meissner has been working incessantly for five years and is in need of a little rest, and I hope that the Railway Commission will take my suggestion into consideration and give him several months' leave next spring, in order that he might recruit his health.

Herr Schroder, who has also been under my orders for twelve years, and who has ably assisted Herr Meissner, is well qualified to replace him during his absence. With the exception of Demme, K. J. Schuler, and


With the exception of Damascus, Kademi Sherif, Deraa, and Maan, the stations are not yet provided with warehouses, &c. Only stone lodgings for the workmen have been built, and these cover an area of from 6 metres to 16 metres, as on the German military railways.



## LIST OF THE STATIONS.

Names of the Stations.	Kilometric Distances from Damascus.	Levels above the Sea.
* Damascus	0	+ 696
* Kisswé	20	
* Derali	35	
* Mesmié	50	
Habab	64	
Ziabab	78	
Mahatzé	92	
Izra	104	
Kirbet-Yazal	114	
* Deraa	127	+ 520
Nassib	141	
Mafrac	166	
Hurbety-Samra	189	
* Zerka	208	
* Amman	228	
Kassir	239	
Luban	256	
* Zizia	269	
Dabah	286	
Hanesbib	301	
* Katrani	330	+ 783
Vady-Saïd	350	
* El-Hassa	386	
Zarouf	419	
Annezé	464	
* Maan	458	+ 1000
Accaba	518	+ 1050
Bahr-ul-ghoul	534	
Mudeveré	572	+ 734

The Stations bearing the \* are the Stations where there is water.





One of these buildings is intended for the use of the station-master. This type of building suffices for the needs of the line beyond Oman.

There are twenty-seven stations over a length of 458 kilom. Those between Damascus and Deraa are separated by distances ranging from 7 kilom. to 21 kilom., and those between Deraa and Maan from 11 kilom. to 36 kilom.

Springs exist at the following stations: Damascus, the head of the line; Deraa, at kilom. 127; Zerka, at kilom. 203; Oman, at kilom. 222; El Hassa, at kilom. 378; Maan, at kilom. 458; and Mudevere, at kilom. 572.

At present tank cars are used for the supply of water to the locomotives.

As already stated in my Report of 1901, the scarcity of water can be remedied by sinking a well at every 50 kilom. or 60 kilom. or by building covered cisterns. The delay in providing for the supply of water is due to everybody's efforts being devoted to the advancement of the building operations, to the exclusion of other requirements. Thanks, however, to His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, this state of things will soon be remedied.

If the pools, which have existed for centuries, and which serve the nomads for watering their camels, are not covered in, they can only be of little use to the railway. As, however, these pools are shallow and very wide, and the cost of covering them would be enormous, it would be more advantageous to build new cisterns at every 6 kilom. to 7 kilom. The pools at Katran have a capacity of 36,000 cubic metres, and those of Djeizé 70,000 cubic metres, but being open, the water evaporates very quickly and both remain dry for months.

On the 6th November, 1905, the line nearly reached kilom. 572, the estimates having been made as far as the 710th kilom.

The earthworks were completed to kilom. 590 by the 1st January, 1906, and it is to be expected that they will reach Tebouk, at kilom. 690, by September 1906. (Herr Kapp believes that Tebouk will be reached, but it is to be hoped that by then the line will come near Mudaini Salih.)

#### *The Haiffa Section.*

The idea of pushing the Hadjaz Railway as far as the sea, and of finding for it an outlet, led to the repurchase of the Concession which had been previously granted.

Believing that the railway would be extended from Museirib to Mufarek via Eremta, Erbaïd, and Ramit, I showed in my Report for 1901 how to join it at Haiffa by way of Eremta, Erbaïd, and Wady-Arab.

In this way 165 kilom. would have been saved, i.e.,  $123 + 14 + 8$ , from Museirib to Mufarek, and 20 from Eremta to Beissan; moreover, Wady-Arab would thus have no more of a gradient than 25 millim. But the Haiffa line having followed the valley of the Yarmouk, and crossed two rivers with a gradient of 20 millim., and at times curving 125 and 100 metres, the above-named scheme has no more practical importance. To cross the valley of the Yarmouk two iron bridges were built, each of 50 metres, as well as several stone bridges, of four girders of a length of  $80 + 50 + 30$  metres, and arches of 12 metres.

Large sums of money were spent in the stone foundations of these bridges, and it was necessary to buy two locomotives for the pumping operations. Eight tunnels of a length of 1,100 metres were built. Save for the last iron bridge, which will be mounted in the course of January, all the masonry and ironwork has been completed in the course of eighteen months.

Between the 1st September, 1904, and 1st September, 1905, 65,000 cubic metres of stone work was built on the Haiffa section; on the Maan section, 30,000 cubic metres of stone work and 300,000 cubic metres of embankment were built.

This suffices to show with what activity the work is being pushed on. In view of the nature and importance of the work, the Haiffa line was given over to contractors, who were fully paid up on the fulfilment of their engagements.

The first part of the railway crosses the Plateau of Esdraelon, and is 60 kilom. long; the second crosses the valley of the Wady-ul-Sheria, as far as Lake Tiberius, and is 30 kilom. in length; the third follows the valley of the Yarmouk for 60 kilom. with a gradient, and the fourth goes through the Sanjak of the Hauran.

Although there is a pier at Haiffa for the accommodation of small craft, it is proposed to build a convenient quay of 690 metres, with a breakwater of 500 metres, at an estimated cost of 4,000,000 to 5,000,000 fr.



## Jeddah-Mecca Section.

To build junctions between Deraa and Haiffa, or Maan and Akaba, so as to connect the trunk line with the sea, enormous sums would be necessary, whereas there are no such difficulties in the way of connecting Mecca with its port in the Red Sea.

According to Ahmed Moukhtar Bey, the engineer, such a line could be built with a gradient of 20 millim. and curves of 300 metres; its length would be 75 kilom.

For every kilometre of this line there would be 5,000 cubic metres of embankment, 100 cubic metres of masonry to build, and 1,000 cubic metres of ballast to carry. The embankments and ballasting could be done by two battalions of 500 men each within eight months; including the masonry, the line would cost 15,000 fr. per kilom., or in all 1,125,000 fr.; in addition to this, there are the following outlays:—

	Cost.
	Fr.
Cost of the line .. .. .	1,125,000
General expenses for one year .. .. .	200,000
Two stone bridges and three reservoirs .. .. .	200,000
Initial outlay for the port of Djedda .. .. .	125,000
Railway material—	
Ballast, at 20,000 fr. per kilom. .. .. .	1,500,000
Four locomotives of 30 tons .. .. .	160,000
Fifty waggons of 15 tons, at 4,000 fr. .. .. .	200,000
Fifteen waggons, at 16,000 fr. .. .. .	240,000
Total .. .. .	3,750,000

According to these estimates, the cost per kilometre would be 50,000 fr., and from careful calculations I have estimated that the passenger and goods traffic would eventually bring about 8 per cent. profit.

As I have said before, work on the main line would have reached kilom. 590 by the 1st January, 1906. As Damascus is 950 kilom. from Mudaini Salih, 1,400 kilom. from Medina, and 1,800 kilom. from Mecca, this will serve as a basis for the following notes:—

The works having started on January 1901, the date of Herr Meissner's arrival at Damascus, and having reached kilom. 590 of the trunk line and kilom. 160 of the Haiffa section—750 kilom. in all—by the 1st January, 1906, the yearly average works out at 150 kilom. Compared with other railway works, this result is satisfactory.

In order to form an idea of the work done, I append a list of railways I have built in the Ottoman Empire over a length of 1,800 kilom.:—

Name.	Length.	Period of Construction.	Annual Average.
	Kilom.	Years.	Kilom.
Ismidt-Angora .. .. .	486	4	121
Salonica-Monastir .. .. .	220	3	73
Salonica-Dedaghat .. .. .	510	3	170
Alashehr-Afin-Kara-Hissar .. .. .	252	2½	100
Rayak-Aleppo .. .. .	332	2½	133
Total .. .. .	1,800	15	120

The construction of the first four lines on the above list was commenced in January 1899, and finished in twelve years, or an annual average of 144 kilom. This shows that the building of 150 kilom. yearly on the Hedjaz Railway is sufficient, and that the idea of building 200 kilom. in a year is contrary to the results hitherto obtained. According to the report of Moukhtar Bey, the Hedjaz line will meet no great obstacles; but as the line gets further away from Damascus and Haiffa, the

works of construction will become more difficult, and the water supply will become a question of great importance. Wells will have to be sunk or springs found, as was the case north of Maan.

From the above it may be inferred that the work yet to be done, beginning with January 1906, can be mapped out as follows:—

Names of Section.	Length in Kilometres.	Period of Construction.	Date of Completion.
		Years.	
To Mudaini-Salih .. .. .	360	2	January 1, 1907.
.. Medina .. .. .	800	5	.. 1, 1910.
.. Mecca .. .. .	1,200	8	.. 1, 1913.

It is very difficult to calculate the average expenditure per kilometre for the Damascus-Maan and Haiffa-Deraa lines, for part of the Haiffa section was over most uneven ground, and necessitated supplementary outlay, and the average based on the total expenditure can never be quite correct.

## Rolling Stock.

The rolling-stock at present owned by the Hedjaz Railway is the following:—

**Locomotives.**—Eleven Kraus locomotives with three axles, each of 30 tons and having a capacity of 3½ cubic metres; nine locomotives with four axles, each of 40 tons, and having a capacity of 12½ cubic metres. Four "B" Hohenzollern locomotives.

**Waggons.**—There are a number of double-axle waggons on their way out, each of 7½ tons weight and able to carry 15 tons; fifteen third-class passenger-cars; one first-class passenger-car and a waggon mosque, built at the Admiralty workshops.

The Commission has, moreover, ordered six locomotives for passenger traffic, with a speed of 45 kilom., and thirteen Kraus locomotives for goods traffic. Thus the Hedjaz Railway owns forty-three locomotives, of which thirty-nine are of modern system, and 460 waggons, including 135 which were recently ordered.

From statistics it is found that the line has so far cost 50,000 fr. per kilom., but this amount does not include the expense incurred for the troops employed on the line.

(The Railway Commission has paid half the cost of the rations, and has occasionally paid for the cost of clothing for the troops. In addition to this, the soldiers and officers were paid 45 paras per cubic metre, and also received a gratuity for each kilom. built. All these expenses have been placed to the Construction Account.)

These accounts may serve as a basis for calculating the cost of building for the remainder of the railway.

At the beginning of 1906 there will remain 1,100 kilom. to be built before Mecca is reached, and this will cost 60,000,000 fr., at the rate of 50,000 fr. per kilom. It will be necessary to build 150 kilom. annually, and the sum of 7,500,000 fr. will be annually required for eight years to come. During the first five years the subscriptions for the line amounted to 17,500,000 fr., that is 3,500,000 fr. per annum. Further, the sale of the skins of sheep sacrificed at Bairam, and the Hedjaz Railway stamp produced 16,000,000 fr. in four years, or 4,000,000 fr. per annum.

The annual income of the railway has been 7,500,000 fr., which amount, as stated above, represents the cost of the building of the line for one year.

Some of the waggons mentioned above are partly covered in, and others are open trucks. As most of the transit for the first eight years will consist chiefly of railway material and grain, it will be necessary to buy several waggons of a capacity of 30 tons. As a matter of fact, if each axle has to support a weight of 60 tons, the net weight of a waggon will be 9,000 kilog., and it can naturally stand a weight of 30 tons. The cost of these waggons is not high in comparison with the others, and the expenses for repairs equal those of waggons of 15 tons capacity.

It is true that the first lot of waggons ordered were not provided with the same system for coupling as those on the Beyrout-Damascus-Hauran line, but this defect was taken into consideration when the new waggons were ordered, and, moreover, those on the line are being daily replaced.



### Damascus.

Having heard that there was a divergence of views as to whether the head offices, factory, and repairing sheds should be built at Damascus, Deraa, or Haiffa, I thought it advisable to take this opportunity for giving my opinion on the subject. In view of the fact that the manager of the line must be continually in touch with the officials of the Vilayet, the Administration of the Beyrout-Damascus Railway, and the Damascus merchants, I propose that the offices be established at Damascus, as also the repairing sheds. (The Hedjaz Railway Board are of the same opinion, and the work of construction has started from this base, but the head offices are temporarily established at Haiffa.) For the factory and repairing sheds a covered area of 8,000 square metres will be required, and they will entail an expenditure of about 1,000,000 fr., including the cost of machinery. The climate at Haiffa is not good, and at Deraa there is no possibility of getting the provisions and clothing necessary for the workmen.

Small repairing sheds, similar to those existing at Maan, Haiffa, and Deraa, should be established at Mudaini-Salih, at kilom. 950; Medina, kilom. 1,400; and Mecca, kilom. 1,800.

### Concluding Observations.

To sum up, the Hedjaz Railway has been well built, and the work has progressed at the rate of 150 kilom. a-year, which may be said to be a satisfactory result.

The High Commission, having guaranteed the necessary sums for purchases and the building operations, and measures having been taken for the works to advance at the rate of 150 kilom. a-year, the Hedjaz Railway, which is one of the greatest works of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, will be completed in eight years.

The Board of Management and of Works have succeeded in obtaining the best results.

The work done by the Imperial troops has been highly satisfactory and beyond all criticism. But for their services it would have been impossible to have made such rapid progress. The completion of this great line will successfully crown one of the many works of His Imperial Majesty, our August Sovereign.

Moukhtar Bey, who worked with me for six years, and who lately surveyed the line as far as Mecca, has not only shown technical ability of high order, but has now proved himself to be an efficient inspector. Several other engineers also accompanied me, and I can affirm that amongst the graduates of the Civil School of Engineers there are a number of young men who are well qualified for posts of assistant engineers, and even sectional chiefs. By acquiring practical knowledge they will become first-rate engineers. The employment of troops on the line has greatly contributed towards the progress of the works. The contractors would have found workmen as far as Oman and Maan, but not beyond these places.

As a matter of fact, it is thanks to the soldiers that the work on the line has so rapidly advanced, and, taking into consideration the fact that the salaries, clothing, and rations were paid by the Seraskierate, the expenditure is following a normal course.

Generally speaking, the railway is worthy of all praise. The building operations have been carried out satisfactorily, and all the material used is of good quality.

As the line crosses level country, bridges and tunnels are comparatively few. Beyond Oman, however, on the Ain-Zorka incline, a gradient of 20 millim. had to be adopted, curves of 100 metres built, a superficies of 3 kilom. filled in, bridges erected 20 metres high, with ten arches each of 12 metres span, in order to obtain a level over valleys 340, 951, and 610 metres broad. The work on this section of the line has entailed triple expense, as well as thrice the time of construction compared with the other sections. On the other side of Maan, too, there is a slope of 150 metres, called the Batn-Ghoul, and this required a gradient of 18 millim., curves of 100 metres, and the levelling of an area of 8 kilom. The earthworks were executed by 400 soldiers, who also dug a cutting of 80,000 cubic metres within five months, which is likewise a brilliant achievement.

Progress of the work depends on supplying food and water to the soldiers, engineers, masons, and the workmen employed on the works of levelling and construction. As it is difficult to transport these supplies by camel, the railway has to be used. A train service has been organized for this purpose at Maan.

The line crosses several valleys which have had to be spanned by bridges ranging from 3 to 60 metres in length; but as there is a bed-rock at a slight depth serving for foundations, and there is little fear of floods to undermine them, the bridges could be built without inconvenience with an opening of 4·3 and 6·5 metres.

[20381]

No. 50.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir N. O'Connor.*

(No. 250.)

*Foreign Office, June 21, 1906.*

Sir,

THE Turkish Ambassador stated on the 14th instant that the Military Commandant of Medjid had furnished a report with regard to certain proceedings of the British Agent at Bahrein to the following effect:—

One of the vessels engaged in the coasting trade of Bahrein, having been overtaken by a storm off the coast of Tars, had thrown all her cargo, consisting of cereals, overboard. This cargo was salvaged by the natives of Bender Bain, and the crew of the vessel had handed over to them of their own free will, as a reward for their zealous assistance, 500 okes of cereals, as was testified by declarations duly signed by the crew.

Although all this had taken place in the most regular manner, the British Agent at Bahrein had arrived at Bender Bain by boat a fortnight later, and had forcibly taken off Issa-bin-Mechayi, the Sheikh of that village, who had not been heard of since.

The British Agent frequently visited the villages on the coast of Kator for one reason or another, and his threats disquieted the natives.

All these proceedings had a disturbing effect on the minds of the people, and were likely to produce difficulties.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) EDWARD GREY.

[19549]

No. 51.

*Sir Edward Grey to the Earl of Cromer.\**

(No. 158.)

*Foreign Office, June 21, 1906.*

My Lord,

I TRANSMIT to you herewith copy of a Memorandum communicated by the Italian Chargé d'Affaires,† respecting the safety of shipping in the Red Sea.

Your Lordship will observe that the Italian Government contemplate the possibility of each Power interested in the security of navigation in the Red Sea undertaking the supervision of that portion of the Arabian coast which is opposite to its African possession.

Such a system of supervision would appear on the face of it undesirable, but I should be glad to be favoured with your observations on the subject.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) EDWARD GREY.

[21274]

No. 52.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 22.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of paraphrase of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 13th instant, on the subject of a flag for Koweit.

*India Office, June 21, 1906.*

\* Also to Sir N. O'Connor (No. 249), *mutatis mutandis*

† No. 42.



Inclosure in No. 52.

*Mr. Morley to Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

FLAG for Koweit.

Your telegram dated the 18th May.

Instructions to advise Sheikh to bring new flag into use may be sent to Political Agent.

*India Office, June 13, 1906.*

[21211]

No. 53.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 22.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of paraphrase of telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 17th June, *re* policy in the Aden Hinterland.

*India Office, June 21, 1906.*

Inclosure in No. 53.

*Government of India to Mr. Morley.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

POLICY in the Aden Hinterland.

*June 17, 1906.*

As we understood that opinions expressed in your despatch of the 4th ultimo, which we have had under consideration, did not amount to absolute orders, we thought it better that Resident, Aden, and Government of Bombay should be given an opportunity of explaining if immediate carrying out of new policy would give rise to any serious difficulty or danger. Impression that your wishes have perhaps been wrongly interpreted is raised by your telegram of the 13th instant respecting Treaty of Beda, which we have now received.

On general question we trust that, before new policy is enforced, we may be permitted, on receipt of opinion from Resident and Government of Bombay, to make certain representations on the subject. We are repeating your telegram of the 13th instant to the Resident for his guidance, and your despatch has doubtless also been communicated to him.

[21213]

No. 54.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 22.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, a paraphrase of telegram to Viceroy (Foreign Department) dated the 19th June, *re* Aden.

*India Office, June 21, 1906.*

Inclosure in No. 54.

*Mr. Morley to Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

AFFAIRS in the Aden Hinterland.

*India Office, June 19, 1906.*

Definite purposes and intentions of His Majesty's Government, not merely general views, were laid down in my despatch of the 4th ultimo. Except in the matter of the prompt withdrawal of troops from Dthali, points of detail as to how effect should be

given to policy were left to the consideration of your Excellency's Government by the despatch.

I shall be glad to learn your views, after consultation with the Resident and the Government of Bombay, on these details and on any questions which concern Aden administration. No action that does not strictly conform with despatch should be taken in the meanwhile. Indeed, in the expectation that your Excellency's Government would apply principles which my despatch laid down to following subjects which I have noticed in the papers forwarded with Secretary's letters of the 12th and 19th April and the 10th and 17th May, I have refrained from commenting upon them. These subjects are encroachments in the Mafalis district, the question of establishing direct communication with Turkish local officials, quarrels between the Humedi and Juledi, continuance of the Dthali civil hospital, and indents for flags for the Political Agent at Dthali.

If my despatch has not already been forwarded to the Resident, please make sure that there is no further delay in doing so.

Your telegram of to-day regarding Beda has just been received. If instructions in my telegram of the 13th June are not understood by Resident, he should telegraph.

[21276]

No. 55.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 22.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a paraphrase of a telegram to the Viceroy, Foreign Department, dated the 13th instant, regarding affairs in Aden Hinterland.

*India Office, June 21, 1906.*

Inclosure in No. 55.

*Mr. Morley to Government of India.*

*June 13, 1906.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

AFFAIRS in Aden Hinterland.

Please see letter from Government of Bombay to Government of India, dated the 20th February, regarding Beda Treaty, which was forwarded with Secretary's weekly letter of the 17th May. Resident will no doubt have received instructions in pursuance of policy laid down in my despatch of the 4th May, to adopt attitude towards Sheikhs, which, unless they insist on it in fulfilment of pledges already given, will render conclusion of Treaty unnecessary. I should be glad to receive report as to whether Sheikhs have made any further communications to Resident.

[21212]

No. 56.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 22.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 19th instant, *re* the Beda Treaty.

*India Office, June 21, 1906.*



Inclosure in No. 56.

*Government of India to Mr. Morley.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

June 19, 1906.

ADEN. We are repeating to Bombay and Aden your telegram, dated the 13th instant, regarding Bada Treaty. Secretary's weekly letter of 17th ultimo forwarded the latest communications on the subject. As regards general subject of policy laid down in your despatch of the 4th ultimo, we are telegraphing to you separately.

[21388]

No. 57.

*Sir N. O'Connor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 25.)*

(No. 413. Secret and Confidential.)

Sir,

*Therapia, June 18, 1906.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 400 of the 11th instant, I have the honour to report that I learn through a secret and confidential source that an Imperial Iradé has been issued to the effect that the pay and allowances granted by the Imperial Government to the late Ibn Reschid are to continue to be paid regularly and in full to his son Mitaab-er-Reschid.

This decision is worth reporting, in so far as it shows that the Imperial Government intends to back Ibn Reschid's son as against his rival Ibn Saood.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

[20052]

No. 58.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, June 27, 1906.*

I HAVE laid before Secretary Sir E. Grey your letters of the 28th ultimo and the 11th instant relative to the Muscat Arbitration Award.

Sir E. Grey notes that the negotiations between the British and French Consuls at Muscat have resulted in an agreement as regards (1) the best method of notifying the Award to the subjects of the Sultan, but that they have been unable to agree as to (2) the list of such persons who are still authorized to fly the French flag.

I am directed by Sir E. Grey to state that he has carefully considered the French proposals for a settlement, as set forth in M. Laronce's letter of the 20th April, and that he is disposed to concur in principle with the criticisms advanced by Major Grey in regard to them. He considers, however, that it is manifestly to the advantage of His Majesty's Government to obtain an early settlement of this question, whereas the interest of the French Government cannot, with equal force, be said to lie in the same direction, and that it would be worth some sacrifices, if not of a vital nature, in order to secure this object. Moreover, it will be remembered that, as no French papers can in the future be issued to fresh dhow-owners, the death of the present flag-holders must automatically bring the whole question to an end within a limited space of time, and this fact renders it all the more desirable to dispose, by reasonable concessions, of what might well prove a source of present irritation and friction if the negotiations are unduly prolonged.

I am therefore to suggest, for Mr. Morley's consideration, that His Majesty's Government should accept the whole list of flag-holders submitted by the French Government, without raising any further question as to the validity of the titles they enjoy; and further, that, in spite of section 2 of the second portion of the Award, which debars the transmission of the French flag from one dhow to another, it should be permitted that the papers of one dhow, which has been lost, sold, destroyed, or otherwise disposed of, should be transferred to one other dhow belonging to the same owner. It should, however, be made clear that these concessions only apply in regard to vessels duly authorized to fly the French flag under the terms of the Award, and that the number of dhows thus authorized can in no case be increased. The views already expressed by His Majesty's Government on the point raised regarding jurisdiction on the high seas or in Muscat waters should be maintained. In accordance

with the suggestion made by Major Grey, the punishment attending any infraction of the new arrangement might be notified to the subjects of the Sultan, and the French flag-holders might be informed that they are at liberty to surrender their papers should they desire to do so.

I am to state that, in the event of the Secretary of State for India agreeing generally in the course suggested above, Sir E. Grey proposes to cause a Memorandum to be prepared for presentation to the French Ambassador, which will be previously submitted for Mr. Morley's concurrence. In the first instance, however, Sir E. Grey would be glad to be favoured with any observations or suggestions which Mr. Morley may desire to make on the subject.

I am to add that the French Ambassador has again called Sir E. Grey's attention to the question, and has requested an early expression of the views of His Majesty's Government.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) E. GORST.